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We continue the battle 
We continue it backwards 
 
Vasko Popa, Worriors of the Field of the Blackbird 
 
 
A whole volume could well be written on the myths of modern man, on the 
mythologies camouflaged in the plays that he enjoys, in the books that he reads. The 
cinema, that “dream factory” takes over and employs countless mythical motifs – the fight 
between hero and monster, initiatory combats and ordeals, paradigmatic figures and 
images (the maiden, the hero, the paradisiacal landscape, hell and do on). Even reading 
includes a mythological function, only because it replaces the recitation of myths in 
archaic societies and the oral literature that still lives in the rural communities of Europe, 
but particularly because, through reading, the modern man succeeds in obtaining an 
‘escape from time’ comparable to the ‘emergence from time’ effected by myths. Whether 
modern man ‘kills’ time with a detective story or enters such a foreign temporal universe 
as is represented by any novel, reading projects him out of the personal duration and 
incorporates him into other rhythms, make him live another ‘history’. 
 
Mercia Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis is a comparative work in which two historical events are defined and 
examined as political myths. The definition immediately raises problems as the habitual 
use of the term “myth” by historians implies falsehood. The author argues that the 
traditional dichotomy of mythos and logos is more problematic than is habitually 
understood. Rather, he argues that certain highly-resonant historical episodes are a 
disconcerting mixture of fact and fiction, and that their appeal to their target audience is 
predicated on an authority that overrides concerns about factual accuracy. Furthermore, as 
this is a study of civic religion and the politics of public commemoration, the thesis 
problematises both the status of the sacred in (supposedly) secularised societies and the 
role of the rational in politics. 
Two cases are presented. These are the Battle of Kosovo Polje of 1389 and the Munich 
Agreement of 1938. Noted is that both events have been extraordinarily influential; that 
they have a paradigmatic status and an authority that has often been used to confer 
political legitimacy. The comparative method uses several factors: durability, factual 
accuracy, ownership, flexibility, level of usage and media of transmission. 
The examination of the legacy of the Battle of Kosovo Polje study is longitudinal. It 
seeks to establish – to the small degree possible – what actually happened in 1389, and 
contrast this with the popular narrative. This popular narrative, most especially the vibrant 
tradition of Serbian epic poetry, is then explored at length through a well-known theory of 
myth analysis. Previous studies have not approached this oral tradition at length or in a 
systematic manner. The work then offers different examples of the agents and events 
inspired by the legacy of the battle, among them the most important events in the modern 
Balkans. It then attempts to systemise the different modalities through which the event has 
been instrumental.  
The examination of the Munich Agreement also offers an overview of the events of the 
1930s, and contrasts this with a highly simplistic narrative has been extracted from these 
events. This is in strong contrast to the Kosovo legacy; in that case there were few sources 
to indicate what happened; as regards the Munich Agreement and the policy of 
appeasement from which it grew, much is known, but the record is largely ignored at the 
expense of an inaccurate but seemingly deeply-compelling narrative. The political usage 
of Munich is then examined via several cases, typically conflict situations. Emphasis is 
placed on the statements and justifications of politicians in different periods and political 
cultures. Modes of argumentation are examined, and a singular pattern is detected. Finally 
the thesis compares the two cases, their differences and similarities, with the ambition of 
solidifying the concept of a political myth, highlighting the extraordinary influence of the 
usable past on the present.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research questions and cases  
The most significant collective memories – memories that suffuse group 
consciousness – derive their power from their claim to express some 
permanent, enduring truth. Such memories are as much about the present as 
they are about the past, and are believed to tell us (and others) something 
fundamental about who we are now; they express, even define, our identity. 
For a memory to take hold in this way, it has to resonate with how we 
understand ourselves; how we see present circumstances, how we think about 
the future. And the relationship is circular. We embrace a memory because it 
speaks to our condition; to the extent that we embrace it, we establish a 
framework for interpreting that condition.1  
One work, which was written on the 60th anniversary of the Munich Conference of 1938, 
carried the following observation in its preface: 
The Munich conference, or simply Munich, belongs to the category of 
phenomena into which many of us, rightly or wrongly, project meanings that 
surpass the confines of those historical events.2 
A list of such phenomena might include the Siege of Masada, (resurrected to central 
importance in modern Israel), the Spanish Reconquista (evoked by the right during the 
Spanish Civil War), or the Crusades (very interesting because they have had two opposing 
interpretations; the Western/Christian one and the Arabic/Islamic one). Such phenomena 
are indeed problematic for historians because they insist of breaking out of the confines of 
the past, which is the normal subject of historical enquiry. Like the collective memories as 
                                                 
1 Novick, Peter, The Holocaust and Collective Memory, Bloomsbury, London, 2001(1999), 170. 
2 Lukes, Igor, and Goldstein, Erik, (eds.), The Munich Crisis, 1938, Frank Cass, London, 1999, ix. 
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described by Novick, they are at once historical and a-historical (even anti-historical), 
collapsing the usual distance between past and present; they are indeed “as much about the 
present as they are about the past”. To clarify this, these phenomena are on one level 
historical because they are about the past, but on another level they are also a- or anti-
historical because they insist on a strong connection to the present and continuity with the 
past, and in that way, diluting and even negating its pastness. Their situationality – their 
temporal location – has become displaced.  
If, as Alex Callinicos writes, the qualitative differentiation of past from present is one of 
the three central beliefs of modern historiography3, then the “category of phenomena”, 
which constitute the subject of this thesis present a formal challenge to students of history. 
Such differentiation of present from past is a task for historians, it is far more difficult for 
non-historians, whether they are practitioners of politics at some level, or merely of that 
elusive entity, ordinary people. 
The research questions of this thesis examine the political use of the past.  
How does one define a historical event that transcends its actual situationality, that is, re-
emerges from the past and seems axiomatically relevant – often very urgently relevant – to 
new times and contexts? And furthermore, are the events themselves really pregnant with 
relevance, or is the claim being made on behalf of the events by interested parties? And if 
this is the case, is the claim valid? The research task of this project is to attempt to clarify 
and conceptualise the “category of phenomena” mentioned above. Two cases are 
examined in detail, they are introduced briefly here. Both are highly influential narratives, 
both are salient examples of the “usable past”. It is their political usage that makes them 
worthy of selection and study. Both have been positioned as paradigmatic, in that these are 
two foundational events back into which subsequent events have been translated, in 
Marx’s famous phrase.4   
                                                 
3 “Every society and period is a singularity, worthy of study for its own sake, and not as a source of 
models and warnings.” Callinicos, Alex, Theories and Narratives, Reflections of the Philosophy of History, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, 59. 
4 Marx, Karl, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Project Gutenberg, 2013 (1852), available 
at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1346/1346-h/1346-h.htm 
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When NATO bombed Serbia (then Yugoslavia) in 1999, one of the ways in which 
NATO’s leaders, especially US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, justified their 
actions was by evoking the failed policy of appeasement and the Munich Agreement of 
1938. On the other side of the conflict, Serbian nationalists justified their actions by 
claiming that Kosovo “belonged” to Serbia on the basis of the famous Battle of Kosovo 
Polje, which was fought there in 1389. Both past events seemed to offer large reservoirs of 
legitimacy to justify on-going actions. One might also note the strange coincidence that 
the Kosovo legacy (however inadvertently) did ignite the First World War, and the 
Munich Conference (notoriously) tried but failed to prevent the Second.  
Case 1: The Battle of Kosovo Polje, 1389 
This medieval battle is the foundational event of Serbian nationalism. Not only is the year 
1389 as well known to Serbs as 1066, 1492, 1776, 1848, or 1917, are to other peoples, but 
the date June 28th (June 15th old style) known as Vidovdan (St.Vitus’ day) is as famous a 
calendar date as July 17th, September 11th, or other comparable calendar dates recalling 
historical events. This thesis presents an overview of the event of that day in the 14th 
Century, and then traces at length the extraordinary influence it has had on subsequent 
events, discourses, and practices. The Kosovo legacy has had, in effect, two lifetimes, one 
covert the other overt. The former was during the centuries of Ottoman rule of Serbdom, 
when the legacy lived through a vivid folk culture. The latter overt lifetime was when 
Serbia emerged as an autonomous and later independent polity in the 19th Century. It was 
in this latter period that the legacy could be institutionalised as the most usable of the 
Serbian past by the apparatus of a modern state. Although very much a national narrative, 
the Kosovo legacy has also had a large impact on international politics, most especially in 
the 20th Century, when it inspired the Sarajevo assassination in 1914 and was a fiercely 
contested legacy in the breakup of Yugoslavia.  
Case 2: The Munich Agreement, 1938 
The second case is the Munich Agreement of 1938. The agreement, which was conducted 
between the leaders of Britain, Germany, Italy and France to solve the Sudeten Crisis, has 
long since become notorious, and the policy of which it was an outcome – appeasement – 
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is one of the most negative words in the political lexicon. Below there will be an overview 
of the events of the 1938, and then a number of examples of the political usage of the 
agreement. These include the Suez Crisis of 1956, various aspects of the Cold War, the 
Falkland’s War, and the recent wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq. As this broad field 
implies, Munich – in contrast to the Kosovo legacy – is not a national narrative, but one 
that had been instrumental in multiple political cultures and contexts. This difference 
aside, I propose to describe both narratives as “political myths” as a basis for proceeding. 
This term is defined in the section below.  
1.2 Myth, history, and political myth 
1.2.1 Myth  
Few words are as ill served by their habitual meaning than myth; in most common usages 
myth is equated with falsehood. This has caused much confusion, as myth is complex 
phenomenon and to equate it with falsehood does it little justice. Alas, many historians 
show little or no interest in engaging with myth in its complexity. If one encounters the 
term in the title of a historical text, it will be most likely along the lines of “The Myth of 
(insert subject)”. Typically this means that the falsehood of (the inserted subject) is going 
to be dismantled by the historian and the record will be set accordingly straight. This 
true/false, factual/fictional sense of myth, however popular, is less than useful. Authors 
such as Ivan Strenski5 and Bruce Lincoln have sought to demonstrate via their extensive 
reviews just how problematic myth can be, and how many (often highly compelling and 
convincing) definitions of myth exist. Lincoln has argued with his trademark erudition 
about the more troubled relationship of logos and mythos, and how one (quite arbitrarily) 
superseded the other in Western culture. As a form of discourse, mythos, Lincoln argues, 
enjoyed higher authority and truth claims than logos in classical Greece, and he continues 
that the tension between them is ongoing:  
                                                 
5 Strenski, Ivan, Four Theories of Myth in the Twentieth Century History, University of Iowa Press, 
Iowa City, 1987. 
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…our views of the lexemes “mythos” and “logos” must become more 
dynamic. There are not words with fixed meanings (indeed, no such words 
exist), nor did their meanings change glacially over time, as the result of 
impersonal forces. Rather these words, along with many others, were the sites 
of pointed and highly semantic skirmishes fought between rival regimes of 
truth.6 
One can only hope this late in the day that the habitual usage of myth by historians that 
(arbitrarily) equates it with falsehood will lose its prominence, but it is unlikely.  
1.2.2 Myth and history 
Indeed on the basis of many writers on the subject, it would seem not. That is not so 
surprising, given that myth itself has been defined so variously. To offer just one example; 
both Roland Barthes and Claude Lévi-Strauss have similar starting points, Sausserian 
linguistics and Marxism, but the myths they describe could hardly be more different; Lévi-
Strauss recounts the ethnographic myths of the Americas; Barthes in his Mythologies, 
writes engagingly about cultural surfaces that are worlds away from Lévi-Strauss’ 
subjects.  
Barthes’s contribution is formidable. He has argued creatively that myth is something that 
pervades culture, most especially speech, and he unerringly points out its one of its most 
salient aspects, its axiomatic value. Concerned as he put it, that nature and history are 
confused, he argues that “myth has the task of giving a historical intention a natural 
justification, of making contingency appear eternal.”7 What myth does to things is that it 
“gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity, which is not that of 
explanation but that of a statement of fact.”8 
In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the 
complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does 
                                                 
6 Lincoln, Bruce, Theorizing Myth, Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, University of Chicago Press, 
1999, 18. 
7 Barthes, Roland, Mythologies, (Translated by Annette Lavers) Paladin, St Albans, 1973 (1957), 142. 
8 Ibid., 143 (italics added). 
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away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately 
visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is 
without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a 
blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves.9 
If for Barthes, myth is a matter of clarity, for Bruce Lincoln – who quotes Barthes 
approvingly – it is more a matter of authority, and it is on the basis of this elusive concept 
that he seeks to redefine myth and its relationship to history. His approach is unorthodox 
but engaging, though not easy to summarise.  
Foundational to Lincoln’s argument is that society is constructed (and can be 
deconstructed) by either force or discourse; the latter can be subdivided into ideological 
persuasion and sentiment evocation. It is this second, which, in his view is most 
important: “Ultimately, that which either holds society together or takes it apart is 
sentiment, and the chief instrument with which such sentiment may be aroused, 
manipulated, and rendered dormant is discourse.”10 In his study Discourse and the 
Construction of Society, Lincoln compares three quite distinct narratives. By placing a 
Nuer myth, alongside and two acceptably “historical” narratives – the Battle of Montepari 
(1260) and the Stockholm Bloodbath (1520) – he argues for similarity of both structure 
and social outcome.  
Following from this, Lincoln argues against the usual privileged position history enjoys 
vis-a-vis myth, namely that it has: 1, a confirmable date frame; 2, written sources 3; and 
only human actors. He continues: “Yet a taxonomy that forces us to separate narratives so 
similar in form and structure…..surely serves us ill as an analytic tool.”11 This boldly 
comparative approach has provided an attractive model for the present thesis. 
Lincoln dismisses both fable and legend, which, he argues, have neither credibility nor 
authority. That is, they have a low truth claim and present themselves as purely fictive, 
and are accepted as such by their target audience. However, he distinguishes this sharply 
from myth, which he argues has both credibility and authority: 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Lincoln, Bruce, Discourse and the Construction of Society, Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual and 
Classification, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1989, 11. 
11 Ibid., 24. 
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Having offered such a definition of Myth, it is necessary, of course, to define 
authority, on which the definition of Myth hangs. In part I have in mind 
something similar to what Malinowski meant when he described myth as a 
form of social charter and what Clifford Geertz meant in his characterization 
of religion as being simultaneously a “model of” and a “model for” reality. 
That is to say a narrative possessed of authority is one for which successful 
claims are made not only to the status of truth, but what is more, to the status 
of paradigmatic truth. In this sense the authority of myth is somewhat akin to 
that of charters, models, templates and blueprints, but one can go beyond this 
formulation and recognize that it is also (and perhaps more important) akin to 
that of revolutionary slogans and ancestral invocations, in that through the 
recitation of myth one may effectively mobilize a social grouping.12  
Lincoln’s most arresting assertion here is that myth has an authority that history simply 
does not. In subsequent work Lincoln had expanded on the problematic topic of authority, 
a topic most familiar from Weber’s categorisation.13 In his Authority, Construction and 
Corrosion (1994) he freely admits how problematic the subject is: “something – an entity? 
a phenomenon? a status? I have come to see as extraordinarily complex, hopelessly 
elusive, and almost as badly misconstrued in most scholarly discussions as it is in popular 
parlance.”14 He arrives at the formula that authority is “best understood in relational terms 
as the effect of a posited, perceived, or institutionally ascribed asymmetry between 
speaker and audience that permits certain speakers to command not just the attention but 
the confidence, respect, and trust of their audience, or – an important proviso – to make 
audiences act as if this were so.”15  
Three aspects of authority are important here. One is the legitimising effect, to gain 
consent “to make audiences act as if this were so”. The second and related aspect is 
asymmetry; this is very important in the linking of present politics to past events; the 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 24-25 (italics added). 
13 See Weber, Max, Economy and society, an outline of interpretive sociology, edited by Guenther Roth 
and Claus Wittich, (Translated by Ephraim Fischoff) Vol 1, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968, 
215-17 
14 Lincoln, Bruce, Authority, Construction and Corrosion, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London, 1994, 1. 
15 Ibid., 4. 
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power-wielder or spokesman rarely translates back – to use Marx’s phrase from The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte – into a lesser narrative; the more foundational 
or established the source narrative, the larger the legitimacy that can be derived from it for 
the target narrative.  
The third point is important though problematic. Lincoln notes that authority resembles 
persuasion, but is not necessarily commensurate with it: 
One persuades by arguing a case, advancing reasoned propositions, 
impassioned appeals, and rhetorical flourishes that lead the hearer to a desired 
conclusion. In contrast, the exercise of authority need not involve 
argumentation and may rest on the naked assertions that the identity of the 
speaker warrants acceptance of the speech.16 
The problematic aspect here is that Lincoln is speaking about authority as embodied and 
transmitted via human agency, whereas I am thinking more about that which is being 
transmitted, that is, the selected past event being evoked, which has authority, prestige (to 
the degree that media and message can be separated, admittedly a problematic issue). 
Because this authority also “need not involve argumentation”, and may have emotional or 
moral elusiveness: it is not merely an intellectual exercise like finding the best-fitting 
historical precedent or analogy (which would be classic argumentation). The cases 
examined below would not stand on the basis or their analogical accuracy, although there 
had to be some minimal degree of isomorphism. Nonetheless they are often (though not 
always) very inaccurate as analogies, but still retain the authority that grants them their 
instrumental value in the present. This recalls Barthes definition of myth’s clarity being 
not that of explanation but that of a statement of fact. 
Lincoln’s assertion that myth has a higher truth claim than history is a bold assertion,  and 
one that might strike a reader as strange, but it will be argued below, the way that the 
history (as typically understood) of the Battle of Kosovo is contrasted with the 
hagiography of the same event, one sees exactly this process happening; a heightening of 
its truth claim, a loading of the event with higher significance, the construction of 
paradigmatic status, an interpretation of a factual happening through a prism of mythical 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 5. 
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thought. However, it will be argued that a similar process – although presented in less 
ornate language – takes place in regard to other chosen historical events, to make them 
paradigmatic and unchallengeable, and in this sense, as is argued below, sacred.  
Finally, one cannot touch upon the subject of myth without giving space to the foremost 
modern theoretician of mythology. Added to this, the late Claude Lévi-Strauss was 
certainly interested in history. However, it seems to me, that the relationship of history and 
myth is treated in an inconsistent manner across Lévi-Strauss’ various writings on 
mythology, although some of his utterances on the subject are very provocative and 
compelling. But rather than outline his overall view of myth, as it constitutes a formidable 
and ambitious project, we will try to isolate the history/myth relationship in Lévi-Strauss. 
Most interestingly, Lévi-Strauss suggests that political history seems to have moved to 
occupy a space vacated by myth in our societies: 
On the one hand, myth always refers to events alleged to have taken place long 
ago. But what gives the myth an operational value is that the specific pattern 
described is timeless; it explains the present and the past as well as the future. 
This can be made clear through a comparison between myth and what appears 
to have largely replaced it in modern societies, namely, politics. When the 
historian refers to the French Revolution, it is always a sequence of past 
happenings, a non-reversible series of events the remote consequences of 
which may still be felt at present. But to the French Politician, as well as his 
followers, the French Revolution is both a sequence belonging to the past – as 
to the historian – and a timeless pattern that can be detected in the 
contemporary French social structure and which provides a clue for its 
interpretation, a lead from which to infer future developments.17 
It is a bold assertion but one he made on several occasions. In an exchange with Paul 
Ricoeur, Lévi-Strauss again stated that “...nothing bears a closer resemblance – formally 
speaking – the myths of what we call exotic or non-literate societies than the political 
ideology of our own societies.”18 He repeated this in a 1978 lecture entitled When Myth 
                                                 
17 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, Structural Anthropology, Penguin Books, London, 1963, 209. 
18 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, “A Confrontation”, New Left Review, 1/62, July-august 1970, 68. 
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Becomes History19, stating in very carefully weighed phraseology, “I am not far from 
believing that, in our own societies, history has replaced mythology and fulfils the same 
function.”20 I am not far from believing this either, and hope to show that certain signal 
events offer the same sort of moral navigation that myths often offer; and that such events 
possess an authority – in Bruce Lincoln’s sense – that can overrule concerns about 
Rankean factual accuracy. This is obviously an awkward place for a historian to be, but to 
ignore this authority and the potentially huge political legitimacy it can confer is risk 
being, in Burke’s worrying phrase, “wise historically, a fool in practice”. 
1.2.3 Political myth  
Although he did not explicitly use the term political myth, perhaps the first person that 
wrote of myth as a political force was Georges Sorel in his Reflections on Violence:  
Men who are participating in a great social movement picture their coming 
action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph. These 
constructions, knowledge of which is so important for historians, I propose to 
call myths.21  
He is quick to point out the instrumentality of myth, “the myths are not descriptions of 
things, but expressions of a determination to act.”22 And one can say that this means to act 
at a social, shared level. In his famous work, Myth of the State (1946), Ernst Cassirer 
wrote “Myth is an objectification of man’s social experience, not his individual 
experience.”23 A later writer who has absorbed both the influences mentioned above was 
                                                 
19 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, Myth and Meaning, Schocken Books, New York, 1979, 43. 
20 Ibid. It is however noteworthy that these statements would see to assert something very un-Lévi-
Straussian; namely that political history seems to be a more developed form of myth. Development, of 
course, is not a term of which he would approve, implying as it does that there is an evolutionally 
relationship between myth and history. Such teleology would be a reversal of everything that was argued, in 
the Savage Mind and in the conclusions of The Raw and the Cooked, both of which assert no fundamental 
difference between “primitive” and “advanced” mind. Whether one accepts the evolutionary direction, the 
idea is intriguing, and one which is embedded in this thesis, the proximity of myth and history.  
21 Sorel, Georges, Reflections on Violence, (Translated by T.E. Hulme) Collier Books, New York, 1967 
(1950), 41-42. 
22 Ibid., 50. 
23 Cassirer, Ernst, Myth of the State, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1963 (1946), 47. 
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Henry Tudor. His common-sense, and pragmatic account, amounted less to a theory that a 
description:  
What marks his (a given myth maker’s) account as being a myth is, not its 
content, but its dramatic form and the fact that it serves as a practical 
argument. Its success as a practical argument depends on its being accepted as 
true, and it is generally accepted as true if it explains the experience of those to 
whom it is addressed and justifies the practical purposes it has in mind.24 
This is probably one way to define a political myth; by its utility. If a given historical 
event – whether a relatively factually-accurate account, or a more heightened retelling – 
can be, and has been used in a political cause, then one can be justified in calling it a 
political myth. In his study of Ukrainian history culture, Johan Dietsch had distinguished 
several modes of the usage of history, based on a scheme by Klas-Göran Karlsson; 
scholarly-scientific use, existential use, moral use, and so on. Two of these, ideological 
use (“legitimacy is often produced by perspectives of unproblematic progress”) and 
political-pedagogical (“deliberate comparative use in which the transfer effect between 
past and present is rendered simple and unproblematic”) are the focus here.25  
A historical event, no matter how well-known, retold and commemorated is not a myth in 
this sense if it has no political utility; the Dunkirk evacuations are one of the best known 
aspects of the British experience of the Second World War, but no matter how compelling 
the narrative, I am not aware of any political speech warning of a “new Dunkirk” or any 
column offering the solemn “lessons of Dunkirk” or a self-congratulatory evocation of the 
“Spirit of Dunkirk” (in the way that a spirit of the South Atlantic would be praised as the 
“real spirit of Britain” by Prime Minister Thatcher after the Falklands War (see section 3.4 
below). 
Christopher Flood’s useful update states that; “Myth had the rhetorical force of a 
paradigmatic model or an analogy. It carries weight insofar as its story is plausible to its 
                                                 
24 Tudor, Henry, Political Myth, Pall Mall, London, 1972, 138. 
25 Dietsch, Johan, Making Sense of Suffering, holocaust and holodomor in ukrainian historical culture. 
Lund University, 2006, 32-36. 
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audience.”26 The word plausible is important and worthy of comment. Roy Rapport makes 
an important distinction between belief and acceptance, noting that belief is private and 
acceptance public, acceptance does not need belief (although it can, of course, correspond 
to belief) and does not even imply belief. And because myth is a social phenomenon, 
public acceptance – a minimum level of plausibility – can be sufficient.27  
Barthes wrote that “Ancient or not, mythology can only have a historical foundation.”28 
But that does not in any way invalidate the assertion that political myths are – to a greater 
or lesser extent – constructs. Bruce Kapferer is surely correct in asserting that: ‘all human 
interpretations of events are constructions...the import of these constructions extends far 
beyond the issues of “did-the-events-really-happen” kind.’29  
That said, Kapferer does argue that historians and other scholars must “demystify the 
distortions of myth” and most historians would agree, in fact, they commonly state that 
this is exactly one of their major tasks (and it is hard to dispute this). However, he 
insightfully qualifies this:  
While this exercise is essential, it fails to address some of the crucial ways in 
which myth and cosmic history achieve their emotional potency, for the critics 
of whatever kind adopt a mode of reasoning which is not that of the myths. 
The critics argue from positions outside the myths and the legends and I 
consider produce a radically incomplete understanding of the power of the 
myths in social and political action.30 
                                                 
26 Floor, Christopher, Political Myth, Routledge, New York and London, 2002 (1996), 108. 
27 See his Ritual and Religion in the making of Humanity, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 121-122. 
He also stresses that acceptance can be in sincere but that does not nullify its difference to belief.   
28 Barthes, 110. 
29 Kapferer, Bruce, Legends of People, Myths of State, Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture in Sri 
Lanka and Australia, Smithsonian Institute Press, Washington and London, 1998 (1988), xiv. Kapferer’s 
study is highly engaging because it compares the cosmic history of Sri Lanka with the much more 
empirically verifiable history of Gallipoli. 
30 Kapferer, 40. 
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One way of approaching this disparity is presented by Pål Kolstø. Like other scholars (for 
example, Geoffrey Schöpflin31) he categorises myths; myths of sui generis, ante murallis, 
mytherium, antiquitas and so on. He furthermore seeks to “divide the research community 
into two camps, which for convenience may be called ‘the enlighteners’ and ‘the 
functionalists.’”32 The former treat myths as the opposite of facts, the latter “see myth-
making as inevitable element of human existence and human societies.”33 It is hard to 
disagree; a scholar must do some double book-keeping, being aware of any factual 
inaccuracies (while trying to ask why these might have come into being) yet being aware, 
that even inaccurate myths have political usage and influence, and this must be assessed 
irrespective of doubts about accuracy.  
 
I will conclude these arguments with a concrete example. The Polish philosopher Leszek 
Kolakowski, wrote that: “One of the things most derided and mocked by twentieth-century 
Polish writers and thinkers was the idea of Polish messianism…it depicted Poland as the 
‘Christ of nations’ whose suffering and crucifixion would redeem mankind.34 This seemed 
a ridiculous, self-comforting, and self-compensating fantasy.”35 One might agree, but 
Kolakowski continues: 
 
…but on closer inspection there may have been some truth in it. Poland, the 
first country to defeat the Red Army shortly after the Revolution, prevented 
Europe from falling victim to communism, and perhaps confirmed the 
Hegelian notion that in every historical form the seeds of its future demise can 
be discerned from the outset. Poland was the only country invaded by the 
allied armies of Hitler and Stalin; this invasion triggered the Second World 
                                                 
31 Hosking, Geoffery, and Schöpflin, George, (eds.), Myths and Nationhood, Hurst and Company, 
London, 1997.  
32 Kolstø, Pål, Myth and Boundaries in South –Eastern Europe, Hurst and Company, London, 2005, 2. 
33 Ibid. 
34 To show how durable this idea is; “In December 2006…forty-six members of the Polish parliament – 
10 percent of the lower house – submitted a bill seeking to proclaim Jesus Christ the King of Poland and to 
follow the path of the Virgin Mary, who was declared honorary Queen of Poland in 1665”. Bazalka, Juraj, 
Nation and Religion, the Politics of Commemoration in South-East Poland, Halle Studies in the 
Anthropology of Eurasia, Halle, 2006, 2. 
35 Quoted in Tismaneau,Vladimir, (ed.) The Revolutions of 1989, Routledge, London, 1999, 59. 
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War. It was the first country to fight the Third Reich and one of two occupied 
(with Yugoslavia) that continued armed resistance against the German 
invaders. After the war, under communist rule, it was the first country to 
develop a mass movement of criticism, ideologically articulate, which 
culminated in 1956 in the change of leadership and first appointment of a 
Communist Party leader without investure by Moscow, indeed in defiance of 
the Kremlin….It was the first country in which the communist ideology 
clearly and irreversibly died away. And the first in which a mass civic 
movement “Solidarnosc” emerged and swept like fire over the land in 1980, 
nearly destroying the communist state machinery. Poland was the first…..  
 
And so on and so forth. Having dismissed the idea that Poland is a Christ-like figure, 
Kolakowski (a notable scholar of Marxism) alters his language and then argues that this is, 
in fact, the case. Note however, that Kolakowski’s tone is neither religious nor overly 
nationalistic. His emplotment of recent Polish history is quite laconic and factual; there is 
very little factual contestation here. Yet his historical facts seem to fit easily into a pre-
existing shape. 
 
Is this history or mythology? Surely it is both. One can find numerous modes of mythical 
discourse embedded in Kolakowski’s text. For example, “the first country to defeat the 
Red Army shortly after the Revolution, prevented Europe from falling victim to 
communism” (ante murallis); “Poland was the only country invaded by the allied armies 
of Hitler and Stalin” (martyrium) ; “It was the first country to fight the Third Reich and 
one of two occupied (with Yugoslavia) that continued armed resistance against the 
German invaders” (myths of valour) . One could even argue for a claims of sui generis, the 
word “first” is used seven times in the text) . This example argues strongly that myth and 
mythological discourse operate even without any contestation of actual factual. “Mythos” 
and “logos” are equal and interchangeable in this case. 
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1.3 Research motivation and study definition  
Where the concept of political myth might be promoted more is by moving it away from 
mere national story and its seemingly primitive irrationality (so evident in the treatment of 
Cassier and – to a lesser extent – Colovic36, it is as much evident in the intense tone of 
their works, urgently trying to make sense of political disasters) and be moved into, and 
applied to, political cultures and systems that citizens of those cultures and systems would 
regard as normal, even if they may balk at certain policies and parties. This is the great 
value of Kapferer’s comparative analysis; it shows us discourses and practices in one 
political culture that a “Western” reader might find alien, that is, irrational, far-fetched, 
primitive, but he does show that similar practices are used in Australian politics and 
culture, which the same reader would find normal; familiar, rational and so on. 
A similar intention is central to this work and its structure. A skeptical reader might find 
the Kosovo Myth as it had resonated in South Slav politics and culture as alien. The same 
reader might not say the same about the various usages of Munich, the logic being that 
they happen in familiar political culture and systems, open, democratic, rational. That said, 
one ambition of this work is question the assumption of the Cartesian rationality of much 
everyday politics, in particular political discourse.  
This is not to say one narrative is to be quickly conflated with the other. On the contrary, 
differences are noted, not only because they are important in and of themselves, but also 
because they are important in terms of definition of what is and what is not a political 
myth, or rather how broad is the scope of the concept. One of the ambitions of this thesis 
is too expand the definition of political myth. But for the same reason – the importance of 
definition – the similarities are very important. 
By way of definition, this is a work of political history. Certainly other discourses and 
disciplines inform it, most notably various theories of mythologies and aspects of social 
psychology. The stress on myth in a way distinguishes it from a prominent field in which 
it could be located, that of memory studies. Noted above was the assertion that authority 
“need not involve argumentation”, and may have emotional or moral elusiveness that is 
                                                 
36 Colovic, Ivan, Politics of Identity in Serbia, Essays in Political Anthropology (Translated by Celia 
Hawkesworth) New York University Press, New York, 2002. 
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not based on argumentation, this work is not a study in analogy and decision-making in 
the manner of Neustadt’s and May’s Thinking in Time.37  
A note on objectivity is merited. In the section dealing with Munich, it is argued that there 
is a disturbing pattern of it being used as a very effective tool of military escalation. Such 
an assertion can only be made from a specific position; namely that the conflict may have 
been avoided, or at least other options might have been exhausted first. In dealing with 
controversies, many still open, some degree of evaluation is necessary. Such evaluation is, 
of course, subjective but if a position is taken by a scholar it should be done so openly and 
explicitly, in full view of the reader. The old Whig formula of using the best available 
materials in good faith still seems a good guide to writing history. 
                                                 
37 Neustadt, Richard, E., and May, Ernest, R., Thinking in Time, The Uses of History for Decision-
Makers, The Free Press, New York, 1986. 
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2 Review of the literature 
2.1 Kosovo 
Several studies have been done on the Kosovo Myth and its large and longstanding 
influence. The Kosovo legacy has been studied by political and cultural historians, as well 
as other scholars in other disciplines. Political/historical studies would include the 
excellent volume edited by Thomas Emmert and Wayne Vucinich.38 That volume 
published conference papers that marked the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 
1989. Dating from exactly the same year however, the battle’s legacy had been so 
influential in Balkan history and more recent scholarship has changed as the object of 
study, it “came alive”, and changed from being a distant historical and cultural tradition 
into a highly-contested, dynamic contemporary event. At the time of writing, it remains 
controversial, contested and dynamic. Many more recent studies on the topic reflect this, 
including especially Tim Judah’s, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of 
Yugoslavia39 and Dejan Dokic’s Whose Myth? Which Nation? The Serbian Kosovo Myth 
Revisited.40 However, Judah’s book, as its title indicates, limits discussion of the Kosovo 
legacy to its negative political role.  
Other notable studies include Alexander Greenwalt’s Kosovo Myths: Karadžić, Njegoš, 
and the Transformation of Serb Memory41 and Florian Bieber’s Nationalist Mobilization 
                                                 
38 Emmert, Thomas and Vucinich, Wayne (eds.), Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle, Minnesota 
Mediterranean and East European Monographs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1991. 
39 Judah, Tim, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Yale, Nota Bene, New 
Haven, 1997. 
40 Dokic, Dejan, “Whose Myth? Which Nation? The Serbian Kosovo Myth Revisited”, available at 
http://eprints.gold.ac.uk/3455/1/Kosovomyth2.pdf 
41 Greenwalt, Alexander, “Kosovo Myths: Karadžić, Njegoš, and the Transformation of Serb Memory”, 
available at http://www.yorku.ca/soi/Vol_3/_HTML/Greenawalt.html  
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and Stories, The Kosovo myth from 600th anniversary to the present.42 A more focused 
study can be found in Ljubinka Trgovčević’s The Kosovo Myth in the First World War.43  
A full, book-length treatment exists in Branimir Anzulovic’s Heavenly Serbia, From Myth 
to Genocide.44 I am strongly opposed to Anzulovic’s analysis, but it has been widely 
discussed and translated.45 I can see little in Anzulovic’s work other than a touchy defense 
of Croatian and Roman Catholic sacred cows; the tone of special pleading pervades, the 
familiar sound of thin skin over chipped shoulder. Studies that come from other genres 
include engaging anthropological works such as Ivan Colovic’s Politics of Identity in 
Serbia46, and Ger Duijzings’ nuanced study, Religion and the politics of identity in 
Kosovo.47 
Much of the background on various aspects of Balkan history has drawn many well-
known general works, such as L. S. Stavrianos’ The Balkans since 145348, Michael Boro 
Petrovich’s two volume classic, A History of Modern Serbia49 and Vladimir Dedijer’s The 
Road to Sarajevo, which is comprehensive overview of Habsburg decline as well as a 
focused study of the events that led to the Sarajevo assassination.50 Other more focused 
                                                 
42 Bieber, Florian, “Nationalist Mobilization and Stories, The Kosovo myth from 600th anniversary to 
the present” Rethinking History 6:1 (2002), 95–110, available at 
http://www.policy.hu/bieber/Publications/bieberkosovo.pdf 
43 Trgovčević, Ljubinka, “The Kosovo Myth in the First World War”, available at 
http://www.rastko.rs/kosovo/istorija/sanu/KOS_MIT.html 
44 Anzulovic, Branimir, Heavenly Serbia, From Myth to Genocide, New York University Press, New York, 
1999. 
45 For example, Louis Sell describes Anzulovic’s work as “a comprehensive and objective account” 
Slobodan Milošević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2002, 
367-68. 
46 Colovic, Ivan, Politics of Identity in Serbia Political of Identity of Serbia, Essays in Political 
Anthropology (Translated by Celia Hawkesworth), New York University Press, New York, 2002. 
47 Duijzings, Ger, Religion and Politics of Identity in Kosovo, Colombia University Press, New York, 
2000. 
48 Stavrianos L. S., The Balkans since 1453, New York University Press, New York, 2001 (1965).  
49 Petrovich, Michael Boro, A History of Modern Serbia, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1976. 
50 Dedijer, Vladimir, The Road to Sarajevo, MacGibbon and Key, London, 1967. Recent studies like 
Tony Fabijancic’s Bosnia in the Footsteps of Gavrilo Princip, University of Alberta Press, 2010, have not 
added anything beyond a post-Bosnian war perspective (and more sympathetic treatment of Princip) to 
Dedijer’s classic (to be fair, Fabijancic admits as much). 
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works have been very useful, such as Andrei Mitrovic’s Serbia’s Great War51, and Ben 
Shepherd’s, recent Terror in the Balkans52, which focus on the World Wars in the region. 
Some studies of the role of religion include Stella Alexander, Church and State in 
Yugoslavia since 194553, which has been neatly complemented and updated by Vjekoslav 
Perica’s Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States.54 Many of the works 
on the breakup of Yugoslavia have not aged well – often the case of instant history – 
though a notable exception is Misha Glenny’s The Fall of Yugoslavia.55David Rieff’s 
Slaughterhouse56, although flawed as a historical work, has a moral seriousness that makes 
it memorable. Some specialist studies of Serbia’s political culture during the breakup 
include Jasna Dragović-Soso’s ‘Saviours of the nation’?57 and Eric Gordy’s The Culture 
of power in Serbia58 are very valuable. Many of the specific studies of the Kosovo Myth 
cover much of the ground covered here – though in perhaps less detail. Florian Bieber’s 
study does anticipate something stated here passim: that influence changes according to 
circumstances, (a point spectacularly missed by Anzulovic, who sees the Kosovo Myth as 
leading directly to genocide, as his title tells us). However, except for the anthropological 
studies mentioned, they do not have a theoretical background, systematic approach, or 
comparative method, all of which the present work does. The comparative method is 
important; to deal with the Kosovo Myth in isolation runs the risk of accepting its 
exceptionalism, which would work against the spirit of critical analysis.  
                                                 
51 Mitrovic, Andrei, Serbia’s Great War, Hurst and Company, London, 2007. 
52 Shepherd, Ben, Terror in the Balkans, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 2012. 
53 Alexander, Stella, Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1979. 
54 Perica, Vjekoslav, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002. 
55 Glenny, Misha, The Fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin, London, 1992. 
56 Rieff, David, Bosnia and the Failure of the West, Vintage, Random House, London, 1995. 
57 Dragović-Soso, Jasna,‘Saviours of the Nation’ Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of 
Nationalism, Hurst & Company, London, 2002. 
58 Gordy, Eric, The Culture of power in Serbia Nationalism and the destruction of alternatives, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. 
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2.2 Munich 
Regarding Munich, and the policy of appeasement generally, there is a large and often 
highly-charged literature. Broadly speaking, there are two“schools” of writing about 
appeasement. 59 One, starting from as early as 1940, has been to write about the subject in 
a tone of great moral outrage, condemning the “Men of Munich” without the slightest 
sympathy for their political dilemma, or without any effort to understand it. This has long 
been called the “Guilty Men” school, named after a pamphlet that was fiercely critical of 
Chamberlain’s government. This school has developed over the years into a huge 
bandwagon for almost everyone to jump on; there seems to have been an endless stream of 
people willing to moralise and denounce. A useful anthology of this school is Gilbert’s 
Roots of Appeasement, which contains a list of the various works on the subject, including 
one by the young John F. Kennedy. Since its publication, of course, the list has grown 
much longer. That said, Gilbert’s book is no detached commentary; his tone throughout is 
shell-shocked, as though he was still trying to make sense in a “how-could-this-have-
happened?” tone. 
The second school is one that tries to see the politics of appeasement in context, alongside 
the other great, divisive debates of British politics in the 1930s, namely disarmament, 
pacifism, and non-intervention (the latter especially in respect to the Spanish Civil War). 
Paul Kennedy judiciously points out the faults in both schools: 
The weakness of the older “guilty men” literature upon appeasement appeared 
to be that it denounced Chamberlain and his colleagues for a failure of 
                                                 
59 I will leave out of this discussion the various theories about cabals of reactionary aristocrats that exist, 
notably in Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel (Faber, London, 1989) and the subsequent Merchant Ivory film The 
Remains of the Day. Although the figure of Lord Darlington was no doubt based on Lord Londonderry, who 
genuinely admired the Nazis, the picture painted is too crude. For example, the Frenchman Dupond is 
concerned only with American duplicity and his sore feet; the only voice of reason is the American Senator 
Lewis. The novel (narrated in July 1956) examines the pro-German leanings of a group of British patriarchs 
(pro-German rather than pro-Nazi as the novel recounts events from 1922). But this presumes that anti-
Germaness, which is such a notable aspect of mid and late 20th century populistic British culture had long 
existed. As Gilbert points out, there was no British tradition of anti-Germanness – unlike the durable distrust 
of all things French – there was even widespread sympathy for the Germans when the French put units of 
North African Tirailleurs among the troops occupying the Ruhr. Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1968, 13-14, 72-74, 102-103. 
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morality and will power without much appreciation (or knowledge) of the 
difficulties under which British governments of the 1920s and 1930s laboured. 
By contrast, most of the later works have focused upon the seemingly 
compelling strategic, economic and political motives behind British policy at 
that time, but without much concern for the morality and ideological aspects of 
it.60 
Some accounts do try and balance these to a certain extent. A quite recent example is In 
Our Time, the Hitler Chamberlain Collusion.61 This study, plainly by two left wing 
historians shows some awareness of the context of the 1930s, however, is also a work that 
shouts with moral outrage. They argue that Chamberlain actively sought broader 
accommodation with the European Fascist states, in a common stand against Soviet 
communism (one might wonder why authors specialising in the politics of the 1930s are 
so surprised by this, anti-Bolshevism was a force in the world long before the Cold War). 
But against their arguments one can cite Chamberlain’s drive towards rearmament and 
recorded distrust of the Germans.62 And this is the problem; that even at this distance, 
historians have not necessarily agreed on appeasement.  
For Gilbert, Munich was not a culmination of appeasement, on the contrary, it was the 
very negation of appeasement; “Munich was not appeasement’s finest hour, but its most 
perverted. It was a distortion of all that all that appeasement stood for.” He speaks of an 
old and new appeasement, the latter born at Munich: 
From 1919-1937, the public, the Press, and the politicians could all welcome 
agreements with Germany as leading to peace. The Munich Agreement was 
welcomed because it averted war. There was a deep difference between the 
two attitudes. At bottom, the old appeasement, was a mood of hope, Victorian 
in its optimism, Burkean in its belief that societies evolved from bad to good 
and that progress could be only for the better. The new appeasement was a 
                                                 
60 Quoted in Martel (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, The A.J.P. Taylor 
Debate after Twenty-Five Years, Allen and Unwin, Boston, 1986,155. 
61 Leibovitz, Clement and Finkel, Alvin, In Our Time, the Hitler Chamberlain Collusion, Monthly 
Review Press, New York, 1998. 
62 See May, Ernest R, A Strange Victory, Hitler’s Conquest of France, I.B. Tauras, New York, 2000, 
169-178.  
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mood of fear, Hobbesian in its insistence upon swallowing the bad in order to 
preserve some remnant of the good, pessimistic in its belief that Nazism was 
here to stay and, horrible as it might be, should be accepted as a way of life 
with which Britain ought to deal.63  
For others such as Williamson Murray, appeasement had benefactors beyond the Fascist 
powers. He writes that the Irish Free State was appeased, an assertion that seems unusual; 
(why would a small, poor country lacking in any leverage need to be appeased?).64 Taking 
another approach, Maurice Cowling writes of appeasement as a domestic policy, and a 
successful one, that was exported to the realm of foreign policy.65 On Chamberlain 
himself (and it is important that the diatribe had been directed – to an extraordinary degree 
– against one man), recent works such as David Dutton’s Neville Chamberlain66 have tried 
to give a fairer picture, but these are compensatory in tone, and unlikely to influence the 
general public, or even many historians. The point here is that if the historical community 
cannot agree as to what appeasement was, and what it meant, is it a surprise that a long list 
of moralists have hijacked the idea of appeasement and applied (or misapplied) it to 
numerous situations? Because for most people, appeasement was, and is, as Hobsbawn 
puts it, “craven retreat”; it has long been removed from its original context. Several cases 
of this misapplication will be examined.67  
                                                 
63 Ibid., 185-185. 
64 “However, even with powers who posed no threat, appeasement could have the most appalling 
consequences, as when Britain surrendered the Treaty Ports to the Irish Republic in April 1938. The denial 
of those ports to the Royal Navy in the second World War led to the deaths of thousands of allied soldiers in 
the Battle of the Atlantic.” Quoted in Boyce, Robert, and. Maiolo, Joseph A (eds.) The Origins of the Second 
World War, the debate continues, Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2003, 113. 
65 Cowling, Maurice, The Impact of Hitler, British Politics and British Policy 1933-1940, Cambridge 
University Press, 1975, Introduction. 
66 Dutton, David, Neville Chamberlain, Reputations Series, Arnold Publishers, London, 2001. 
67 Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Extremes, Vintage, New York, 1996, 146. 
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2.3 Sources and materials 
To anticipate the conclusions of this work, the two cases are very different in many 
respects, but also alike in other ways. This will be reflected in the choice of sources used 
for each.  
 
In examining the Battle of Kosovo and its resonance, a researcher is first faced with the 
fact that almost no sources exist for the battle itself. The formidable hagiography that 
sustained the battle story for several centuries was based, to a small extent, on Church 
sources, but as these could be read by very few people, the story was carried though a 
vibrant folk culture, especially oral poetry. This poetry will be looked at below. When 
Serbia gradually emerged as a state, it was able to institutionalise the Kosovo legacy, and 
there is documentary evidence of this process, very much part of a culture- and nation-
building process. As it not unreasonable to say that in an emerging society, the dichotomy 
between the civil and the political is far less clear than in an developed society, material 
reviewed will include political plans and speeches, archive materials that included 
diplomatic telegrams, letters, etc., but also images, the literary and artistic tradition, theater 
records, even the first Serbian film (made in 1911). Furthermore, some aspects of ritual, 
both formally religious and more secular are examined.  
 
By contrast, in dealing with Munich the researcher is confronted with the paradox of a 
huge range of materials, many of which are ignored as they might weaken or complicate 
the popular narrative. The material is there, but beyond specialists, nobody seems 
interested.  
 
The stress in the second case of this thesis will be on political statements that utilise 
Munich as a historical trope and political tool or mechanism. But there is a formal intent to 
match the specific statements with specific actions taken by the makers of the statements. 
These statements are largely either speeches made to “sell” a given policy as it is being 
created and implemented (both public and confidential), or retrospective accounts made to 
justify past actions, often in the form of political memoirs. Matching politicians’ words 
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and their deeds is a perilous business, and must be undertaken with great skepticism. 
Therefore attention is paid, when possible, to different accounts given by the same office 
holder in public and private. Sources, reflecting the broad, international usage of Munich, 
include diplomatic cables, parliamentary records, military reports, diaries, documentary 
interviews, academic conferences and debates, mainly for Anglo-American sources, but 
also French, Soviet/Russian, Israeli, Australian and Argentinian.  
2.4 Methodology 
In dealing with the two cases, I use a scheme that examines them in terms of the following 
factors: 
1. Durability  
2. Factual accuracy  
3. Group-centeredness and “ownership”  
4. Flexibility  
5. Level of usage  
6. Media of transmission  
To briefly explain these. Durability means the ability of a political myth to last a long 
time. Peter Novick notes that the myth of Masada – a mass-suicide by Jewish rebels 
during an uprising against the Romans – had no place in Jewish culture for 1900 years. 
But when the State of Israel was founded, Masada became its foundational myth. Officers 
of the Israeli Defense Forces, then as now, that country’s most cherished institution, were 
sworn in on the site of Masada, vowing “Masada will never fall again!” Indeed the 
archeologist responsible for the exploration of Masada, Yigael Yadin was the second 
Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (one of his replacements, the legendary Moshe 
Dayan, was a keen amateur archeologist). In his exhaustive study, Nachman Ben-Yehuda 
writes that: 
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...commanders wanted to use the Masada as a vehicle by which to instil what 
they felt were important values in their new recruits: a willingness to fight to 
the end, nonsurrender, a renewed link to the past, an identification with ancient 
Jewish warriors, a love of freedom, a willingness to sacrifice.68 
Yet within two generations, Masada was replaced by another, more powerful narrative, the 
Holocaust. It must be stated that in the immediate post war years – when Masada was 
sanctioned as the national narrative – the recent Holocaust was not publically mentioned 
or institutionalised in Israel. But this all changed, as Amos Elon wrote:  
 
By the later Fifties, the stunned silence about the Holocaust gave way to 
loquacious – often officially sponsored – national discussion of its effects. It 
became common to speak of the Holocaust as the central trauma affecting 
Israeli society. It would be impossible to exaggerate the effect on the process 
of nation building.69   
 
Today Masada is more of tourist site70 than the centre of a heroic national story. Dormant 
for almost 2,000 years, the narrative was (very literally) dug up and placed into the centre 
of national political/cultural life, but discarded within two generations, replaced by 
another narrative. This is typical of political myths; they are commissioned and 
decommissioned on the basis of changing circumstances.  
 
In 1906, Georges Sorel wrote that national epics cannot be:  
 
…about things which the people cannot picture to themselves as reproducible 
in the near future; popular poetry implies the future much more than the past; 
it is for this reason that the adventures of the Gauls, of Charlemagne, of the 
                                                 
68 Ben-Yehuda, Nachman, The Masada Myth, collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel, University 
of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1995, 59 (italics added). 
69 Elon, Amos, “The Politics of Memory” New York review of Books, Volume XV, Number 16, October 
7, 1993. 
70 Furthermore, the large majority of people visiting Masada are increasingly non-Israelis. Ben-Yehuda, 
gives a figure of 646,000 non-Israelis visitors for the year 1996, as compared to only 77, 351 Israelis. Ben-
Yehuda, 199.  
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Crusades, of Joan of Arc cannot form the subject of a narrative capable of 
moving any but literary people.71 
 
As Wolfgang Schivelbusch argued, there had been at least one attempt to revive Joan of 
Arc – who had been dismissed by Voltaire in the 18th Century as La pauvre idiote – during 
the turmoil of the Franco/Prussian War of 1870. But her time had not yet come; she had to 
compete with the more Spartan, republican virtues of Marian, and Joan lost out; “To 
renounce Joan’s ambiguity for Marianne’s clarity was to neglect the need for martyrs that 
every vanquished nation feels.”72 However, later circumstances would revive the maiden. 
Within a generation of Sorel’s (1906) dismissal, Joan of Arc was revived to become the 
symbol of France (a secular Republic) under German occupation, as witnessed by the 
numerous wartime speeches of Charles De Gaulle. He spoke in 1941 of: “A country 
three/quarters conquered. The greater part of its men in collaboration with the enemy. 
Paris, Bordeaux, Orléans, Reims, under enemy garrisons...treason spreading everywhere” 
making a forceful connection between past and present: “such was, on the face of it, 
France, in 1412 when Joan of Arc left to fulfill her mission; such is, on the face of it, 
France today.”73 From obscurity and mockery to personification of the nation (which 
already had an official – and female – personification, Marian). One might note that a year 
later, Stalin’s USSR would be reviving Alexander Nevsky – and later Russian heroes like 
Alexander Suvorov – which took considerable ideological calibration.74 
 
Although both cases examined in this thesis are examples of how the past is evoked and 
seen as relevant to the present, they seem to operate in two distinct, though related, 
modalities. The two processes are distinct – and this distinction is an important aspect of 
the comparative agenda of the thesis – but they do have a common functionality, using the 
past to legitimise present actions. 
                                                 
71 Sorel, 102. 
72 Schivelbusch, Wolfgang, The Culture of Defeat, on National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery, 
Picador/H. Holt, New York, 2004, 142. 
73 De Gaulle, Charles, Discours et Messages, Pendant la Guerre, Juin 1940 – Janvier 1946, Libraire 
Plon, 1970, 85. 
74 A wartime poster addressed the Soviet public as “grandchildren of Suvorov”. See Stites, Richard and 
Van Gelden, James (eds.) Russian Wartime Culture, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995. 
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Factual accuracy disturbingly matters less than it should in political myths. Masada is 
factually dubious, but this not so of anther foundational myth, Gallipoli. We know pretty 
much what happened, but subsequent readings make subscribers to the myth interpret the 
facts in self-serving ways. This leads us to ownership and flexibility, and Gallipoli is 
instructive about both. There is little doubt that Australians (and to a lesser extend New 
Zealanders75) “own” Gallipoli. Thousands of French and British troops died there too, but 
Australians have made it, to quote Robert Hughes “our Thermopylae”76 (to be fair, the 
British and French have their own commemorations of other theatres of the Great War).  
 
By flexibility I mean they ways in which Gallipoli had been interpreted by different 
audiences and generations. In Eric Bogle’s 1972 song “And the band played Waltzing 
Matilda” there is a strong anti-war theme (very typical of Vietnam era folk songs). In  
Peter Weir’s 1981 film “Gallipoli”, there was a notable anti-British theme. At the most 
recent Anzac Day commemoration in Gallipoli, Prime Minister Julia Gillard described the 
Australians who fought there as: “Men who came from “the ends of the earth” in an 
enterprise of hope to end a far-off, dreadful war.”77 This interpretation makes it sound like 
a contemporary peace-keeping mission. Yet, to reflect, the young Australians who 
volunteered to fight in the Great War (Australia did not have conscription) were certainly 
not anti-British and certainly not anti-war; they willingly went to fight for the Empire.78 
One brief example of how Gallipoli is “versioned” for new generations is the re-
publication of the first book published by a Gallipoli combatant, Sydney Loch’s The 
                                                 
75 It seem that some Australian schoolgoers are not even aware New Zealand’s contribution: an article 
in AAP.com.au stated that “Dr Crotty, a New Zealander who lectures Australian students, tells a story of one 
student who ‘thumped the table after I'd given a seminar and complained at having a New Zealander come 
and tell us about Anzac’. ‘He was genuinely shocked when I told him what the N and the Z stood for.’ The 
historian said Australians had a very ‘parochial’ view of WW1 and were even less aware of France and 
Britain's involvement than they were of New Zealand's.” http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/2355369/Aussies-
forget-the-NZ-in-Anzac 
76 Hughes, Robert, The Fatal Shore, The Epic of Australia’s Founding, Vintage, New York, 1986, xiv. 
77 Gillard, Julia, Speech, available at http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/dawn-service-gallipoli. 
78 Although their motives were surely mixed, as so often with soldiers, military service offered some 
chance of social mobility, a rare chance to travel overseas, and real adventure. One Anzac Diarist writes of 
the first day of the Anzac landings April 25, 1915; “The sound of rifles has not ceased, same with ships guns 
till about 8 p.m. Hydroplanes and an observation balloon have been up all day. No firing going on at present. 
The sight of a lifetime.” Will Lycett 1870-1975. Lycett, a British-born Australian, lost his father and 3 
brothers in the Great War. See Anzac, the Great War Diaries, available at http://www.anzacs.net/Diary.htm.  
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Straights Impregnable.79 The book had been originally published as a work of fiction to 
escape military censorship. However when re-published this century, its original title was 
dropped and replaced with the Hollywood-esque and banal “To Hell and Back”. Why this 
act of editorial presumption, if not to make the book more attractive to younger 
generations?  
 
By level of usage I mean the ways in which a given myth is used; is it commemorated in 
the public realm? Has it become a public holiday (and if so, a celebratory one like July 4th 
in the United States, or a more solemn one like Remembrance Day in Britain)? Is it 
confined to political speech, or has it become a popular theme in the arts (like Gallipoli 
and the Holocaust)? This leads us to the final factor media of transmission; folk belief, 
ritual, church ceremony, oral tradition and so forth.   
2.5 Key concepts and definitions 
2.5.1 The sacred, the secular, and civic religion  
In his Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said wrote that “Every society and official 
tradition defends itself against interferences with its sanctioned narratives; over time these 
acquire an almost theological status, with founding heroes, cherished ideas and values, 
national allegories having an inestimable effect in cultural and political life.”80 What is 
meant by this “almost theological status” is worth dwelling upon. The term civic religion 
well describes public practices that seem to exist in a poorly-lit confusion of secular and 
sacred.  
In this sense the gradual secularisation of Western societies since the Enlightenment has 
only been a partially-fulfilled project, despite what religious authors might believe. For 
                                                 
79 To Hell and Back, the banned account of Gallipoli by Sydney Loch, HarperCollins Publishers, 
Sydney, 2007. The book is edited by Jake and Susanna De Vries. Her books – it if is fair to judge by the 
titles – have a hagiographic air about them; “Heroic Australian Women in War”, “Great Pioneer Women of 
the Outback”, and “The Complete Book of Great Australian Women”. As is often the case with over-eager 
patriots, neither she nor her husband is Australian-born. 
80 Said, Edward, Culture and Imperialism, Vintage, London, 1993, 380. 
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example, the philosopher and practicing Roman Catholic, Charles Taylor can assert – with 
some obvious concern from his perspective – that “The presumption of unbelief has 
become the dominant one in more and more of these milieu and has achieved hegemony in 
certain crucial ones,…”81 This may be accurate in respect to some (though not all) 
institutions, but this is not the full picture. I fully agree with Mircea Eliade’s assertion that:  
…the man who has made his choice in favor of a profane life never succeeds 
in completely doing away with religious behavior…even the most desacralized 
existence still preserves traces of a religious valorization of the world.82 
Civic religion, and political myths, may not be concerned with deities, but they do hold up 
their chosen narrative, heroes and events as revered, much in the manner of doctrinal 
religion. Much heritage and custom, particularly in the public/political sphere seems to 
preserve “religious valorization of the world” and long for the sacred. The sacred – as a 
category, familiar from Durkheim and elsewhere – is pervasive in human cultures. One 
particular aspect of the sacred is of interest here, this is, its unchallengeability. To be 
unchallengeable is an enviable status, and no culture – yet alone interested political 
agency – would be in a hurry to ditch it.  
To place a certain historical narrative beyond challenge is to make it functionally sacred. 
This is being carried out in extremis by the strange contemporary practice of “memory 
laws” that is, passing real and binding legal statures that make the denial of a historical 
episode illegal. It is well-known that to deny that the Holocaust took place is illegal in 
Germany and elsewhere; less formally but no less stridently, to affirm the existence of the 
Armenian genocide is considered subversive in Turkey, and there have been several 
prosecutions under the controversial Penal code 301, which makes it illegal to insult “the 
Turkish Nation”. In both cases the stakes are high; it is nothing less than genocide that is 
being denied or affirmed. However, another and far less familiar example of the legal 
sanctification of the past exists in Australia, in a case where full legal guardianship would 
hardly seem warranted. In his study Inventing Anzac, Graham Seal writes that the word 
“Anzac” (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) “was, and is, protected from misuse 
                                                 
81 Taylor, Charles, A Secular Age, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 2007, 13. 
82 Eliade, Mircea, The Sacred and the Profane, The Nature of Religion, (Translated by Willard R. Trask) 
A Harvest/HBJ Book, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1959 (1957), 23. 
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by legal proscription.”83 So much of the politics of commemoration are about the 
construction of historical iconography, formalised and ritualised to the point of being 
unchallengeable. Obliviously this differs from political culture to culture, and it cannot 
always be read at literal level; one need only think of the formidable personality cult that 
surrounds Kemal Ataturk; the founder of the secular Turkish Republic is nonetheless 
revered. More obliviously one can point to the personality cults of communist regimes 
past (and in the case of North Korea) present with their “theological status”. 
2.5.2 The irrational and the political 
In his timeless classic, The Paranoid Style in American Politics,84 Richard Hofstadter 
wrote of the intrusions of the emotional and irrational into the political sphere: 
People respond, in short, to the great drama of the public scene. But this 
drama, as it is set before them and as they perceive it, is not identical with 
questions involving material interests and the possession of power. Even those 
who exercise power are not immune to the content of the drama.85 
The point could hardly be better made. Politics can be and often is a theater of the 
irrational, or at least the semi-rational, with people’s group, party or tribal loyalties and 
prejudices, short-circuiting their objective interests, not that they can necessarily be told 
that. The “great drama” often seems to wish for dramatic dénouement, heroes and villains, 
savior-like individuals, and so on. In his attack on revolutionary ideologues, Edmund 
                                                 
83 Seal, Graham, Inventing Anzac, the Digger and National Mythology, University of Queensland Press, 
St. Lucia, 2004, 4. 
84 Hofstadter, Richard, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, Jonathan Cape, London, 1966. 
85 Ibid., x. Not that political paranoia is limited to the United States or any given period. Other historians 
and writers have used Hofstadter’s insights to examine paranoia in different periods and contexts. These 
include Eli Sagan’s The Honey and the Hemlock, Democracy and Paranoia in Ancient Athens and Modern 
America (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994), and Lacey Baldwin Smiths’ Treason in Tudor 
England, Politics and Paranoia, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1986). That said, the modern United States is a 
theme park-sized gallery of political paranoia, and so many – mostly rightwing, Hofstadter’s speciality – 
utterances are exactly full of the attributes “overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose and 
apocalyptic in vision” he describes, but pass for normal among large portions of the media and the public. 
Paranoid discourse and mythical discourse (as will defined below) can be co-exist most cosily; both often 
seek a single answer, a central conspiracy in one case, a revelation in the other.  
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Burke noted that “they have nothing of politics save the passion they excite.”86 This 
damning judgment is true of many people (indeed Raymond Williams wondered if it could 
not perhaps be applied to Edmund Burke).87 In his study of leadership, John MacGregor 
Burns wrote of how conflict is “intrinsically compelling; it galvanizes, prods, motivates 
people” and leaders “whatever their professions of harmony, do not shun conflict; they 
confront it, exploit it, ultimately embody it”.88 Digging deeper into human psychology, 
Primo Levi wrote:  
Nevertheless, for reasons that go back to our origins as social animals, the 
need to divide the field into “we” and “they” is so strong that this pattern, the 
bipartisan – friend/enemy – prevails over all others. Popular history, and also 
the history taught in schools, is also influenced but this Manichean tendency, 
which shuns half-tints and complexities: it is prone to reduce the river of 
human occurrences to conflicts, and the conflicts, to duels – we and they....89 
Such binary reductions – us/them, good/bad, friend/enemy – are typical patterns of 
mythical thought, and therefore are central to this thesis, especially the pairing of heroes 
and traitors (real or alleged). Furthermore, such reductions are part of the polarisations of 
rival groups in conflict.  
The willful seeking of conflict for conflict’s sake is hardly a model of rational politics, but 
seemingly in many cases – several with be examined in the second part of this thesis – 
conflict, passion and drama seem far more compelling than mere compromise. Indeed the 
idea of compromise – or even of negotiation – will come under particular attention in 
dealing with Munich. 
                                                 
86 Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Penguin Classics, London, 1968 (1790), 94. 
87 Williams, Raymond, Culture and Society 1780-950, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1963 (1958), 27. 
88 MacGregor Burns, John, Leadership, Harper and Row, New York, 1978, 38-39. 
89 Levi, Primo, The Drowned and the Saved, Summit Books, New York, 1988 (1986), 37. 
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2.5.3 Historical time and age value 
René Girard noted that “When a society breaks down, time sequences shorten”.90 It is 
difficult to prove empirically, but one can argue that time is indeed experienced in highly 
subjective ways by people, and the dividing of time into objective calendar units – 
necessary as it is – does not really indicate how time is felt and lived through by people. 
This is truer of historical time, in which people – or perhaps more accurately peoples – 
experience their shared sense of the past. The subjective ways in which objective time is 
experienced is embedded in this essay, not only in the obvious terms of conscious 
awareness (and deliberate evocations) of the past, but also in more social terms of 
acceleration of change, because the slower the rate of change experienced, the easier is the 
sense of continuity with the past.  
People in the 20th and 21st Centuries (most especially if they are urban dwellers and well-
educated) are aware of rapid change occurring, their lives are measurably different from 
those of their ancestors). For previous generations, especially before the Industrial 
Revolution, there may not have been any sense of progress or change; people’s lives were 
lived much the same as those people’s ancestors’ lives. And as one moves back from the 
modern period and away from urban life, one could ask how accurate was the sense of 
time held by people in, say, the late medieval period? To quote Alfred Crosby on 
Jerónimo de Aguilar (a Spanish monk who has spent years stranded among the Maya of 
Yucatán, he later returned with Cortez); “This keeper of calendars, typical of his era and 
people, was not interested in accuracy (of time) per se but vis-à-vis tradition and the 
possibility of salvation.”91 As a monk, Aguilar was an educated man, but as Crosby 
continues; “For peasants schedules were approximate: weather, dawn, and sunset dictated 
their tempi.” This vagueness of time92 is worth keeping in mind when considering the 
transmission of events in the Balkans in the late medieval and early modern periods; how 
really separate were the past and the present in people’s sensibilities? If there was little 
                                                 
90 Girard, René, The Scapegoat, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, 13.  
91 Crosby, Alfred, The Measure of Reality, Quantification and Western Society, 1250-1600, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997, 76. 
92 From our modern perspective we accept that pre-Copernican man had a model of space different to 
our own, perhaps the sense of time was also different? 
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difference between the two, then surely the past – perhaps lacking sense of inferiority to 
the present – was a salient aspect of lived experience? 
To apply this point to political historical consciousness, evocation of the past for the 
purpose of encouraging and legitimising actions, always entail temporal connection; “we-
are-now-fighting-them-again-and-this-is-the-same-struggle!” In Northern Ireland, 
combatants and their spokesmen draw strong temporal connections to legitimise their 
actions; for Republicans, they often speak of centuries of British misrule, evoking the 
great famine of the 19th Century or even the Cromwellian Wars of the 17th. Loyalists 
evoke such events the Siege of Derry (1689), the Battle of the Boyne (1693) and the Battle 
of the Somme (1916), temporally connecting these events with the recent conflict, 
legitimising their own actions on the basis of their usable past. 
Mark Thompson wrote of the extraordinary sense of historical continuity he encountered 
among a group of young Serbs during the breakup of Yugoslavia: “You would think these 
young engineers had lost at the battle of Kosovo in 1389, rebelled with Karadjordje in 
1804, beaten the Austrians in 1914, risen against the Axis in 1941, been terrorised in 
Kosovo in the 1980s.”93 
But it is not only Serbs who might have their own sense of continuity and discontinuity. 
Rudi Giuliani was recently interviewed on Serbian television (he had been invited to 
consult on urban renewal and development). He was asked if he had seen the bombed 
buildings (referring to the NATO bombings of Belgrade in 1999). His response was to 
state that people have to put the past behind them. Leaving aside the question of whether 
or not the NATO bombings were justified, could anyone image trying to tell Mayor 
Giuliani that he should put the bombings of New York (only two years later that the 
bombings in Belgrade) behind himself?  
 
This example illustrates that many groups can self-righteously insist that some historical 
event is very relevant in the here and now, while denying the same right to a rival group. 
One could argue that a certain group may have a subjective experience of time, while 
judging other groups by objective standards. Furthermore, as the above examples imply, 
                                                 
93 Thompson, Mark, A Paper House, the Ending of Yugoslavia, Vintage, London, 1992, 198. 
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this would seem to be especially the case when people are part of a conflict, when 
certainties are clung to, as society is undergoing violent change.  
But historical time can also work in the other direction; not only does it resist 
diachronicity by shrinking the distance between past and present, it can also use the 
separation to enhance the past. That it, as a historical event is contemplated, it gains in 
stature by virtue of its distance, becoming, in lazy parlance “time-honoured”. Time past 
endows prestige; to quote Graham Seal writing about Australia; “History itself imparts 
ever-accumulating significance to Anzac in the form of sacred time, for even elapsing, 
forever accreting around the icons and images of the Anzac tradition.”94 This is the logical 
lethargy at the core of tradition, however skeptically we may now look upon it; something 
gains in stature merely because it has existed for a certain amount of time and the longer it 
lasts the more it distinguished it becomes. This is what archeologists and historians call 
the “age value” of a given find or artifact, and it is also applicable to a given epoch or 
event.  
                                                 
94 Seal, 2004, 4. 
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3 Kosovo 
3.1 The battle itself: what is known 
Writers on nationalism often posit a Golden Age (often as imagined as real) in a particular 
culture’s or country’s history, and often, a national Catastrophe. The two, if there are two in a 
culture’s history, need not necessarily be close; for example, the Irish or Ukrainian Golden Ages 
were in the early and late medieval periods, and their catastrophes in the 19th and 20th Centuries 
(the Great Famine and the Holdomar). If however, a culture’s Golden Age happened to have 
been brought to an end by its Catastrophe, the two reinforce each other; the loss all the greater, 
the fall more traumatic. Such was the case of the Serbs.  
 
In his study of a Serbian village in the mid-1950s, Joel Halpern noted that it was on Vidovdan 
that, “the names of all those who had died in the nation’s wars are read in parish churches.”95 
This shows the importance of the tradition of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in Serbian life and 
culture; the dead of all wars (and Serbia had fought four wars between 1912 and 1945) were 
remembered through the great battle of 1389. It was the foundational event through which all 
other events were experienced; it was in that sense paradigmatic.  
 
It is a fact that on Vidovdan, June 15, 1389, the Serbs, without help from a 
single European nation, defended on Kosovo Field not only the frontiers of 
their own territory and lives of their people, but, at the risk of losing their 
national independence, they also defended the interests and security of 
Christian Europe. In the conflict of 2 rival civilizations, the Muslim and the 
Christian, the Serbs checked the wave of the Turkish invasion, interposed 
themselves as a wall between the Turks and Europe, and enabled Europe to 
make preparations for its own defense. It is questionable whether the history 
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of Europe would have been the same without the Battle of Kosovo and the 
sacrifice of the Serbian nation. 
 
This passage by Fr. Mateja Matejic in Kosovo edited by William Dorich96 is typical of the 
hagiography that has grown around the Battle of Kosovo Polje; a continent-saving battle, 
binary and symmetrical in form, fought along confessional lines; two civilizations at war 
to the death. Unsurprisingly on closer examination the patterns are not quite so neat. That 
said, a closer examination is difficult because of the lack of documentary evidence, only 
one or two letters that would constitute sources exist. Accounts of the battle, being rare 
and fragmentary, don’t necessarily tell us very much, even the actual outcome. 
 
But what can be said with some certainly is that on Vidovdan 1389 the Serbian Tzar Lazar 
with an army estimated at 15,000 – 20,000 troops faced an Ottoman army of 27,000 – 30, 
000, led by Sultan Murad on Kovoso Polje (Field of the Blackbirds) near Pristina. Let 
there be no doubt that these were large armies; the famous Battle of Agincourt – fought 
some three decades later in 1415 – was contested by forces whose numbers are estimated 
at 6,000-9,000 on one side and 12,000-30,000 (much the biggest estimate) on the other.97 
Both armies – and this is a fact that is ignored by the hagiographic telling – contained 
soldiers of various origins; Bosnians, Albanians, Hungarians, Greeks, Bulgars, perhaps 
even Catalans (on the Ottoman side). In a few hours both monarchs were dead, there 
would seem to have been huge losses, and both sides seem to have left the field. Noel 
Malcolm, in his exhaustive account of the battle asks “whether, in the end, it should be 
characterized as a victory or a draw.”98 Indeed, early reports celebrated the battle as a 
Christian victory; after all the Serbs had killed an Ottoman Sultan (the only Ottoman 
Sultan ever killed in battle). 
                                                 
96 Doric, William, Kosovo, The Kosovo Charity Fund, Alhambra, 1992, available online at  
http://www.srpska-mreza.com/bookstore/kosovo/kosovo.htm. Dorich is a controversial figure, but the 
book does have contributions from serious scholars, most notably Tomas Emmert, the distinguished 
historian of the battle’s legacy. 
97 Some of the Ottoman accounts of the battle greatly exaggerate the numbers involved, and the 
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of Ottoman accounts of the battle see, Nicolas C.J. Pappas and Lee Brigance Pappas’ “The Ottoman View of 
the Battle of Kosovo” in Emmert and Kusinich (eds.), 41-53. 
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Supposedly the battle dramatically and suddenly ended the Golden Age of Serbia. The age 
referred to the medieval Serbian Empire. This was in indeed a very powerful polity, which 
reached its height under Stephan Dušan “the Mighty”, when the empire covered most of 
the Balkan Peninsula. Dušan was the author of a famous law code (Dušanov zakonik) and 
it was during his reign that the Serbian Orthodox Church achieved autocephaly (it is very 
important to note the archbishopric seat of the Church was in the Monastery of Peć in 
Kosovo). These were formidable achievements, and Dušan even had pretenses to replace 
the Byzantine Empire, calling himself “The Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks”.  
 
Traditionally the Empire came to a dramatic end with the battle of 1389, and following 
this the Serbs underwent submergence to Ottoman Islam. In fact, the Serbian Kingdom 
was on the decline prior to the battle but survived it still for some 60 years, albeit in a 
compromised manner.99 Michael Petrovic describes the status changes as:  
 
...the medieval Serbian state – which had first been a grand zupante, then a 
kingdom, than an empire and became another conquered Ottoman province. 
But that medieval state continued to live the Serbian memory through four 
centuries of alien rule, not as it really was, but sanctified by the Church and 
idealized by folk poetry.100  
 
Furthermore, as was stated above, the famous defeat was not seen as a defeat to others 
elsewhere in Europe at the time; the killing of an Ottoman Sultan was a cause for 
celebration. Indeed, King Tvrtko of Bosnia (who had sent troops to help Tzar Lazar under 
Vlatko Vuković) even boasted that he had won the Battle of Kosovo. Yet in the ensuing 
popular narrative, any talk of victory was rejected, but rejected with one very important 
qualification. It was claimed that the Serbian Monarch Lazar was visited by Archangel 
Elijah on the night before the battle and offered a choice. This was that he could choose to 
win a battle the next day, or he could lose the battle and forsake his own life but in doing 
                                                 
99 It cannot be overstressed that the battle may have shown the decline of the Serbian Kingdom through 
the loss of its monarch and many of its ruling Lords, but in military terms, it seems to have been more like a 
bloody stalemate.  
100 Petrovich, Michael Boro, A History of Modern Serbia, volume i, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New 
York, 1976, 6. 
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so he would gain a kingdom for his people in heaven. After agonising, he chooses to lose 
the battle and secure for his people a place in Heaven. From this comes the idea of 
Heavenly Serbia; the claim that the Serbs are a blessed, even a chosen, people. This is a 
highly exceptionalist claim, and from a critical distance one must wonder how literally it 
had been taken? But even among the skeptical, that is a heavy piece of ancestral baggage, 
it must be hard to totally ignore, most especially when there is enough “history” in the 
national narrative to offer evidence of compelling and often catastrophic people’s 
experience.101  
3.2 The battle as commemorated: the Kosovo Myth 
In The Culture of Defeat, Wolfgang Schivelbusch makes the point that victory typically 
brings hubris and self-congratulation whereas defeat can bring a much deeper historical 
understanding; the defeated search more deeply and more painfully for answers. He quotes 
his countryman Reinhard Koselleck; “History man in the short term be made by the 
victors but historical wisdom is in the long run enriched by the vanquished”.102 This had 
indeed been the Serbian experience of the Battle of Kosovo; for centuries the 
commemoration of defeat seemed far deeper, seemed to speak to people more than the 
celebration of a victory. The commemoration of defeat is fairly rare in national narratives 
(we noted two in Masada and Gallipoli), but Kosovo is such a case; defeat was 
commemorated for centuries (commemorated even after alleged “revenge” had been 
accomplished, to run ahead of chronology for a moment). The historian Ralph Bogert has 
asked the probing question: “What would cause a people to perpetuate such a paradigm (of 
defeat) even after the historical circumstances would seemingly have allowed for its 
sublimation or even its retirement?”103 
                                                 
101 It is significant, as Ivan Čolović points out, that the term “narod” means both nation and people. In 
that sense it is possible to speak of a collective before the ideology and institutionalisation of nationalism. 
Čolović, 7. 
102 Schivelbrusch, Wolfgang, The Culture of Defeat, on national trauma, mourning, and recovery, 
Picador/H. Holt, New York, 2004, 4. 
103 Bogert, “Paradigm of Defeat or Victory”, in Emmert and Vucinich (eds.), 179. 
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This section proposes to offer an answer to this question by examining the Kosovo Myth, 
that is, how the battle has traditionally been commemorated by Serbs.  
For centuries, the story of the battle was transmitted by two media, church texts such as 
those of Constantine of the Philosopher, and through Serbian epic poetry, most especially 
the Kosovo Cycle, which when written down in the 19th Century became a “national” epic 
like the Kalevala, the Poem of the Cid, the Tain or the Song of Igor’s Campaign. The 
latter medium was by far the most important media; simply stated, most Serbs were 
illiterate until the late 19th Century. Therefore epic poetry was the most common medium. 
It must be stated that epic poetry was a highly developed and important cultural form 
among Serbs, and a source of pride, identity and a very strong linkage to the past.  
The British archaeologist (and at that time journalist for the Manchester Guardian) Arthur 
Evans, travelled through the Balkans when the rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina took 
place (1875-1878) and noted of the Serbs: “Their spirit has been continually refreshed 
from the perennial fount of epic song.”104 Indeed he noted one performance of epic poetry: 
“I have witnessed crowds surrounding a blind old singer, and every cheek was wet with 
tears; it was not the music, but the words, which affected them. For these songs speak to 
the heart.”105 
A later visitor, the famous folklorist Alfred Lord who travelled to the region in the 1920s 
to specifically to study the vibrant oral tradition noted; “Epic poetry in Yugoslavia is sung 
on a variety of occasions. It forms, at the present time, or until very recently, the chief 
entertainment of the adult male population in the villages and small towns.”106 The 
tradition was still vibrant in post-war Yugoslavia as Joel Halpern noted about the villagers 
of Orašac: 
The patriotism and pride exhibited by the Orašasi are characteristics of all 
Serbs. They feel themselves to be much more that simple inhabitants of 
                                                 
104 Evans, Arthur, Through Bosnia and the Herzegóvina on foot during the insurrection, August and 
September 1875; with an historical review of Bosnia and a glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, and the 
ancient republic of Ragusa, Longmans, Greens and Co., London, 1877, 140. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Lord, Alfred, The Singer of Tales, Michell, Stephen, and Nagy, Gregory, (eds.), Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Second Edition, 2000, (1960), 14. 
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Serbia. They are the creators and defenders of their county. “We are Serbia”. 
This binding identity with their homeland had been reinforced over 
generations by the chanting of heroic epic poems, in stilling in almost every 
child a knowledge of, and love of, his country which he retains throughout his 
life.107 
And to fast forward again, the tradition of playing the gusle and chanting poems was 
notable among Serbs during the breakup of Yugoslavia. In a fascinating documentary film 
Serbian Epics directed by Paweł Pawlikowski, one can see chilling footage of members of 
the Bosnia Serb army besieging Sarajevo, barbequing a sheep, drinking rakija and 
chanting around two guslars:  
Oh pretty Turkish girl 
Our monks will soon baptize you 
Sarajevo in the valley 
The Serbs have encircled you 
The same men also chant the traditional songs about the Battle of Kosovo. Later in the 
same documentary, Radovan Karadžić, recites his own poetry and has a lofty discussion 
with the Russian writer Eduard Limonov, while looking down on the besieged city. In a 
less self-assured time, following Western intervention and a final lifting of the siege, many 
Serbs left Sarajevo, Louis Sell described the following pitiful scene: 
At the end of the war in Bosnia, I witnessed a Serb singer weaving a tale of 
lament that described the ongoing flight from Serb-held areas around Sarajevo. 
The singer – not, I believe blind – accompanied himself on the traditional one 
stringed gusle while all around him buildings burned and panic-stricken Serbs 
                                                 
107 Halpern, 293. Note that he was writing the 1950s, but local allegiance seems far stronger than 
Yugoslavia’s official Brotherhood and Unity.  
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loaded their families and belongings onto buses, cars, and wagons to flee 
incoming Bosnian forces.108  
It is quite extraordinary how the poetic tradition survived (or had been periodically 
revived). Čolović even goes as far as to suggest that, “It is impossible to govern Serbia 
without poetry.”109 His argument being that the present/past connection that the poetic 
tradition offers:  
The explanation of this interest of Serbian politics in poetry must be sought in 
our very lively romantic conception of poetry as the deepest, most authentic 
manifestation of human, and especially national aspirations. To be with poetry, 
to have at one’s side the dead and living giants of poetry, means to have an 
unbreakable connection with the people.110 
As epic poetry is so important, and in particular the epics about the Battle of Kosovo, I 
propose to comment briefly on the poems and aspects of their contents, which other 
commentators usually overlook. Authors such as Judah and Greenawalt quote the earlier 
poems in which Tsar Lazar is visited the Archangel Elijah and makes his famous choice 
between victory on earth or defeat but a defeat with the heavenly kingdom: 
'Lazar! Lazar! Tsar of noble family,  
Which kingdom is it that you long for most?  
Will you choose a heavenly crown today?  
Or will you choose an earthly crown?111  
                                                 
108 Sell, Louis, Slobodan Milošević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, Duke University Press, Durham 
and London, 2002, 368. 
109 Čolović, 149. One of the leading voices in the campaign against Kosovo’s independence is the 
actress Ivana Žigon. She is well known for reading her Prkosna Pesma (poem of protest) in public.  
110 Ibid. It might be said that Čolović’s own writing, exaggerated but insightful, aphoristic and dense is 
itself very poetic.  
111 The translation quoted is by John Matthias and Vladeta Vuckovic, Swallow Press/Ohio University 
Press, Athens, 1987, prefaced by Charles Simic, available at 
http://www.kosovo.net/sk/history/battle_of_kosovo.html. 
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Lazar, as mentioned earlier, agonises appropriately over the choice but commits himself 
the higher ideal: 
"O, Dearest God, what shall I do, and how?  
Shall I choose the earth? Shall I choose  
The skies? And if I choose the kingdom,  
If I choose an earthly kingdom now,  
Earthly kingdoms are such passing things-  
A heavenly kingdom, raging in the dark, endures eternally." 
And Lazarus chose heaven… 
This is the core of the poems; Lazar’s choice of the Heavenly Kingdom. By this choice, 
the Kosovo Myth claims divine right; this is the sanctioning of exceptionionalism. A 
group can only be exceptional vis-a-vis other groups; to make an exceptionalist claim is to 
define your group’ relationship to another group; this is a political act. As authors such as 
Ger Duijzings have rightly stated, that Kosovo Myth is “profoundly religious”,112 in fact 
the religious and political combine.  
A short word about the relationship of religion and politics in Serbian identity is merited. 
Odd as it sounds, while stressing the traditional importance of the Church to Serbs, 
especially during the Ottoman years, Petrovic comments that it quite indifferent to matters 
of doctrine:  
The role of the Serbian church had little to do with religion either as theology 
or as a set of personal beliefs and convictions. Rather, the Serbian church was 
a cultural and quasi-political institution, which embodied and expressed the 
ethos of the Serbian people to such a degree that nationality and religion fused 
into a distinctively “Serbian faith”.113  
                                                 
112 Duijzings, 176. 
113 Petrovich, i, 10. 
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So political as well as profoundly religious, the poem cycle seems to imaginatively 
combine Christian with pre- or non-Christian themes. It is interesting to try to detach the 
Christian elements from the non-Christian elements, insofar as this can be done. The two 
may overlap, but the Christian themes seem to be programmatic and predictable, whereas 
the pre-Christian seem much freer and more imaginative, and are all the more compelling 
for that.  
These Christian aspects are most recognisably the theme of martyrdom, the dramatic “last 
supper” scene on the night before the battle, and the mapping of the stories of Christ and 
Judas onto the figures of Lazar and Brankovic, and the Serbs are seen as fighting an 
enemy of Christianity. Indeed, many of the Christian elements of the cycle have numerical 
associations, the numbers 12 and 3 appear throughout the poems. These numbers have 
transparent religious associations, the 12 apostles and the Holy Trinity, a uniquely 
important symbol in Orthodox Christianity (and now a symbol of Serbian nationalism);  
? The number 3:  
• Obilić is one of 3 “blood brothers”  
• The Kosovo Maiden see 3 lords who each give a gift 
? The number 12: 
• There are 12 Bishops mentioned  
• Musich Stefan’s army lose 12,000 men  
• They march behind 12 banners 
• (Other accounts of the battle say that 12 Serbian lords broke through 
the ranks of the Turks allowing Obilić to kill Murad) 
 
By contrast, the non-Christian strain that will be traced below is provided by reference to 
the various birds that appear in the tale, for as I will argue, they form the most vital link to 
the deepest theme of the poems, the linking of earth and sky (heaven). 
The present thesis is not the place for a lengthy structural analysis of the poem cycle, but I 
would like to at least hint at one as briefly as possible, using the ideas of Lévi-Strauss. The 
poems can be broken down into binaries and opposites. We have the following set of 
opposing pairs: 
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• Earth/ Heaven 
• Christianity/Islam (understood as True Believer/Infidel) 
• Lazar the slain leader/Murat the slain leader 
• Traitor Brankovic/Hero-Assassin Obilić (a very strong bind, the 
assassin had been accused of treason by the traitor) 
 
It is a core belief of Lévi-Strauss that mythical thought proceeds by trying to reconcile 
opposites. This seems to be precisely vindicated by what these poems are trying to do, 
unify defeat and victory. It was mentioned that there are the recurring numbers 3 and 12, 
and another aspect of the poems in the recurring images of birds, which seems to be the 
core of the cycle.  
The poem cycle begins with a fragment, which immediately tells of a message delivered 
from Murat to Lazar. The first formal poem (quoted above) also begins with the 
transmission of a message:  
Yes, and from Jerusalem, O from that holy place,  
A great gray bird, a taloned falcon flew!  
And in his beak he held a gentle swallow. 
But wait! it's not a falcon, this gray bird,  
It is a saint, Holy Saint Eliyah: 
And he bears with him no gentle swallow  
But a letter from the Blessed Mother 
What is most interest here is the form of the message and the form in which it is delivered, 
a bird is carrying another bird. The messenger is a bird of prey, one often associated in 
Serbian culture with warriors, the falcon, the message is a sparrow (a non-hunting bird) 
before it is transformed into a letter.  
Indeed the linkage of warrior with falcon is made explicit later; when Obilić (the man who 
kills the Sultan) makes a vow to his blood brother, who replies: 
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O Miloš Obilić, I think you must be mad! 
Where do you suppose that tent is placed  
But in the middle of the vast encampment  
And even if you had a falcon's wings  
And flew down from the clear blue skies above  
Your wings would never fly you out again alive 
And, in fact, Obilić is killed as soon as he assassinates Sultan Murad. The wife of another 
hero Musich Stefan, who will also die in the battle, wakes the night before the battle and 
tells her servant of a premonition: 
Pity me; I've had an evil dream.  
I dreamed I saw a flock of doves in flight  
with two gray falcons flying on before them,  
Flying right before this very castle.  
They flew to Kosovo and landed there  
In Sultan Murad's cruel vast encampment- 
But never did I see them rise again. 
Again there are birds of prey with non-hunting birds, which are elsewhere compared to the 
Turks. In a later passage, a new bird species in introduced: 
Two black ravens fly to Krushevats  
From Kosovo, that wide and level plain, 
And land upon the narrow castle tower,  
The castle tower of Lazarus the Tsar.  
The first bird caws, the second starts to talk: 
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"Is this the tower of Glorious Lazarus,  
These ravens then speak with Lazar’s wife Militsa, telling her that her husband is slain, 
and while they are speaking the servant Milutin rides back wounded and Militsa asked 
about the battle. 
The two ravens are messengers in themselves but they also herald another (human) 
messenger (remember that the first falcon had also heralded another messenger, by turning 
into a Saint). What is different in the above passage is that unlike the previous birds 
(including the falcon prior to its transformation) the ravens can actually speak. 
One of the archetypical figures of the poem, the Mother of the Jugovici, hears of the death 
of not only her husband but also of her nine sons. She asks God to grant her the “eyes of a 
falcon, white wings of a swan” and her wish is granted. She is able to fly above the 
battlefield and sees her sons (and husband) who are compared to lions and falcons. She is 
later given grim confirmation of the death of one son, again by the interventions of two 
ravens: 
Two black ravens fly up to the castle,  
Their wings all red and bloody to the shoulders  
And their beaks all foaming with white foam. 
They carry there a warrior's severed hand  
With a wedding ring upon its finger  
And they drop it in the mother's lap. 
From these various passages we encounter birds as message and birds as messengers, 
whether obscurely as premonitions or very explicitly by the birds that can speak. The 
heroes and heroines are praised by comparison with bird-like features. (And the headgear 
of Serbian heroes is described as being decorated with feathers). However, some species 
are presented in strange contexts; most particularity the doves, so often a symbol of peace, 
being compared here to the enemy. And if one were to expand the parameters of the 
Kosovo Myth beyond this cycle, one would find a folk tradition that stated that upon the 
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death of Lazar, his daughters turned into cuckoos. This is quoted in the hugely influential 
Mountain Wreath (Gorski vijenac) of Petar Petrović Njegoš, which also has striking 
images of birds in the context of anti-Ottoman warfare; the Ottomans are seen as an owl, 
gulping a bird, “as Murat gulped Serbia” (almost an inversion of the opening image of the 
Kosovo cycle quoted above in which a flacon carries a sparrow). Another striking bird 
image in the Mountain Wreath is the description of a partridge in sexual terms: “A falcon 
seeks to find a partridge bird/ a partridge is a slender, timid bird/ but her body is like live, 
darting fire”.114Njegoš, like Karadjordje (to whom he dedicated the Mountain Wreath) 
was a larger than life individual and as one of the main promoters of the Kosovo Myth in 
the 19th Century.115 (Both Njegoš and Karadjordje are discussed below.) 
A latter contribution to this taxonomy is the eagle. This too is seen in an unfamiliar 
context; usually the king of winged predators, the eagle is downgraded to a scavenger 
(exactly like a raven or crow). For example, in a passage about Lazar's severed head, we 
read: 
Here before us lies a sovereign's noble head!  
In God's name it would be a sin 
If it were pecked at by the eagles and the crows  
Or trampled on by horses and by heroes"  
In the Matthias and Vuckovic translation quoted here there is an additional poem, which is 
not usually in the Kosovo Cycle (although it is about the Battle of Kosovo). A beautiful 
poem, it seems to me to be a “key” to the central theme of the Kosovo Myth. In this poem 
we read about the hero Prince Marko and an eagle (or falcon, depending on translation). 
Marko is wounded and is being sheltered from the sun by an eagle, who also gives the 
wounded man water from his beak. When a vila (a nymph in South Slavonic folklore) 
witnesses this, she asks what then man has done to deserve such treatment from an eagle. 
                                                 
114 Njegoš, Petar Petrovic, The Mountain Wreath, (Translated by Vasa D. Mihailovichor), available at 
http://www.rastko.rs/knjizevnost/umetnicka/Njegoš/mountain_wreath.html 
115 See, for example, Greenwalt, Alexander, “Kosovo Myths: Karadži , Njegoš, and the Transformation 
of Serb Memory”, available at http://www.yorku.ca/soi/Vol_3/_HTML/Greenawalt.html  
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The eagle – who very importantly is able to speak – relates that it had been at Kosovo, 
feasting on the flesh and blood of dead heroes. This is central, the bird that is normally a 
hunter (and, if an eagle, the king of winger hunters) is now behaving like a scavenger. The 
blood of heroes dried on its feathers and prevented the eagle from being able to fly. Marko 
took pity on the creature and took it away to a wood where a shower of rain washed the 
blood away, allowing the eagle to fry freely again: 
Then God sent Marko to me on that plain  
Who plucked me from the flowing blood of heroes  
And set me down behind him on the back of Sharats116.  
He took me straight into the nearest woods  
And put me on the green branch of a pine.  
Then a gentle rain began to rain.  
It fell down from the sky and washed my wings,  
Washed away the blood of noble heroes,  
And I could fly above beyond the forest  
And join all the eagles, join my swift companions. 
The core of the cycle is the tension between heaven and earth. Without the “loss” on earth, 
there is no right to the kingdom of heaven. Yet they remain separate realms, earth and sky. 
Hence surely the importance of the gallery of birds, creatures distinguished by their ability 
to fly, that is, travel between earth and sky (we must also try to imagine how incredible 
this must have seemed to the pre-Copernican imagination). One might also point to the 
site of the battle Kosovo Polje, which means “field of the blackbirds” (although this is 
probably just co-incidence). One might further point out that in traditional images of St. 
Vitus/Guido, he is usually accompanied by a bird. In Njegoš’ poem, the hero Obilić is 
seen in a dream flying on his horse. 
                                                 
116 Marko’s horse. 
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One can read the various birds as messengers and messages, interlopers between heaven 
and earth. To taxonomise, we have:  
? Blackbird (Kosovo Polje “Field of the Blackbirds”) 
? Falcon (messenger/warrior) 
? Swallow (message) 
? Doves (cowardly/weak enemy) 
? Swan (its wings are given to a heroine)   
o Raven (higher messenger) 
o Eagle (higher messenger) 
To extend the parameters to include Njegoš’ poem: 
? Owl (Ottoman empire) 
? Unnamed bird (devoured by the owl) 
? Cuckoo (daughters of Lazar) 
? Partridge (female “partner” to the falcon) 
Most interesting are the cases of the birds (raven and eagle) given the gift of human 
speech. If one recalls Lévi-Strauss’ myth readings, one must note that the raven is almost 
always an interloper (or in North American mythology, a "trickster") because – so the 
argument runs – it is a scavenger, not a bird of prey, that is, it is half-way between a 
carnivore and herbivore. 
Yet the eagle, twice mentioned in the poem cycle, is seen not a carnivore, which is very 
unusual, but rather as a seen as a scavenger. However, in that final poem about Marko and 
a bird, the eagle regains its ability to fly (and therefore its ability to hunt again) by having 
the blood of heroes washed from him; he graduates from scavenger to hunter. 
Furthermore, this is this done by one of the only ways the sky can connect to earth, rain, 
which cleans the eagle of the blood of the dead men it has feasted on, and allows the bird 
to fly again, that is, frees the bird to be able to reach the sky. This is what Lévi-Strauss 
called a “mediating structure”: 
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If we keep in mind that mythical thought always progresses from the 
awareness of oppositions toward their resolution, the reason for these choices 
becomes clearer. We need only assume that two opposite terms with no 
intermediary always tend to be replaced by two equivalent terms which admit 
of a third one as a mediator; then one of the polar terms and the mediator 
become replaced by a new triad, and so on. Thus we have a mediating 
structure of the following type:117 
 
These poems present us with creatures that mediate between earth and sky. Of these 
creatures, two are higher order mediators, gifted with speech. Both are carrion eaters, 
scavengers, in this case, a raven and an eagle. The latter presents an identical structure: 
Heaven 
  Rain 
    Hunter 
      Eagle 
    Scavenger 
  Blood 
Earth 
                                                 
117 Lévi-Strauss, 1963, 224. 
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Surely this is why the battle has been held to be a profound defeat; something as precious 
as a place in heaven for your people could not be purchased by a narrow loss in battle; the 
sacrifice had to be vast. This perhaps offers an answer to Bogert’s question regarding what 
would cause a people to perpetuate such a paradigm (of defeat) even after the historical 
circumstances would seemingly have allowed for its sublimation or even its retirement? 
Heavenly Serbia had to be purchased by a huge loss. As an old Serbian folk proverb puts 
it, “If I was meant to have it good, they wouldn’t have killed Lazar at Kosovo”.  
3.3 Serbia in the 19th Century 
The following chapter traces the cultural and political legacy of the battle of Kosovo as it 
re-emerges in circumstances where it can be officially sanctioned, that is, when a Serbian 
“nation” starts to emerge in the 19th Century. This chapter is an informal attempt at 
microhistory, seeking to trace larger patterns by focusing (at least to begin with) on one or 
two representative lives. This is a matter of scale, that is, of trying to cover a lot of ground 
without getting lost in too much detail. In dealing with the 19th Century, I have in mind 
Hobsbawm’s “long 19th Century” which stretches from the French Revolution until the 
First World War (he follows up on this idea by positing a “short 20th Century” 1914-1989). 
This model could not suite my subject more; Serbia had one of the most successful revolts 
of the Napoleonic period, and the cult of Kosovo and Vidivodan is what ignites (although 
it did not by any means cause) the First World War. Furthermore the period that ends 1989 
also coincides with the post-Tito revival of the cult of Kosovo, most notably when 
Slobodan Milošević started to reinvent himself as a nationalist when speaking in Kosovo 
on Vidovdan 1989, the 600th anniversary of the battle.  
  
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
Picture 1 David and Leon Koen. 
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3.3.1 The Serbian Coen Brothers 
 
As on one occasion he was looking from Pancevo at the right bank of the 
Danube, towards Belgrade and the castle of Kalemegdan, the Polish humorist 
Stanislav Jerzy Lec said that where he was standing, on the left bank, he still 
felt at home, inside the frontiers of the old Habsburg monarchy, whereas for 
the other side of the river was immediately “abroad”, foreign parts. The 
Danube was, in fact, the border between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 
Kingdom of Serbia.118 
There is something of the “normal exception” about the lives of these two brothers, and 
they seem to embody several of the most important aspect of Serbian experience in the 
mid and late 19th Century.119 Not least is the fact that like the brothers, there were in effect 
two Serbian entities; the Austro-Hungarian ruled area of Vojvodina, and the autonomous 
Ottoman Serbian lands, south of the river Danube and including Belgrade.120 Although 
slightly smaller demographically,121 Vojvodina was is a sense the older brother, with a 
more educated and developed population. It had less autonomy; it was proclaimed the 
Vojvodina (Dukedom) of Serbia following the upheavals of 1848, but was fully integrated 
into Hungary after the establishment of the Dual Monarchy in 1867. Nonetheless, it was 
the home of the most advanced Serbian community; Serbia’s main economic product – 
pigs – were exported via Vojvodina merchants and in rebellious times, guns were imported 
from there. Indeed the term for “foreign” Serbs was prečani (from preko, across) meaning 
those who lived across the Danube or Sava.   
There were, of course, other brothers, that is, the dispersed Serbs of Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and “Old Serbia” meaning Kosovo, the lost land, site of the legendary battle 
and spiritual core of Serbian nationalism. A popular expression stated that; “Montenegro 
                                                 
118 Claudio Magris, Danube, Harvill Panter, 1989 (1986), 330-331. 
119 This chapter is deeply indebted to Vesna Adic’s paper “The Tragic Story of Leon Koen, the First Sephardi 
Painter from Belgrade: A Symbolist and Admirer of Nietzsche” presented at a Workshop Jewish Art and 
Tradition, held at the University of Belgrade, 27 January–10 February 2008 and published online at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/20885576/Vesna-Adic-The-Tragic-Story-of-Leon-Koen-A-Symbolist-and-
Admirer-of-Nietzsche 
120 Having gained de facto autonomy after the uprisings of 1804 and 1815, Serbia was a de jure autonomous 
Principality (Sanjak) from 1832, and would become a fully independent country in 1878. 
121 They covered almost the same area, but Vojvodina had large Hungarian and German populations, unlike 
the more homogenous province of Serbia. 
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with its doughty warriors saved the Serbs form despair, the Vojvodina with its schools and 
presses saved them from ignorance”.122 It might also be noted that a later polity that would 
incorporate Serbia, Yugoslavia was – at least in its second incarnation 1945-1991 – 
predicated on Bratstvo, (brotherhood.) 
Leon Koen123 (1859–1934) was a Serbian painter, of Sephardic Jewish background. He 
was described as an awkward and introverted youth, and seems to have discovered his 
artistic talent almost by accident, while working as a tailor and dressmaker. Koen first took 
private art lessons, and later formally trained in Munich (while also studying philosophy). 
While in Munich, he became acquainted with symbolism and would be the first painter to 
introduce symbolism into Serbia, which was then dominated by historical painting. Much 
as another Belgrade Jewish painter Moshe Pijade – later a famous partisan and politician – 
was the first person to translate Marx into Serbian, Leon Koen was also the first person to 
translate the works of Nietzsche into Serbian. (Nietzsche – perhaps only superficially 
understood – combined with the cult of Kosovo, would be one of the influences on the 
angry young nationalists of the Young Bosnia movement, see below). Leon Koen suffered 
from severe psychological problems and stopped painting suddenly in middle age, never 
to return to it. Lamentably, most of his works were destroyed during the Second World 
War; only 15 remain, of which some are only sketches. The introverted younger Koen 
seems to have been strongly influenced by his older brother’s formidable personality and 
sense of dual identity. 
David Koen (1854-1915), was a lawyer and passionate Serbian nationalist, who authored, 
among other things ‘A Sermon to Serbian Youth of Moses’ Faith, a plea for Jews to 
embrace Serbian identity while keeping their own traditions. The older Koen was literally 
his brother’s keeper; the painter spent much of his life living with the writer and his 
family. David Koen was a commissar in the First Balkan War of 1912, in which Kosovo 
was “liberated” by the Serbs. Koen would be killed by Bulgarians during the First World 
War because he admitted to writing and refused to renounce a book called Bog čuva Srbiju 
(“God Protects the Serbs – The Apotheosis of the Serbian Genius in the Light of 
Religion”). The Bulgarians made plans for a unified South Slav entity in Belgrade in 1860, 
                                                 
122Quoted in Stavrianos, L.S., The Balkans since 1452, New York University Press, New York, 2001 (1958), 
235. 
123 The typical Serbian Latin spelling is Koen. 
 
 
 
 
65 
their Bulgarian Legion (including their national hero, Vasil Levski) were trained by the 
Serbs, and even one of the first Bulgarian newspaper Dunavski lebed (Swan of the 
Danube) was published in Belgrade, financed by the Serbian government.124 Despite this 
level of cooperation and mentorship, the Bulgarians would go to war with (and indeed 
defeat) the Serbs in 1885, and were then defeated by the Serbs in the Second Balkan War 
of 1913. They were again on opposite sides during the First World War. (Notable 
especially was the brutality of the Bulgarian occupation of areas of Serbia.)125 By this act 
of heroic defiance, telling his captors “I am the author of that book, and I cannot renounce 
it, because all that was written there was my firm conviction.”126 David Koen earned 
himself a small (Jewish) space in Serbia’s formidable martyrology. Leon, whose mental 
stability was further shaken by the death of his older brother, would self-identify as a 
martyr himself, although a Christian one; in later life he always carried a Serbian 
translation of the New Testament with him, grew a long beard and started to identify with 
Jesus.  
During the period 1881–82 Leon Koen began taking private painting lessons with Stevan 
Todorovic, a renowned Serbian painter of that time.127 Todorovic’s painting Hajduk Veljko 
next to the Cannon (1860) was one of the national icons symbolising the Serbian struggle 
for independence from the Turks. 
Koen’s own paintings reflected his dual identity, and combined Jewish and biblical themes 
such as Joseph’s Dream, The Finding of Moses, and the Eternal Jew, with “national” 
themes, such as Djuradj Brankovic and The Turks Kidnap Serbian Maidens for the Harem, 
which was exhibited at the World Exhibition in 1900, an early exercise in what we now 
call national “branding”. (Among other painters whose works were displayed in the 
                                                 
124 Dmitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, Colombia 
University Press, New York, 1981, 125. 
125 See Andrei Mitrovic’s Serbia’s Great War, Hurst and Company, London, 2007, 221-232.  
126 Quoted in Mihailo B. Miloshevic, Jevreji Za Slobodu Serbije (Jews for Serbian Freedom)1912-1918, 
Filip Visnjic, Beograd, 1995, 8.  
127 1832-1925, was a Novi Sad-born painter, very much of national romantic school. He trained in Vienna 
and Munich before establishing himself in Belgrade, where he opened a school to mentor younger painters.  
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various national128 pavilions was Axel Gallen-Kallela representing Finland, and a 19 year 
Andalusian called Picasso representing Spain.) 
It was an interesting image by which Serbia chose to present itself, that of a female victim. 
Serbs were known as warriors in the late 19th and early 20th Century, admired when 
fighting the Turks, but reviled when they committed regicide in 1903. Rado ide Srbin u 
vojnike (Gladly does the Serb become a soldier) was one of the Serbian tunes upon which 
Tchaikovsky based his famous Marche Slave or Serbo-Russian March of 1876 (the march 
was written to raise money for Russian volunteers who fought in the Serbo-Turkish war of 
that year).129 Yet at the world exhibition, Serbia showed a feminine and vulnerable image 
of itself. 
19th Century orientalist art produced many self-consciously exotic paintings on the theme 
of Harems, odalisques and slave girls. Famous examples would include Ingres’ Le Bain 
Turc (1862), and his much earlier La Grande Odalisque (1814). The idealized images of 
the Orient seem to open a door onto a repressed area of Western sexuality; many of the 
images are of a sexual nature, as though the exotic was a license for the erotic. Many of 
the images may seek to portray Victorian moral outrage, but they betray Victorian sexual 
repression. Jean-Leon Gerom’s oriental images are often eroticised, and some paintings – 
such as The Slave Market (c. 1884) are shamelessly voyeuristic. Other paintings in this 
genre, such as the The Bulgarian Martyresses, by Russia painter Konstantin Makovsky 
(1887), have a pointed political message, though the content is still voyeuristic. 
Noteworthy is the degree to which the women – all seen in subservient roles, concubines 
or slaves – look white and European, in contrast to their captors who are typically exotic, 
often with black African features, such as one of the figures in Makovsky’s painting. This 
polarising tendency is exactly as was described by Edward Said; “the Oriental becomes 
more Oriental, the Westerner more Western.”130 The motif of the “Turk” as a violator of 
European women was not confined to the visual arts; if it provided theatrical colour for 
Mozart’s opera The Abduction from the Seraglio, it was more political in Turgenev’s On 
                                                 
128 Some of the pavilions represented autonomous regions, such as Finland and Bosnia, rather than 
independent countries. 
129 Brown, David, Tchaikovsky: A Biography and Critical Study, Volume II The Crisis Years (1874-
1878) Victor Gollancz, London, 1982, 100-102. 
130 Said, Edward,Orientalism, Western Conceptions of the Orient, Penguin, London, 1991 (1978), 45. 
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the Eve. In Turgenev’s novel, the Bulgarian hero Insarov – who is mistaken for both a 
Serb and a Montenegrin – is the son of a woman who was later raped and murdered by a 
Turk (there is an actual Serbian character, Vulich in Lermantov’s Hero of Our Times).  
What is interesting about Koen’s The Turks Kidnap Serbian Maidens for the Harem was 
its lack of voyeuristic elements; there is violence but not sexual. It probably provides some 
insight into Koen’s naive personality. In another linking of Maiden and Nation, Serbia’s 
most famous painting, the Kosovo Maiden (Kosovka devojka, 1919) by Uroš Predić would 
combine the ideals of female purity with the Kosovo legacy (the figure depicted is the 
maiden who attends the wounded and fallen Serbian warriors after the battle). Although a 
very different artist, Predić was a champion of Koen. 
Koen as a Jewish painter was politically engaged – and allowed to be – in a way that, for 
example, the Russian Jewish painter Isaac Levitan (1860-1900, born within a year of 
Koen) was not, confining himself to his famous spiritual landscapes and occasionally 
portraiture (although one can note the exception of The Vladimirka Road, painted in 1892, 
which depicted the road by which convicts were transported to Siberia). Koen would also 
later become a set painter for the National Theater in Belgrade, which was founded in 
1868.131 In fact, a Serbian theater had already been founded in Novi Sad, Vojvodina in 
1861. As in other matters such as education and intellectual life, Vojvodina’s Serbian 
community were more advanced than their fellow Serbs in the Ottoman Empire. 
According to Adic, one of Koen’s national paintings (mentioned above) was probably 
inspired by a play he saw as a teenage in the National Theater of Belgrade, “Djuradj 
Brankovic”.132 This was the first play ever performed in Belgrade’s theater, and took as its 
subject Serbia’s pre-Ottoman history. Many other pieces written for the theater would also 
take up these historical themes. In 1903, among the concerts and plays that were 
performed in Belgrade’s theater there were the following; “Miloš Obilić, a Historical 
Tragedy” (42nd showing), “Dusan, a Tragedy” (16th showing) and the Battle of Kosovo, a 
Historical Tragedy” (16th showing).  
                                                 
131 This awkward title, Narodno Pozorište u Beogradu, distinguishes it from the Serbian National Theater 
(Srpsko Narodno Pozorište) which existed already in Novi Sad. 
132 Djuradj (George) Brankovic had decidedly crossed lineage (at least to a traditionally Serbian view of 
things) being the son of Tzar Lazar’s daughter and the son of Vuk Brankovic, the man traditionally cursed as 
the traitor of the 1389. Djuradj was despot of Serbia from 1427-1456, when he died aged 91. 
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It is also of note that when the new rival to stage – film – became established in Serbia, its 
first subject was also historical. The first ever Serbian film was shot in 1911 and it was a 
life of Karadjordje. Two early scenes are of particular interest; young George plays with 
other boys, organising them as Turks and Hujuks. Then a blind guslar comes to sing for 
the boys. The intertitle states that he is Filip Višnjić the famous guslar and singer (from 
whom Vuk Karadžić heard many of the songs he transcribed). The blind man sings about 
the Battle of Kosovo, (the intertitle informs the audience that he is singing about the defeat 
of Tzar Lazar in and the death of Sultan Murat “at the hand of the hero Miloš Obilić”).  
In the next scene the boy is minding the pigs when “he encounters a wonton Turk”. Being 
challenged, he kills the Turk “in righteous indignation” (he even comes back into view to 
kick the corpse) takes his weapons and flees to become a legend (leaving the poor pigs to 
fend for themselves…). This was 1911, and anti-Turkish feelings were running high, they 
would explode into open war a year later.  
In the distinction between civil society and political society, culture is usually held to be in 
the realm of civil society. But this depends largely on the state of development of the 
society in question, the degree to which its institutions are established and autonomous. It 
is argued here that an emerging society, the civil/political dichotomy is far less clear than 
in a more mature society, which will be less centralised and far more diversified. Serbia in 
the “long” 19th Century was certainly an emerging society, struggling for independence, 
developing institutions and a shared identity. This latter was done through culture, but 
culture was politicised to a high degree.  
Many aspects of the lives of the Koen brothers were miniatures of the concerns of the 
emerging Serbian nation: the need to educate people and build a culture (visual, literary 
and dramatic), the sense of national mission (and the role of religion in society; which 
would change with the pivotal Berlin Conference; Jews were given full religious rights), 
the glorious past (exemplified by the pre-1389 Serbian Kingdom), the troubled 
relationship with the rival Orthodox and south Slavonic country Bulgaria, and above all, 
the search for outside models, and the related need to impress outside powers. These were 
very much the concerns of an emerging “nation”. 
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3.3.2 The uprising and after 
Serbs made their first bit for something that might be called nationhood, with the uprising 
of 1804-1813. The revolt against the Dahias (leading Janissary133) was a rebellion against 
local Ottoman governors, not against Constantinople as such; in fact the Sultan, Selim III 
– a reformer who struggled against the prevailing conservatism of his administration – 
supported the rebels against the Janissaries, who were beyond the central control of the 
Sublime Porte (a systemic problem in the late Ottoman Empire). The leaders of the revolt 
would repeatedly tell the Sultan that they wished to remain loyal to him, though not to his 
corrupt subordinates.134 
The revolt had been provoked by the brutal Slaughter of the Knigez (lit. Princes, local 
headmen, usually the elected spokesmen of the extended families Zadruga, which were 
the backbone of Serbian economic and communal life) that was ordered by the Dahias; 
some 200 Knignez were murdered. The Serbian rebellion was headed by George Petrovic 
(1768-1817) who would become known as Karadjordje (Black George). His “black” 
character has often enough been commented upon: he was willing to personally administer 
punishment, corporeal and capital. Although an illiterate pig farmer, he was a formidable 
leader and warrior. No less a historian than Leopold von Ranke considered Karadjordje to 
be “a very extraordinary man”: 
Of lofty stature, spare, and broad shouldered, his face seamed by a large scar, 
and enlivened with sparkling, deep-set eyes, he could not fail to be instantly 
recognized. He would spring form his horse, for he preferred fighting on foot, 
and though his right hand had been disabled by a wound received when he was 
a Heyduc, he contrived to use his rifle most skillfully. Whenever he appeared, 
                                                 
133 An Ottoman innovation, an elite corps of troops, typically captured slaves who were not allowed to 
marry but rather maintained a level of professional dedication that was ahead of their time. By the late 
Ottoman period however, they had become corrupt and self-serving. Their reputation for brutality was 
notable. 
134 Glenny, 2000, 8. 
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the Turks became panic-stricken; for victory was believed to be inevitably his 
companion.135 
Unsurprisingly, the unlikely alliance of ill-disciplined Serbian rebels and the Sultan with 
their divergent agendas did break down. The Porte was happy about the Dahias’ defeat, 
but was worried about the autonomy that the rebels gained, and the demands made by 
Karadjordje. 
The rebellion was about real economic grievance, but it was, as Pavlowitch notes, not so 
much ideological as millennial; folk rumours predicted the return of Prince Marko.136 The 
only “ideology” that Karadjordje could use was rhetoric about the Battle of Kosovo. To 
quote Dushan Batakovic: 
The main source of historical knowledge – apart from folk poetry, oral 
historical chronicles about medieval glory, the struggle against the Turks and 
the desire to renew the empire lost in the Battle of Kosovo (1389) – were the 
works of "monastic historicism", compilations of older history books made in 
the eighteenth century.137 
Most Serbs were illiterate and their history was largely transmitted through the folk poetry, 
most especially the Kosovo Cycle, which was sung and chanted for centuries, and first 
published by the Serbian linguistic reformer Vuk Karadžić in the early 19th Century (for a 
lengthy analysis of the cycle, see section 2.2 above). Karadjordje further revived the 
Kosovo Myth by declaring himself Kum (Godfather) to any ninth child born in Serbia 
(godparentage, Kumstvo, was along with Zadruga, was vital in Serbian family and 
communal life). The tradition of the ninth child, goes back to the Mother of the Jugovici, a 
woman in the Kosovo cycle, who supposedly lost her husband and nine sons at the Battle 
of Kosovo. Strangely, given that he was suspicious of nationalism and not himself Serbian, 
Tito would revive this pattern of godparentage in Socialist Yugoslavia (for more on this, 
see section 3.4). 
                                                 
135 von Ranke, Leopold, A History of Servia, and the Servian Revolution, (Translated by Mrs Alexsander 
Kerr) Hamburg 1829, John Murray, London, 1847, 205. 
136 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia, The History behind the Name, Hurst, London, 2002, 28. 
137Ilija Garašanin's "Nacertanije" A Reassessment, Balkanica, vol. XXV-1, Belgrade, 1994, available at 
http://www.rastko.rs/istorija/batakovic/batakovic-nacertanije_eng.html 
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As would happen often throughout the next two centuries, external circumstances – the 
ambitions of the great European powers – suddenly altered facts in the Balkans. Russia, 
which had been protector of the Christian interests in the Ottoman-controlled Balkans, 
first helped the Serbs but then dropped its support in 1812, when its troops withdrew to 
Russia to help against Napoleon's invasion. A treaty was signed between Russia and 
Turkey and defeated, Karadjordje fled the county. When he later tried to return during the 
Second Serbian Uprising of 1815-1817 he was murdered (almost certainly on the orders of 
his rival Miloš Obrenović). Miloš was responsible for considerable developments in 
Serbia's economic life (making himself very wealthy in the process), and his Pasha-like 
rule was eventually curbed by a movement to establish a constitution. It must be noted that 
in political/economic terms Serbia was notably egalitarian, especially for an agrarian 
culture; most famers were small holders, there was no landed gentry who ruled over vast 
estates like there were in Romanian Principalities or Russia or elsewhere in Europe. Nor 
was there an institution of serfdom.  
The Defenders of the Constitution or Constitutionalists (Ustavobranitelji) were led by Ilija 
Garašanin (1812-1874) who was probably the most significant Serbian politician of the 
19th Century. Garašanin was – among other achievements and frustrations – the author of 
a national “plan” Nacertanije (also translated as “project”, or most accurately as sketch” 
from the verb nacrtati to draw) of 1844. The document is of large historical importance, 
and was very influential until 1918. From a post-Yugoslavian perspective it could be seen 
as either a blueprint for a Greater Serbia or for a crypto Yugoslav entity (it could not 
realistically be both). Politically, Garašanin was a defender of the so called “Turkish” 
constitution of 1838, which was written in the Port to place restraints on Miloš Obrenović 
(who had replaced Karadjordje; these two families – Obrenović and Karadjordjević – 
would violently contest the crown of Serbia throughout the century). A practical politician, 
he was able to maintain links with both Croatian bishop Josip Strossmayer (1815-1905) 
one of the leading “Illyrianists”138 and a crypto-Yugoslav and Petar Petrović Njegoš the 
Prince/Bishop (Vladika) of Montenegro mentioned above, a great romantic poet and 
Serbian nationalist. Although both were Bishops, Strossmayer and Njegoš could hardly be 
                                                 
138 Napoleon had founded an Illyrian state in areas now containing Slovenia and northern Croatia. Despite 
these regions returning to Austrian rule, Illyrianism continued to grow as an aspiration, especially among 
Croats who – in marked contrast to 20th Century Croatian nationalists – saw their best chance of statehood as 
being part of a South Slav entity, probably under Serbian leadership. 
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more different; the Croat was ecumenical139, his dream of a South Slav land (Yugoslavia) 
was driven by a wish that Western (Catholic) and Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity could 
overcome their differences (in socialist Yugoslavia, Tito would often speak very highly of 
him).140 Indeed, Strossmayer was a friend of Gladstone and has been compared to John 
Henry Cardinal Newmann, the English catholic. Although Gladstone did admire – from a 
safe distance – Montenegrins (“a band of heroes such as the world has rarely seen stand on 
the rocks of Montenegro, and are ready now, as they have ever been during the 400 years 
of their exile from their fertile plains, to sweep down from their fastnesses and meet the 
Turks at any odds for the re-establishment of justice and of peace in those countries”),141 
these liberals seem a world away from Njegoš' Manichaean imagination. Njegoš was 
intolerant by temperament, a tribal-minded Montenegrin; his most famous work The 
Mountain Wreath (Gorski vijenac) praises the killing of religious converts. 
The plan was a secret document, intended only for the eyes of influential politicians, and 
this secretive nature may have added to its gravitas; it was not published until 1905. It is, 
of course, anachronistic to see it in 20th Century terms; but it is worth examining because 
it give great insight into the political and cultural predicaments and challenges faced by 
Serbian leadership in the period of emerging nationhood. 
The “plan”, brief though the document is, touches upon some the of the most important 
issues facing Serbia in the mid and late19th Century; how to get free of Ottoman influence, 
what Western and other outside models and influences to accept, the Bosnian Question 
(and more generally, how to forge some unity with the scattered Serbian communities) the 
role of Russia142 in Serbian affairs, and the troubled rivalry with Bulgaria. The document 
                                                 
139 For more on Strossmayer see, Marcus Tanner, Croatia, A Nation Forged in War, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London, 2010 (1997), 94-101. 
140 Alexander, Stella Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1979, 58. 
141 Gladstone in House of Commons, May 1877, Hansard, HC Deb 07 May 1877 vol 234 cc366-476. 
142 It is notable how suspicious the Serbs were of Russia, and how relatively cool they were in their pan-
Slavism. For the Russians, pan-Slavism must have been a large burden on their political calculus. Referring 
to Russian dilemmas and its choices for involvement in the Balkans, Alfred J. Rieber writes: “The tension 
between Russia’s obligations to the European system and to the Orthodox-Slavic population of the Ottoman 
Empire spawned a series of crises throughout the nineteenth century: the Greek War for Independence in the 
1820s, the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and the rapid succession of crises from 1907 to 
1914. In each case, Russian policymakers were torn between two courses of action. One was to attempt to 
resolve the crisis within the context of European diplomacy; the other was to intervene unilaterally in the 
name of a higher allegiance to Slavic or Orthodox solidarity disguised by appeals to Russian national 
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speaks of a sense of national “mission”; in this, it was very much of its time, this was after 
all the era of Hegelian geist, “manifest destiny”, “the Russian idea”, the Greek Megali 
Idea (Great Idea) and of the Forza del Destino of numerous nationalisms. Since the 
upheavals of 1789, Europe was haunted by the spectre of revolution, and imbued with the 
spirit of romanticism. The Balkans, although less developed than Western Europe, were 
not immune to such influence. As Stavrianos writes, speaking of 1789 and the subsequent 
Napoleonic wars: 
...there can be no doubt about the very real influence of French revolutionary 
ideology upon certain sections of the Balkan people. Masonic lodges and other 
secret organizations were established in the principle towns. Newspapers were 
founded dedicated to the overthrow of Turkish dominations. The revolutionary 
ideology may not have been transferred intact from West to East, and the 
concepts of liberty, equality, and fraternity may have been but barely 
comprehended. Yet the uprisings in Paris and the exploits of Napoleon made 
the subject Balkan peoples more restless, more independent and more 
determined to win their freedom.143 
However, other scholars such as Djordjevic and Fischer-Galati do stress the local 
conditions and pressures; arguing that it is misguided to see the Serbian Revolution of 
1804 as “an offshoot of the French Revolution”.144 For them, “the Serbian uprising should 
be considered as an expression of indigenous exasperation over the ever-increasing abuses 
                                                                                                                                                   
interest. . . . In the 1870s, rebellions in Bosnia and the Bulgarian provinces of the Ottoman Empire once 
again plunged official Russia into a crisis over intervention. Alexander II was no pan-Slav; his leading 
ministers opposed the war. But the pressure of the vociferous nationalist-Panslav right – organized in Slavic 
committees, sustained by elements of the press, and buoyed by a widespread surge of sympathy from the 
Russian-educated public – created an atmosphere in which the government could not easily abstain from 
intervention without seriously compromising its honor and prestige both at home and abroad.” Quoted in 
“Virtual War, Virtual Journalism?: Russian Media Responses to ‘Balkan’ Entanglements in Historical 
Perspective, 1877-2001”, workshop paper, Kennedy Center for European Studies, Brown University, 2002. 
For a detailed treatment of Serbian/Russian pan-Slavism, see MacKenzie, David, The Serbs and Russian 
Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878, Cornell University Press, New York, 1967. 
143 Stavrianos, 211. 
144 Djordjević, Djordjević, and Fischer-Galati, Stephen, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1981, 68. 
 
 
 
 
74 
perpetrated by military and political unites of the declining Ottoman Empire against the 
Serbian people…”145 
Garašanin’s Plan took as given that the Ottoman Empire was doomed, and that Serbdom 
would benefit from this and would regain its pre-1389 glory:  
The Ottoman Empire must disintegrate and this disintegration can only occur 
in two possible ways: 
1. either it will be partitioned, or 
2. it will be rebuilt anew by its Christian inhabitants.146 
With this future in mind, the past is then evoked: 
The Serbian state which has already seen its good start, but must strive to 
expand and become stronger, has its roots and firm foundation in the Serbian 
Empire of the 13th and 14th centuries and in the glorious and rich Serbian 
history. It is known from this history that the Serbian rulers began to assume 
the position held by the Greek [i.e., Byzantine] Empire and almost succeeded 
in making an end of it in order to replace the collapsed Eastern Roman Empire 
with a Serbian-Slavic Empire. Emperor Dusan the Mighty had even adopted 
the coat-of-arms of the Greek Empire… 
These foundations and walls of the Serbian Empire, therefore, must be cleared 
of all ruins and debris, and brought to light, so that a new edifice may be 
constructed on this solid and durable historical foundation. Such an enterprise 
will be endowed with inestimable importance and great prestige among all the 
nations and their cabinets; for then we Serbs shall appear before the world as 
the true heirs of our illustrious forefathers, doing nothing new but restoring 
their legacy. 
Hence, our present will not be without a link to the past, but they will make an 
interdependent, integrated, and well-ordered whole; thus, the Serbdom, its 
                                                 
145 Ibid. 
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nationality and the life of its state stand under the protection of the sacred 
historical right.147 
Garašanin shows a certain conservative temperament; his evocation of the past is not 
breezy romanticism, rather it is the restoration of legal rights (and not an act of 
revolution); “Our aspirations cannot be reproached as something novel and unfounded, as 
revolution and coup; but all must acknowledge that they are politically necessary, 
grounded in ancient ages…”148 
External circumstances would soon provide a very compelling model for Serbia and its 
political aspirations. The Italian Risorgimento – and the eventual declaration of an Italian 
Kingdom in 1861 – pointed the way for Serbia. Serbia would seek to become the South 
Slav Piedmont, the eventual center around which a South Slav entity would be 
constructed. Later politicians such as the Liberal Jovan Ristic (1831-1899) and Prince 
Michael Obrenović were very conscious of the Piedmont model; in fact, the latter knew 
Giuseppi Mazzani – the founder of Young Italy – personally. The question was would 
other Balkan peoples be attracted into such a project? As of 1844, when he wrote the Plan, 
Garašanin sounds like a man trying to suppress his own considerable doubts, and his 
language is notably unconvincing. “If we consider the revival of the Serbian Empire from 
this standpoint, then other South Slavs will easily understand this idea and accept it with 
joy”.149 His argumentation again goes back to Serbia’s gloried past, in the hope that it 
alone will be enough to get neighboring peoples onboard:  
…no European country is the memory of the historical past so vivid as among 
the Slavs of Turkey, for whom the recollection is intense and faithful of the 
celebrated figures and events of their history. Therefore, it may be counted as 
certain that this enterprise will be readily accepted among the people, making 
unnecessary decades of activity among them, just in order to prepare them to 
understand utility and value of an independent administration.150 
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However progress in attracting other South Slavs into some form of unified entity was not 
sufficiently rapid, and as Pavlowitch notes; “Serbia offered a mixed picture at the end of 
the 19th century...there was progress but it was not very attractive for Serbs outside its 
borders, yet alone other South Slavs.”151 Serbia was not able to inspire much confidence 
until the early 20th Century. One of the turning points, argue Djordjevic and Fischer-
Galati, was the active role played by Belgrade University, which drew many Croatian 
students and also Bulgarian students when the University of Sofia was closed in 1907.152 
But it was really by its later achievement of winning both Balkan Wars of 1912-13, that 
made it look like Serbia was sufficiently sturdy to become the Piedmont of a South Slav 
entity. It was in the first of the Balkan wars – in which Kosovo was “liberated” by Serbian 
troops – that David Koen served (in one of his speeches, Koen spoke in highly romantic 
terms about the Serbian national “mission” saying that “Serbia is entrusted with the key 
that opens the door for the miraculous crossing to the east ... Serbia is the Piedmont of the 
East!”).153  
It is worth dwelling on Koen’s belief in the Serbian national genius. From a Jewish point 
of view, he was an arch-assimilationist (interestingly when he spoke of the Battle of 
Kosovo, he spoke in classical historical terms of it as “our Thermopylae” he avoided 
religious/mythic language. One must guess this was because of his different religion?). 
Koen belonged to the same generation as the founder of Zionism; Theodore Herzl was 
born in the Hungarian capital Budapest, but his family hailed from Zemun (then a separate 
town and part of Hungary, now part of Belgrade). Koen’s Besede (speeches) was 
published in 1897, just one year after Hertzl published the Der Judenstaat. In this seminal 
work Herzl wrote: 
We have honestly endeavored everywhere to merge ourselves in the social life 
of surrounding communities and to preserve the faith of our fathers. We are 
not permitted to do so. In vain are we loyal patriots, our loyalty is some places 
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running to extremes; in vain do we make the same sacrifices of life and 
property as our fellow citizens.154  
Herzl could well have been describing Koen, with his loyalty running almost to extremes, 
and who certainly did make the ultimate “sacrifice of life”.  
Pivotal to this nation-building was the reform and standardising of the Serbian language, 
which was carried out by Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864). Karadžić was a huge figure in the 
history of Serbia; if only as a collector of folklore he was as important a figure as Elias 
Lönnrot was in Finnish culture, and the many comparable figures at this time; Herder and 
the Brothers Grimm in German culture, Kruetzvald (collector of the Kalevipoeg) in 
Estonian, and Andreas Pumpurs in Latvian. Indeed as Vilmos Voigt argued in is 
assessment of his life and achievements:  
Karadžić could stand as a stereotype of such men: the son of a peasant family, 
an irregular student; a man of letters, or more precisely a scribe; a volunteer 
when it came to war, but often ill, hardly able to walk, he still travelled widely, 
a customs officer, variously alleged to be an Austrian and Russian spy, and for 
a time President of the Serbian Court of Law; translator of the New Testament 
(paid from Russian sources) and at the same time of the Code Napoleon, 
protagonist and antagonist of Serbian and other rulers….meeting leading 
German scholars such as Jacob Grimm, poets such as Goethe…155 
Common to Karadžić and these other figures across Europe was a belief that a unique 
“national” genius existed and could be unearthed by the tabulation and study of folk 
culture, a cultural “nationalism” that would, in different times and locations, become a 
political nationalism whenever circumstances allowed.  
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3.3.3 Cultural revival and Vidovdan as a festival 
Despite mixed success in its state-building efforts, Serbia could boast of some formidable 
cultural achievements. This was again typical of its time, the correlation between language 
and nation was one of the new ideas that Herder and others had put into circulation. 
Karadžić also met with Ljudevit Gaj (1809-1872) a leader of the Illyrian movement, and 
they agreed on a literary standard, favouring the Stokavian above the Cakavian and 
Kajkavian dialects of what would become known as Serbo-Croatian (a term no longer 
used). Numerous journals and publications came into being (one called Vidovdan), reading 
clubs were opened, and the cultural group Omladina (very much modeled after Young 
Italy) was founded in Novi Sad in 1868.  
Milorad Ekmecic writes that Vidovdan as an organised commemoration emerged in three 
distinct periods, each dependent on the media used for social communication. As he puts 
it, “educated and illiterate men cannot depend on the same type of nationalism”.156 The 
three periods were: 1800-1848, 1849-1903, and from 1903 onwards. He speaks of the 
progression of Vidovdan from being something mentioned only in books to one in which 
there was much larger “mass” participation. The critical mass involved was a sufficient 
number of literate people, something that only came to Serbia after 1903, by which time 
30% of the Serbian population were literate (though only if schoolchildren were included). 
Prior to that, literacy rates were very low; in 1886 only 4.2 % of the population of Serbia 
was literate, and these people were mostly city dwellers. This drive towards literacy was 
impressive, as was the drive towards education in general; in 1879 the government spent 
119,000 dinars on grants to study abroad, more than on parliament.157 The artist Leon 
Keon was one of the recipients of such a grant. 
It was in the second period (1849) that Vidovdan was institutionalised as a “national” day. 
It must be stated that Serbian was still an autonomous principality at this time; the 
Ottoman flag still flew alongside a Serbian one in Belgrade, and Ottoman troops were still 
stationed in Serbian barracks; to have a national day was premature and risky. Indeed there 
was a minor diplomatic incident when a lecturer spoke on June 27th 1851 in Belgrade’s 
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reading hall (that it was the night before Vidovdan, stressed the “last supper” aspect of the 
Kosovo Myth). The speaker ended with the provocative words “Yes Brothers, it is high 
time to go to Kosovo and fight for out lost independence”.158 
The war with Turkey in 1876 would even be declared on June 28th, and was defined as 
revenge for Kosovo (as was the later war of 1878, the resolution of which involved the 
Berlin Conference).  
Vidovdan 1889 marked the 500 years anniversary of the battle, this was commemorated 
throughout Serbian lands, and representative of Serbian communities living abroad in 
London and Berlin sent telegrams of congratulation to the Serbian King and government. 
One from London read (in a laconic English manner); “Today anniversary of Kossovo 
(sic) kindly be assured of sincere sympathy with objects of Celebration”.159 Another from 
a certain Pavlovitch in Berlin was less upbeat, evoking Lazar and “the loss at Kosovo”.160 
The potential legitimising power of the Kosovo legacy was demonstrated by a highly 
choreographed gesture this same year. The Obrenenevic dynasty, which had a rivalry with 
the Karadjordjević dynasty (both claimed, and in turn possessed, the crown of Serbia) had 
suffered in prestige because of the many failings and scandals of the young king’s father, 
the recently-abdicated Milan Obrenenvic. 
The King, regents, court, cabinet, and Metropolitan Michael went to Krusevac, 
Prince Lazar’s medieval capital, and from there to Zica Monastery, where 
Alexander was anointed king. The entire observance was designed to evoke 
patriotic feelings, to link the Obrenevic dynasty with the Nemanaja dynasty of 
medieval Serbia, and to stress modern Serbia’s role as the historic heartland of 
all Serbs, in and out of the kingdom.161   
But alas, not even the legitimacy offered by the Kosovo legacy could save the young 
monarch, who – along with his wife – would be brutally murdered in 1903.  
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But interestingly there were also acknowledgements from elsewhere; Czechs, Greeks and 
Russians marked the day in various ways. It may surprise one – considering their often 
bloody rivalry in the 20th Century – that many Croatians looked with some admiration at 
the Serbs, seeing them as an example to be emulated in their own aspirations to 
independence. The Zagreb newspaper Obzor praised the occasion: “...we Croatians – 
brothers by blood desire with the Serbs – today shout for joy: Praise to the eternal Serbian 
Kosovo heroes who with their blood made certain that the desire for freedom and glory 
would never die...”162 Serbian politicians of all parties used Kosovo as a reference point 
(with the notable exception of the socialists, although the response of many socialists 
would be very different on the 600th anniversary of the battle!). The past in a sense was the 
present; in an article entitled Kosovo (1389-1889) one journal stated that: 
There is sometimes in the life of a people a special moment, a moment that the 
people have long waited for, a moment that has been passed from generation 
to generation…. such extraordinary moments are the way to measure the life 
force of a people.163 
Of the many organisations that were established in the latter 19th Century, some were 
political in intent, even dangerously so. A secret, patriotic society, the Narodna Odbrana 
(People's Defense) was founded in Serbia in approximately 1908, the year of the Austrian 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an act that was widely resented, both by Serbs and 
internationally. Although their enemies were now the Hapsburgs, they still spoke about the 
Turks and had a dire message of survival: 
The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people 
suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more fearful and 
dangerous than the old...They want to take our freedom and our language from 
us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which 
approaches in that quarter. The Serbian people are faced by the question 'to be 
or not to be?’164 
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Another organisation that was formed at this time was the Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia). 
A young man form Herzegovina called Gavrilo Princip belonged to this organisation, 
which was inclusive, in that its members were not only Serbian. The group was interested 
in progressive issues such as agricultural reforms and women’s rights, but it also had 
revolutionary tendencies. Ridding Bosnia of Austrian rule was its main aim. As the name 
indicates, it was modelled on Young Italy.  
If the 1908 annexation was a source of anger among South Slavs, a lightening victory only 
four years later – that of the First Balkan War of 1912 – would prove intoxicating. 
Interestingly if David Koen, the middle aged Jewish lawyer took part in this as a political 
commissar; the young revolutionary Princip was refused entry into the army because of 
his small physique. Princip had travelled first to Belgrade, where he was refused entry into 
a komite, (a band of Serbian irregulars) by their leader Major Vojislav Tankosic, who was 
a member of the central committee of the Unity or Death (Ujedinjenje ili smrt) 
organisation. This group was led by “Apis” (Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević 1876-1917) 
who was one of those responsible for the assassination of the King and Queen in 1903, 
and would supply the weapons that were used in the Sarajevo assassination. Ujedinjenje ili 
smrt were popularly known as the Black Hand. Their newsletter – echoing the dominant 
political model – was called Piedmont. Apis, named after the ancient Egyptian bull god, 
was a Serbian original. The “congenial conspirator” (as his biographer calls him) was a 
man of enormous physique and energy, an outstanding officer, who could seemingly 
inspire and manipulate with a mere few words. When he bravely faced his execution for 
dubious changes in late June 1917, he lamented it was only two days short of Vidovdan.165 
Princip then travelled to the border town of Prokuplje, where Serbs were amassing for an 
attack across the Turkish frontier. Again he was rejected, being told he was too small and 
weak.166 One did not have to be – as Princip was – a sensitive and bookish youth, to feel 
deeply humiliated by this rejection. It surely left him with much to prove.  
This was a moment of nationalistic fervor; Dedijer notes that even in far off Slovenia, 
people were naming their infants after the heroes of 1389. If the Balkan Wars were in 
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retrospect dwarfed by the huge war that began in 1914, it is worth pointing out that the 
victory over the Ottomans in the first war was seen as a huge achievement internationally 
at the time. And again, if in retrospect the wars have become notorious for their brutality 
and civilian atrocities, the first war was seen as pristine in its moral clarity, indeed the 
struggle was often seen in civilisational terms. J. L. Eddy, a Fleet Street editor sent a 
telegram (in French) to the Serbian Government: “The Hearst papers have constantly 
applauded the cause of Serbia against the Turkish aggression, and the expulsion from 
European territory the Muslim tyrants”.167 Other voices were even more expansive on the 
confessional and crusading aspects (as they saw them) of the Serb’s victory. A letter from 
Alexander De’ Lacour, Consul Royal Barcelona stated:  
In our land, which had been under the Islamic yoke for eight centuries, and 
which was watered with the blood of Christians every quarter of Spanish soil, 
the Balkan lands have won all the sympathies with their noble gesture, for 
their selflessness, and for the courage in regard to the feelings of their 
oppressed brothers.168 
Of the enlisted men of the various armies (Greek, Serbian, Montenegrin and Bulgarian) 
who would fight Turkey, those with some level of education were indoctrinated by being 
told of their glorious medieval past as part of their training. As Richard C. Hall notes:  
Bulgarians learned of the empires of Tsar Simeon (893-927), Greeks learned 
about the Emperor Basil II (known as the Bulgar Slayer, 976-1025), and 
Montenegrins and Serbs learned about Stefan Dushan (1331-55). These 
individuals had established medieval states that briefly controlled most of the 
Balkan Peninsula. The modern nation states recognized these earlier ones as 
lineal antecedents and models to be emulated. 169 
So “history” was being handed to the troop with their rifles. Hall also comments on the 
extraordinary sense of historical continuity that existed among the combatants:   
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, Bulgarian army commanders 
justified or at least excused their decisions in part on the basis of events that 
had occurred a millennium ago. It is remarkable that the figures of medieval 
Bulgarian rulers appeared in the Bulgarian decision-making process at this 
critical juncture. Such was the power of Balkan nationalism.170 
But interestingly, damaged Turkish pride now also revived an interest in the Battle of 
Kosovo, remembered as a great Ottoman victory, to compensate the recent humiliation. In 
1913 a work called Kosova mydan muharabesi (the Battle of Kosovo Plain) was published 
by a Turkish writer Ali Haydar. According to Pappas and Pappas, the work did not: 
“subject traditional Ottoman historiography to modern historical criticism but rather uses 
it as a literary device for a swan song about Ottoman power in Europe”.171 The victors and 
the defeated had exchanged places.  
Should the Kosovo Myth not then have fallen into disuse? Nothing of the sort happened, 
quite the contrary. Two year after the dream of retaking Kosovo was realised, a national 
obsession should have been put to rest: instead the opposite happened, a local affair 
sparked a World War.  
3.3.4 The Vivovdan assassination  
Without doubt the most famous incident that occurred on Vidovdan was the Sarajevo 
assassination of 1914, in which ArchDuke Franz Ferdinand and his wife172 were killed, the 
event that triggered the First World War. The assassins were a group of young students 
with a mixed bag of political and ideological convictions. There were influenced by 
socialistic and anarchistic thought (the two might not seem as distinct from each other at 
the time as they do in retrospect; see Čabrinović’s testimony below) and Nietzsche, though 
the latter was perhaps only superficially understood; for example, Princip liked to recite 
his poetry. Nietzsche, as mentioned, had been quite recently introduced into the Serbian 
language by the painter Leon Koen, who had studied philosophy as well as painting in 
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Munich. The outlook of the conspirators was modernistic and in many ways progressive. 
They wanted rights for women, and some of them – most especially Princip – were anti-
religious and anti-clerical. Yet parallel to this generally modernistic strain, they were also 
seeped in traditional Serbian culture. In his classic account of the assassination, Dedijer 
wrote about the burden of the past in the environment in which the assassins grew up: 
It was true that under the influence of capitalism this burden of the past was 
starting to disintegrate, but the folklore of tribalism, in an impoverished and 
illiterate peasantry, remained alive in our century. The historic circumstances, 
under which the South Slavs lived, in an uninterrupted state of rebellion 
against foreign occupiers, facilitated the preservation of the ancient idea, 
expressed in the folklore epic of Kosovo, that the assassination of a tyrannical 
foreign ruler is one of the noblest aims of life.173  
One of these was the famous dramatic poem The Mountain Wreath by Petar Petrović 
Njegoš. The poem, mentioned above, is not only considered one of the masterpieces of 
South Slavonic literature, it is also a text that extols the heroic ideal and the spirit of the 
Kosovo Myth. It is a point of pride among some Serbs even to the present day (though 
perhaps with a certain ironic playfulness) as to how many lines of The Mountain Wreath 
they are able to recite by heart. Princip knew the entire poem by heart (it’s over 30,000 
words in English translation). Clearly, their progressive tendencies apart, the conspirators 
saw themselves as embodying the ideals of the Kosovo Myth, and doing so with a level of 
literalness that really does highlight their youth and naiveté.  
In justifying his actions at his trial, Nedeljko Čabrinović, the conspirator who threw the 
bomb at Franz Ferdinand (the Archduke, of course, died along with his wife as a result of 
being later shot at point blank range by Princip), stated that: 
I am an adherent of the radical anarchist idea, which aims at destroying the 
present system through terrorism in order to bring in the liberal system in its 
place. Therefore I hate all representations of the constitutional system - of 
course, not this or that person as such but as the bearer of power which 
oppresses the people. I have educated myself in this spirit through the reading 
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of socialistic and anarchist writings and I can say that I have read through 
almost all the literature of this type that I could get in the Serbo-Croatian 
language.174 
He speaks of “liberal”, “anarchist” and “socialist” but for all this, Čabrinović was deeply 
immersed in the Kosovo Myth and even seemed to have had a very personal and very 
problematic identification with one of the figures of the Battle of Kosovo. At his 
investigation he said; “Our folklore tradition tells how Miloš Obilić was accused before 
Vidovdan that he was a traitor and how he answered ‘On Vidovdan we shall see who is and 
is not a traitor.’ And Obilić became the first assassin who went into the enemy camp and 
murdered sultan Murad”.175 The accusation of treason, so much part of the myth, was real 
and painfully personalised for Čabrinović because his father was an informer for the 
Austrian police, and not only was Čabrinović aware of this, but he was aware that this was 
known by other people. This was a shame that must have rivaled, if not surpassed, the 
humiliation that Princip endured by not being accepted as capable of fighting for the Serb 
volunteers during the First Balkan War.  
Importantly, when Princip had fired the fatal shots, he tried to shoot himself with his 
pistol, but was restrained from doing so, and then took poison that he taken with him, but 
it did little damage. Čabrinović also took poison after he had thrown his bomb, and then 
jumped into the Miljacka river. But the poison did not kill him either, though it did weaken 
him, leaving his ill for several days. It was essential to their plans that they should die 
while carrying out their deed. In this too, there were seeking to emulate the heroes of 
1389. 
It is impossible to consider the First World War with reference to the Kosovo Myth, firstly 
because the incident that provoked the reaction of the war (though not, of course, its 
cause) was an incident entirely linked to the myth. Secondly, the war had terrible 
consequences for Serbia, in some ways reinforcing the self-image of martyrdom that the 
cult signified. Thirdly, the manner of the diplomacy between the assassination on 
Vidovdan and the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war and attack, was so bullying that it 
presented Serbia with a “Kosovo Moment”, an ultimatum that recalled the existential 
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situation when Lazar’s army of 1389 faced a similar moment of seeming hopelessness 
(according that is, to the traditional narrative). Within the war itself, this life-or-death 
pattern would be repeated by the retreat to the Adriatic, a huge event that recalled the most 
mythologised event in Serbian since the battle of 1389, the great retreat from Kosovo in 
1660. Indeed, one of the three human columns that made the long trek over the mountains 
left from the Monetary of Peć. John Keegan described this huge human movement, of the 
defeated army led by the aged King, and the feeble army commander Marshall Putnik; 
“carried by his devoted solders in a closed sedan chair, along the snowbound tracks and 
over mountain passes.”176 He continued: 
Only an army of natural mountaineers could have survived the passage 
through Montenegro, and many did not, dying of disease, starvation or cold as 
they fell out of line by the wayside. Of the 200,000 who set out, no less than 
140,000 survived to cross in early December the frontier of Albania.177  
From Albania, created as a result of the Balkan Wars, the survivors were evacuated to the 
island of Corfu; the popular song Tamo Daleko (There Far Away) was written about their 
exile.  
Finally the eventual settlement of the war brought a new country into existence; the long 
imagined Illyrian or South Slav polity, the Kingdom of Slovenes, Serbs and Croats (signed 
into being on Vidovdan, 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles). Indeed the new country’s 
constitution (1921) was called the Vidovdan Constitution. 
The second point – the hugeness of Serbian losses – can hardly be overstated. While the 
major combatants France, Germany and Britain lost on average 2-3% of their populations, 
Serbia between actual fighting and the typhus epidemic that swept through the country, 
lost 15% of its total population, including a hugely disproportionate number among its 
adult males.178 The unrepentant Princip, who was kept in brutal conditions in a prison in 
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Theresienstadt (where Madeline Albright’s Jewish relatives would later be killed by the 
Nazis; see the section 3.6 below) was deeply depressed to hear in 1916; “that Serbia no 
longer exists”.179 The young assassin managed to endure chains that froze at night, solitary 
confinement in an unlit cell, and eventual amputation of his arm for the tuberculosis that 
contributed to his death at 23 during the final year of the war.  
One paradox emerges in this: in his memorable writings from Serbia in 1915 (which he 
described as “A Nation Exterminated”), John Reed noted that Serbs always justified their 
commitment to fighting as “revenge for Kosovo”. Yet Reed also noted that in regard to the 
Austrian Hungarians who had laid waste to their country:  
This extraordinary lack of bitterness we found everywhere in Serbia; the 
people seemed to think that the smashing Austrian defeat revenged them for 
all those black enormities, for the murder of their brothers, for the bringing of 
the typhus.180 
Perhaps this shows how abstracted “Kosovo” had become? The real horrors inflicted were 
considered to be avenged, whereas the ancient wrongs were still unappeasable; after all, 
this was 1915, three years after Kosovo had finally been re-taken after centuries of 
longing. It was in this very sense that Tudor – echoing Sorel – was correct in saying that 
“a myth cannot be refuted”.  
3.4 World War II 
During the Second World War, Kosovo would become a rallying cry. Indeed, the 
ownership rights to the cult were contested by enemies. The war was complex and 
enormously bloody for all residents of Yugoslavia. However, only a simplistic post-war 
narrative would be tolerated, and this repression of other voices was a source of 
resentment that would surface after Tito’s death and during the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
One can speak of the war as being extensively mythologised; firstly by the Communists 
whose official version cast everything out of sight except virtuous Partisans overcoming 
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invaders and their collaborators. On a more tribal level, the two biggest groups in 
Yugoslavia, the Croats and Serbs took a deep sense of grievance and victimhood from the 
war. Sirkka Ahnonen has written of how both communities cherished their victimhood 
narratives; the Croats the Bleiberg massacre (in which many Croats were massacred by 
Tito’s Partisans) and the Serbs Jasenovac (the notorious camp where tens (and probably 
hundreds) of thousands of Serbs were killed by Croatian Ustasa).181  
The Yugoslav (the country had been renamed in 1927) government of the Serbian regent 
Prince Paul – under huge German and Axis pressure – agreed to a pact with the Axis 
powers in 1941. However, nationalist feelings drove a group of army officers to overthrow 
the government in rejection of the pact (knowing full well that this would lead to German 
retribution). They had the support of a broad range of forces, from Communists to the 
Orthodox Church. In the streets of Belgrade huge crowds of people chanted, “Bolje rat 
nego pakt” (better war than the pact) and “Bolje grob nego rob” (better the grave than 
slavery). The newly declared King Petar II wrote a front page message on the newspaper 
Politka addressed to “Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes”, urging them to perform their duty to 
King and Fatherland “with faith in God and the future of Yugoslavia”.182 It was an 
extraordinary moment in a people’s history, though perhaps a dizzy one. Politka carried 
the headlines “Joy in the whole country” and “New Regime, New Roads”.183 Churchill 
would later describe the “reckless, heroic defiance of the tyrant and conqueror (Hitler) in 
the moment of his greatest power.”184 
Giving an elegant voice to the feeling of the people, Patriarch Gavrilo of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church (Gavrilo Dožić, 1881–1950) gave an address on Radio Belgrade on 
March 27th 1941, invoking the Kosovo Myth:  
Before our nation in these days the question of our fate again presents itself. 
This morning at dawn the question received its answer. We chose the heavenly 
kingdom - the kingdom of truth, justice, national strength, and freedom. That 
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eternal ideal is carried in the hearts of all Serbs, preserved in the shrines of our 
churches, and written on our banners…185  
This sense defiance and inat (and stubborn bravery in the face of huge odds, which Serbs 
see as part of their national character) must have been truly inspiring, and it must be added 
that the Patriarch proved himself to be a man of great courage and integrity, refusing to 
have anything to do with the Germans (or their puppet administration) when they invaded, 
despite confinement and intimidation. In her study of the relations of church and state in 
Yugoslavia, Stella Alexander states that: “He (Gavrilo) was to spend altogether four years 
in prisons and concentrations camps in Yugoslavia and in Germany resisting all Germans 
efforts to make him collaborate with them.”186 
The contrast between the two Gavrilos – Princip and Patriarch – could not be more 
striking (although one must acknowledge they both shared in the very different ways 
exemplary courage, whatever one may think of Princip’s crime). The Patriarch’s 
interpretation of the Kosovo Myth was deeply religious, seeing it as a paragon of 
cherished Christian values. For the young Serbian rebel from Herzegovina – who despite 
his political idealism, was notably anti-religious – the Kosovo legacy could hardly have 
been more different; it was progressive, modern, and revolutionary. Yet both these 
worldviews could draw on the same well of legitimacy, and other worldviews would also 
attempt (with a very questionable chance of succeeding). 
The collaborationist Nedić regime, which the Germans installed, tried to recover 
“ownership” of the Kosovo myth; it insisted that what the Yugoslav resistance movements 
represented was in direct opposition to the spirit, ideals, and the legacy of the heroes of 
Kosovo. On June 28th 1942 its newspaper Nasa Borba (Our Struggle) argued 
disingenuously that:  
It is not dangerous to lose a battle. It is not even that dangerous to lose a 
state ... Such losses can be made up. It is dangerous, however, when one 
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begins to distort the truth, warp principles, corrupt ideals, and poison 
traditions. Then the spirit suffers…if truth is replaced with lies, wisdom with 
foolishness, beauty with ugliness, patriotism with hatred of country ... blessing 
with damnation…187  
This indicated just how cherished ownership of the Kosovo legacy was, even collaborating 
forces sought it. The most notorious of collaborationist forces, the Croatian Ustasha, used 
Vidovdan as a pretext to unleash their massacres of Serbs in the NHD (Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska), the Independent State of Croatia, which included all of Bosnia with its large 
Serbian population. According to historian Enver Redzic, “The NDH repressive measures 
began under the guise of taking hostages to prevent a supposed ‘great Serb rebellion’ on 
Vidovdan.”188 A wave of arrests of prominent Serbs took place across Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Redzic argues that these measures in fact became largely self-fulfilling; 
“These actions triggered a Serbian uprising.”189  
 
We need not get lost in the complex and bloody details of the war, but it was very 
complex and very bloody, with eventually hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs killed.190 
(The numbers were very controversial, and arguments over the numbers killed and by 
whom – especially in regard to the slaughter of Serbs by the Ustasa – would be one of the 
factors in the disintegration of Yugoslav unity in the 1980s).  
 
Of the other major combatant groups, Serbian Chetniks and Tito’s Patisans, they too took 
inspiration from the Kosovo legacy, even when engaged in a fierce conflict with each 
other. Partisan leader and author Milovan Djilas noted that both groups cherished Njegoš’ 
Mountain Wreath, which had been such a popular transmitter of the Kosovo Myth, 
especially in Djilas’ (and Njegoš’) native Montenegro: 
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The Communists in Montenegro celebrated Christmas in early 1942 (January 
6 N.S.) with recitations against aggressors and traitors from Njegoš’ Mountain 
Wreath, while the Montenegrin Chetniks celebrated that same holiday the 
following year but the “inspirational reading” of the episode of the Massacre 
of the Renegades – the Moslems – from the same Mountain Wreath.191 
 
On the ruins left by the war Tito and his communists constructed the second Yugoslavia. 
Distrustful of all internal nationalism, Tito had little use for the Kosovo cult, preferring to 
establish and maintain legitimacy by constructing a large, self-serving heroic narrative of 
the war. As Pavlowitch notes: “The Communists had been good at enlisting in the service 
of their cause all the myth-making propensities of Serbian history…Like the 
contemporaries of the battle of Kosovo in 1389, those who had to knuckle under in the 
early 1940s knew how to embellish their defeats in order to restore morale and turn a 
brave face towards the future.”192  
 
Events from the Partisans’ War, such as the Battle of Sutjeska, in which we are asked to 
believe Tito’s loyal dog dived onto a bomb to save his master’s life, became places of 
pilgrimage. Recalling a visit by Egypt’s President Nasser (who like Tito, was a grandee of 
the Non-Aligned Movement) to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the battle, 
Mohamed Heikal wrote that; “The battlefield had become something holy”.193 Holy, and 
not without an element of hagiographic kitsch: “Tito told Nasser of a girl partisan who 
came to him during the thick of the fighting with a scarf on which she had embroidered his 
name. ‘How did you get this?’ he asked. And she replied: I bought it for you with a kilo of 
butter.’”194 So in Country and Western terms, he lost his dog but got the girl… 
One must note one bizarre appearance of Kosovo mythology after the Second World War. 
This was the traumatic Yugoslavian split with the Soviet Union in 1948. It was with true 
Stalinist poetic injustice that Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform on June 28th 1948 
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(one can only admire such attention to detail). The pattern was again discernible; the 
country (albeit Yugoslavia not just Serbia) stood up to a much greater power. It did not 
lead to actual conflict and invasion, but this was greatly feared at the time. Anton Bebler 
argues that not only was there huge economic and diplomatic pressure placed on 
Yugoslavia, but that the country might have well shared the later fate of Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia: 
Yugoslavia accepted (the breach with Stalin’s USSR) by 1949 and withstood 
an economic blockade imposed by the Soviet-led bloc, as well as open threats 
and attempts at intimidation, “Special warfare”, concentration and maneuvers 
of Soviet and satellite troops, etc. Yugoslavia demonstrated clearly its resolve 
to defend itself against a Soviet organized and led invasion which was being 
prepared prior to the outbreak of war in Korea. Soviet military preparations for 
an all-out invasion of Yugoslavia were registered by several sources and later 
confirmed.195  
The split redefined Yugoslavia’s unique position within the broader structure of the Cold 
War. Tito and his regime had to quickly redefine itself as Communist yet independent of 
the Soviet Bloc. Nationalism would have been the obvious tool for this, but nationalism 
would have meant resuscitating the grievances of the war. Therefore a more federal 
Brotherhood and Unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo) was promoted over the narrow nationalisms 
of Croatian, Slovenia, Serbia and so on. Part of this was the Tito personality cult, 
presenting him a father of the (broader federal) nation. And although it seemed an unlikely 
tool for such as task – given that the state was secular and trying to build its own inclusive 
ideology and war-based mythology – the Kosovo Myth was helpful (despite the fact that 
Tito was himself not a Serb).  
Misha Glenny notes that during the 19th Century, Karadjordje declared himself Godfather 
(Kum) to the 9th child of any family who had that many children. 196 The figure of 9 refers 
back to the Jugovici family, the nine sons who were supposedly killed in the battle of 1389 
(their mother is a central figure in the Kosovo Cycle). This is surely a retelling of the 
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biblical story of Hanna, the Mother of the Maccabees (who watches her seven sons die 
with great bravery and dignity, before her own death)?197 Both stories extol the courage of 
the Mother who refuses to grieve, despite her great pain. This tradition of kumstvo was 
indulged by Tito, who became Godfather to perhaps thousands of Yugoslav children. As 
the Bulgarian scholar Dimitar Grigorov, who has recently researched this topic, pointed 
out, Tito was not alone in this; his fellow communist Ceausescu was also Godfather to 
thousands of Romanian children: 
As in Tito’s Yugoslavia, the Romanian leader, though the local authorities, 
gave presents to the parents and children, including money and firewood. The 
functions of the ritual on a political level were probably similar to those of 
Yugoslavia. The ritual had to strengthen the position of the leader.198 
And also strengthen his regime; Grigorov point out that the first of Tito’s Godchildren 
hailed from an area of Serbia were the Chetniks had been strong, and therefore the 
Communist party was unpopular.199 
3.4 After Tito 
It is tempting to see Tito’s death in 1980 in end-of-an-era terms. Certainly his symbolic 
value as a unifier would be missed. New forces started to emerge, or at least, gain more 
traction on people following his death. Two are worthy of mention. The first was the 
alleged apparition of the Virgin Mary in the Bosnian town of Medjugorge in 1981. This is 
worth noting because it was part of a reassertion of Roman Catholicism among Croats. 
This was resented by the Serbian Orthodox Church who saw the phenomena – which 
quickly drew many thousands of foreign pilgrims – as a supposed re-assertion of an 
Ustasa-like Croatian nationalism (they alleged that there were mass graves of Serbs killed 
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by the Ustasa around Medjugorge). This domestic re-assertion of Catholicism and – by 
implication – Croatian nationalism (open Croatian nationalism had been repressed during 
Tito’s time, especially following the “Croatian Spring” in the early 1970s) was largely 
fuelled by the Croatian diaspora. This diaspora nationalism was largely based on two 
grievances; firstly the 1946 show trial of Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac of Zagreb200, and 
secondly what became known as the “Bleiburg Tragedy of the Croatian People” 
commemorating the massacre of Croats and Slovenes by Tito’s Partisans. Vjekoslav 
Perica writes that the Blieburg Myth “became a Croatian equivalent to the Kosovo 
Myth.”201 The second incident was also related to the overlap of religion and nationalist 
politics; also in 1981 the revered Monastery of Peć, historical seat of the Serbian Orthodox 
Patriarchy was partially destroyed in an arson attack. In a foretaste of what was to happen 
in Kosovo’s politics, Albanian separatists were blamed. 
It was prior to and during the Milošević era that Kosovo – both as abstracted imaginary202 
and as a real place inhabited by real people – came back to the top of the political agenda. 
Kosovo was the poorest – seven times poorer than Slovenia – of Yugoslavia’s regions (it 
was not a full republic; rather it became an autonomous region with the passing of the 
1974 constitution). Trouble began there within a year of Tito’s death in 1980, and 
deteriorated throughout the decade. The earliest protests were over a relatively minor 
issue, the quality of food in a university canteen. But relations between the Kosovo 
Albanian and Serbian communities, often strained, began to deteriorate. Following riots in 
1987, Milošević visited the region still speaking in Titoesque phrases about “Brotherhood 
and Unity” but as elsewhere in central and Eastern Europe, the language of socialism was 
becoming exhausted. Milošević seemed to have quickly realised that the sense of Serbian 
greviance was a much stronger force.  
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This transformation of Milošević from grey apparchnik into fiery nationalist had been 
given much attention and rightly so. Not only is it of interest in the history of the 
destruction of Yugoslavia, which alone makes it a question of enormous historical 
importance, but it also raises questions that concern this work, the use of the Kosovo Myth 
for gaining political legitimacy and power.  
The first, more historical issue is still an open debate, to what degree was Milošević 
responsible, but this is of limited concern here.  
The second issue concerns the usage of the Kosovo Myth by someone who, at least at first 
glance, seem like an unlikey candidate for the task. It its different usages, it was seen as a 
religious or, at least, in the case of the Young Bosnians a romantic-nationalist myth (“a 
national religion of a higher type”, as one them stated at their trial).203 Milošević's 
professed politics at the time should have precluded him from either religious concerns or 
nationalistic feelings.  
There had been rising nationalist chauvanism in Serbian throughout the 1980s; many 
commentators point to the publication of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts as a real turning point in the breakup of Yugoslavia.204 The document’s 
contents broke several taboos, and was condemned by, strange as it now seems, Slobodan 
Milošević and Radovan Karadžić.  
One wonders in the documents unorthodox publishing history did not add to its impact? 
Initially a draft form was leaked – which can only have added to its conspiratorial gravitas 
– and very widely circulated as zamisdat. In 1988 it was more formally published, first in 
Croatia, and finally in 1989 it was published in the popular Serbian magazine Duga, just 
before the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, which was, as Jasna Dragovic-Soso 
sharply puts it, “Milošević’s symbolic coronation as national leader”.205 
The document saw Serbia as being severely disadvantaged vis-a-via the other republics, 
most especially in Kosovo: 
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…the Serbian nation, for instance, was not given the right to have its own 
state. The large sections of the Serbian people who live in other republics, 
unlike the national minorities, do not have the right to use their own language 
and script; they do not have the right to set up their own political or cultural 
organizations or to foster the common cultural traditions of their nation 
together with their co-nationals. The unremitting persecution and expulsion of 
Serbs from Kosovo… 
The text mixes self-pity (“Only Serbia made genuine sacrifices for the sake of the 
development of the three underdeveloped republics and the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo” with paranoia (three times it refers to the anti-Serb “genocide” in 
Kosovo). There were also, unsurprisingly, accusations of treason: 
The capitulation of Serbia's political spokesmen makes one wonder, especially 
about their right to take such a step. We might well ask who is authorized to 
acquiesce to a decision which condemns Serbia's economy to long-term 
stagnation in the future.206 
The document made much of horror stories about Kosovo Serbs calling the situation 
“open and total war…declared on the Serbian people.”207 Furthermore it made special 
mention of the notorious Martinović case, which is worthy of comment here.  
One very salient form of mythical discourse is what Michael Ignatieff had called “atrocity 
myth”. This is a common aspect of conflict and extreme distrust between communities. In 
such a conflict, one community will accuse the other of forms of violence that the 
accusing community find deeply repugnant and wholly unacceptable. Of course, they may 
have their own practices of violence which it considers legitimate. What is more, 
individual acts quickly condemn entire groups, as Ignatieff writes; “All members of a 
group are held to have such a propensity even though atrocity can only be committed by 
specific individuals.”208 In the circumstances of a conflict, nothing can draw such a 
distinctive line between two communities; they will negatively essentialise each other on 
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the basis of practices of violence, and typically one side will see the other as beyond the 
pale of civilization. Furthermore, by corollary, the given group will see their own actions 
as, at best, purely defensive (and therefore justified) or, at worst, unfortunately excessive 
but still better than the horrible practices of the enemy (and therefore still justified). 
Exactly such a case happened in Kosovo in 1985. 
A Kosovo Serbian farmer Djordje Martinović (1929-2000) was taken to hospital with 
injuries caused by the insertion of a bottle into his anus. He claimed to have been attacked 
by two local Albanians. He later recanted and said that he injury was self-inflicted, but 
later again said that the confession was false and had been conceded only because his 
children were offered employment if he confessed. There is little point here on getting lost 
in the legal details (which have never been established; nobody has ever been charged 
with his assault) but the manner in which the case – however absurd – was turned into a 
crusading moment in Serbian victimhood and chauvinism. Major figures, such has the 
veteran novelist Dobrica Cosic got involved (hiring a lawyer for Martinovic), poems were 
written elevating Martinovic to a new national martyr, and a leading Serbian artist Mića 
Popović painted a depiction of the act, basing it on Jusepe de Ribera's Martyrdom of St. 
Philip, an image of crucifixion.  
The Memorandum would refer to the case in highly alarmist terms: “unprecedented 
violence involved, which is reminiscent of the darkest days of the Turkish practice of 
impalement”. With statements like these (and the image mentioned above) there was a 
radical polaritistion taking place; Serbs were becoming Christian victims and Kosovo 
Albanians were becoming Turkish Islamic predators. It was exactly as Edward Said 
described polarizing distinctions, “the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner 
more Western.”209 The Memorandum states:  
The physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population 
in Kosovo and Metohija is a worse defeat than any experienced in the 
liberation wars waged by Serbia from the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 to the 
uprising of 1941. The reasons for this defeat can primarily be laid at the door 
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of the legacy of the Comintern210 which is still alive in the Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia's national policy and the Serbian communists' adherence to this 
policy, but they also lie in costly ideological and political delusions, ignorance, 
immaturity, or the inveterate opportunism of generations of Serbian politicians 
since the Second World War, who are always on the defensive and always 
worried more about what others think of them and their timid overtures at 
raising the issue of Serbia's status than about the objective facts affecting the 
future of the nation whom they lead. 
The plunge into the past was emblematic of the text, Serbs were again being driven from 
Kosovo, Serbs were again victims of grotesque violence, again being conspired against by 
an “anti-Serbian coalition”.211 
Another event that contributed to Serbian suspicions about Kosovo’s Albanians was a 
shooting that took place in the Paracin JNA barracks in 1987. An Albanian conscript 
named Aziz Kelmendi shot dead four sleeping fellow soldiers – only one of who was a 
Serb; Kelmendi later escaped and shot himself). There was no evidence that there was any 
political motivation for the shooting, but in the poisonous atmosphere of mutual distrust, 
eight Albanian soldiers were accused of helping Kelmendi. The said that they had 
confessed under coercion but were nonetheless sentenced to prison, for periods ranging 
from two to twenty years. Louis Sell reports that the funeral of the slain Serb turned into a 
nationalistic rally; nationalistic that is, in being both anti-Yugoslav (“No Yugoslavia” was 
chanted and hisses greeted the Yugoslav national anthem) but also viciously anti-Albanian 
“all Shiptars out of Serbia212”.  
Another event that contributed to the rising nationalism was that the relics of Prince Lazar 
were taken on a tour of Serbian inhabited regions of Yugoslavia, a morbid exercise in 
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medieval relic worship, and evidence or a revival of religious feelings or perhaps more of 
a willingness to display religious feelings in public. This religious revival was not 
confined to Orthodox; as mentioned there was a revival of religious feelings among the 
Catholics of Bosnia and Croatia following the apparition at Medjugorge. 213 However the 
orthodox revival had its political dark side; Jovan Byford had charted the rehabilitation of 
Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, a man of viciously anti-semitic views, who has since been 
canonised.214  
During this period, Milošević was reinventing himself as a nationalist to exploit this 
potential source of power. It might be noted that this nationalism was of a very 
authoritarian strain, in that way not as different from Milošević’s professed communism as 
one might habitually imagine. As Eric Gordy wrote:   
Nationalist tendencies were correlated with impulses for Communist 
restoration and authoritarian forces in such institutions as the military and the 
academy…Not only is it a small step from Communism’s false collective of 
the popular to nationalism’s false collective of the people, it is a step that many 
Serbian intellectuals made before the regime did.215  
On the six hundredth anniversary of the battle, close to a million Serbs went to Kosovo 
and heard Milošević speak on Vidovdan 1989 (this coincided with the reburial of Lazar’s 
remains in Kosovo, at the site where Milošević gave his speech).216 It was a pageant of 
nationalism, many exiled Serbs travelled from Australia and North American to take part. 
People wore national dress, young women dressed as the Kosovo Maiden. With the crowd 
chanting and comparing him to Lazar, Milošević stood in front of a banner with the 
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Orthodox cross and four Cyrillic ‘C’s.217 He was now using fighting words, explicitly 
linking present and past: 
Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing 
battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded 
yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won 
without resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were 
present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past.218  
“They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet”. This sounds, in 
retrospect, like one of the understatements of the past century. Of course, Milošević was a 
consummate opportunist, and did not believe in this Kosovo mystique personally. 
According to his biographers, “Milošević was prone to dismiss Serbia’s ancient obsession 
as ‘Bullshit’, yet he cleverly moulded it for his political purposes.”219 But given the 
descent into nationalism and political paranoia, many did take it seriously. The leading 
newspaper Politka stated of Milošević’s speech that: "We are once more living in the times 
of Kosovo, as it is in Kosovo and around Kosovo that the destiny of Yugoslavia and the 
destiny of socialism are being determined”. Not only Politika, but also many of Serbia’s 
intelligentsia had committed a collective treason of the clerks. 
In her detailed study of the role of Serbian intellectuals in the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
Dragovic-Soso argued that: 
This nationalism was inherently incompatible with the intelligentsia’s declared 
commitment to democracy because its proposed solutions were founded upon 
double standards and because its discourse was based on an extreme notion of 
victimization, the concept of “genocide” and conspiracy theories, all of which 
preclude negotiation and compromise essential to any democratic process. 
Moreover, such nationalism inherently made the search for a savior figure 
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more likely and provides some insight into the adulation of Milošević in the 
early period of his rule.220 
In gaining and consolidating power, he revoked Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, Milošević 
proved himself a master of populism. As it emerged from Turkish rule in the 19th Century, 
Serbia became a fertile ground for populism, with its overwhelmingly rural (and mostly 
illiterate) population, who had a sense of grievance and memory of oppression. Alex 
Dragnich notes in his study of Serbian populism: 
In passionate terms they (populist leaders) articulated the feelings of the 
downtrodden, the disadvantaged, and the lowly, and appealed for the 
correction of the alleged wrongs that had been inflicted on upon the common 
folk.221 
The sociologist and Politika columnist Jovo Bakic sees populism as still pervasive in 
Serbian political culture, citing the country’s large rural population; indeed he goes so far 
as to describe it as a “paradise for demagogues.”222 As a demagogue, Milošević was in his 
element. As Dragovic-Soso writes: “The dramatic events of 1988, known as the ‘anti-
bureaucratic revolution’ and ‘happenings of the people’ swayed most Serbian intellectuals, 
like the rest of the population.”223  
These “happenings of the people” or “meetings of truth” were the occasions on which 
political opponents of Milošević were forced from office. Crowds of demonstrators (how 
spontaneous or orchestrated is still open to debate) hounded local leaders in Vojvodina and 
Montenegro. As Sell rightly observed: “In classic Stalinist fashion, it was the victims 
themselves who were required to proclaim their fate…Sogorov confessed that the 
Vojvodina leadership had lost the trust of the people.”224 If communist in form, they were 
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nonetheless nationalist in content. And crucially, as Olga Zirojevic noted, the symbols of 
the Kosovo Myth were widely used in these manifestations.225  
Plainly the legacy of Kosovo was again proving itself as a uniquely fertile source of 
political legitimacy. By 1992 (the year in which Czechoslovakia, like Yugoslavia, a 
creation of Versailles, was preparing its peaceful Velvet Divorce), Yugoslavia was 
disintegrating with the succession first of Slovenia, then with increasing bloodshed, 
Croatia and Bosnia. At this time, Milošević was under huge pressure from opposition 
forces in Serbia. Yet they too, sought to gain ownership of the Kosovo legacy. This 
opposition organised a sustained protest, timing it fall on Vidovdan 1992.226 But Milošević 
was then too powerful to relinquish possession of the legacy as he embarked upon a 
project of Greater Serbia. 
Milošević’s Greater Serbia project, which might unify all Serbs in one state, proved to be a 
disaster both for Serbia’s neighbours and for Serbs. Following the unresolved war in 
Croatia in 1991, Bosnia Herzegovina declared itself independent and descended into truly 
horrifying bloodshed. Bosnian cities and towns are now known for the atrocities they 
hosted; Sarajevo, Prijedor, Srebrenica. The leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan 
Karadžić and Ratko Mladic (now both in captivity and on trial for war crimes) too found 
the Kosovo Myth a useful wartime tool. Mladic – very importantly – would also evoke the 
Munich Agreement.227 As for Karadžić, not only was he a poet himself, he was often the 
subject of nationalistic poems and songs that compared him to historical figures: 
Radovane, covjec od gvodja 
Privi vozde posle Karadjordja 
(Radovan, man of iron 
                                                 
225 Slogans included, “Let us not give away Kosovo, let us not give away the grave of Milos”, “Kosovo 
is sacred Serbian ground”, and “Emperor Murad, you fell in Kosovo, and so will the traitors of today”. 
Zirojevic, Olga, “Kosovo in Collective Memory” in Popov, Nebosja (ed.) The Road to War in Serbia, 
Trauma and Catharsis, Central University Press, 2000, 206. 
226 Branson and Doder, 135. A document suggests that as many as 100,000 people took place in the protests 
in central Belgrade, see, http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/1106171306_context_analysis_of.pdf 
227 See Misha Glenny’s character sketch and interview, in The Fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin, London, 
1992, 26-29. 
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Our first leader after Karajordge)228 
The paramilitaries that would become a notorious feature of the Bosnia War, also sought 
historical legitimacy, not least by calling themselves Chetniks (recalling not only 
Mikailovic’s royalist Serbian troops in the Second World War, but also the longer local 
tradition of Turk fighting). One of their organisers, the gangster “Arkan” (Željko 
Ražnatović, 1952-2000) was lauded in song as a Kosovo hero:  
Srpska truba ponovo se cuje 
Srbin samo Arkanu veruje 
Oj Kosovo od Kosovskog boja 
Takvog nisi imala heroja 
(The Serbian bugle is heard again 
Serbs only believe in Arkan 
Oh Kosovo, since the time of the battle 
You did not have such a hero)229 
When he married – with much fuss and media attention – the Turbo-folk singer Ceca, they 
were compared in the newspaper Vreme to the Kosovo Maiden and a Kosovo hero.230 
Duijzings also notes that during the Bosnian War, men who were reluctant to fight or were 
against the war were routinely referred to as Vuk Brankovic; war widows were compared 
to the Mother of the Jugovici.231  
The Kosovo Myth took on an even more sinister aspect in Mladic’s hands. Vidovdan was 
made into the official day of the Bosnian Serb army in 1992, and Mladic was lauded as a 
hero defending his Christian flock from the “Turks”. In 1995 Mladic spoke to his troop in 
the town of Bijeljina; “Prince Lazar gave his army the sacrament and bowed for the 
Heavenly Empire…Today we are a victorious army, we do not want to convert Lazar’s 
offering into the blinding myth of sacrifice.” So Mladic was rejecting the Heavenly 
Kingdom, and within days his troops had taken Srebrenica, with appalling consequences.  
                                                 
228 Quoted in Duijzings, 198. 
229 Ibid.  
230 Ibid., 200-201. 
231 Ibid., 199. 
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Following the almost inevitable clash in Kosovo itself (culminating in the NATO 
bombings of 1999; another Kosovo moment, Serbia standing alone against vastly superior 
forces) Milošević was eventually driven from power. Despite the defiance, and NATO’s 
miscalculations, Milošević still lost Kosovo. In doing so, he also lost the support of the 
Serbian Church.  
A few weeks before Saint Vitus’ Day in 1999, Serbian military and police 
withdrew from Kosovo. Columns of Serb refugees followed the troops, and 
the new great migration of Serbs was recorded in church chronicles. By the 
summer of 2000, less than a hundred thousand Serbs were left in the province. 
Yet the Church and the shrines remained. Serb church leaders put all the blame 
on Milošević. The disillusioned zealot bishop Atansije Jevtic´ requested a 
retirement from the Holy Synod (allegedly due to poor health). The Bishop of 
Kosovo, Artemije, and the patriarch began tactfully collaborating with the 
West. In June 1999, on the occasion of the 610th anniversary of the Kosovo 
battle, Patriarch Pavle called Slobodan Milošević, before Western television 
cameras, the source of evil.232 
Yet again the Kosovo legacy was re-contested. In post-Milošević Serbia, like an Olympic 
torch changing hands, the Kosovo legacy was retaken by the administration of Zoran 
Djindjić (1952-2003) when Milošević himself was surrendered to the ICTY, on Vidovdan 
2001.  
Was this deliberate on Djindjić’s part? Although he professed it to be a co-incidence that 
Milošević was expelled on that of all days, it is difficult to believe. In an interview, 
Djindjić’s deptuty Prime Minister Čedomir Jovanović, did imply that it was an accident: ‘I 
went to Zoran’s place and said “Man! Today is Vidovdan!’”.233 He says that they were so 
involved that they had forgotten even the days of the week but that Djindjić then wrote a 
                                                 
232 Perica, 163. 
233 Transcript of R92 radio interview, available at, 
http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?yyyy=2005&mm=04&nav_id=166741 
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speech “that was motivated by that historic date.”234 His speech, with its historical sense 
of conclusion ran: 
Dear citizens of Serbia, exactly 12 years ago on this same day, one of the 
biggest Serbian holidays, Vidovdan, Slobodan Milošević called on our people 
to realize what he termed the ideals of Heavenly Serbia. This led to 12 years of 
wars, disasters and the destruction of our country. The Serbian government 
today pledged to uphold the ideals of the Serbian land, not so much for 
ourselves, not for our parents, but for our children, because by this decision, 
we save the future of our children.235 
Conclusion, or was it continuation? Because whether or not the date of the arrest was co-
incidence or not, Djindjić still went back to the same historical well of legitimisation to 
seek a blessing for his decision. It was not to be the last political act that would be 
centered on Vidovdan. Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, the 
Kosovo Serbs have organised their own parallel political institutions. They announced 
their unwillingness to cooperate with the Kosovo government – unsurprisingly – on June 
28th of that year.236 
                                                 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 One might also note the appearance of a Serbian resistance group called the Tzar Lazar Guard, 
although they will probably prove to be a minor phenomenon. 
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3.5 Modalities of the myth 
If one thinks of the vast different political forces and agents who used Kosovo, one might 
categorise them as follows: 
? Secular, modern, revolutionary (Gavrilo Princip in 1914)  
? Religious, literalist, conservative (Patriarch Gavrilo in 1941)  
? Cynical exploitation (Milošević in 1989)  
The exploitation could also take place on various levels (not all of them as pernicious as 
Milošević’s exploitation):  
? Banded  
? Commerialised 
? Kitschified 
To offer examples, any visitor to Belgrade will be aware of commercailsed images of the 
Kosovo legacy; the same visitor may try, for example, Tzar Lazar wine. These 
commercialised images are in and of themselves harmless (and hardly unique to Serbia). 
The same visitor will note the city’s ubiquitous graffiti. Nothing is more common than 
“1389”, without comment or explanation. This is taking the exploitation up another level, 
at least potentially – graffiti is a salient part of many hate campaigns and conflicts. A level 
on, a more sinister example of exploitation concerns the football team Obilić. The team 
has existed since the 1920s under that name, but was owned at the time of his death by 
Arkan, who organised the paramilitaries who terrorised people in Croatian and Bosnia in 
the early 1990s. His widow – herself the popular turbofolk singer Ceca – still owns the 
team. In this case, the commercial and political overlap.  
Yet one might point out that in terms of actual instrumental value it might not make much 
practical difference whether or not the usage was sincere or cynical, both spectrums can 
nonetheless cause real action: 
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The above case study has tried to show the longitudal influence of the Kosovo Myth, and 
the various modalities in which it has operated, and its ability to legitimise and inspire.  
 
"The Kosovo spirit is the 'revolutionary spirit of justice, humanity, equity, equality of 
rights, with a noticeably democratic and progressive quality of respect for the rights of all 
other people."237 This is quoted from Emmert, who then offers similar sentiments himself:  
In these few words Stojadinovic expresses the timeless character of the 
Kosovo ethic. As we have noted, this ethic was nourished in the patriarchal 
society of the Serbian peasant during the centuries of Ottoman domination. It 
expressed a basic attitude toward life itself: democratic, anti-feudal, with a 
love for justice and social equality. For centuries it has been an essential 
ingredient in the historical consciousness of the Serbian people.238  
For Anzulovic, by stark contrast, the same Kosovo legacy is a blueprint for genocide, 
nothing less. Can these diametric views be reconciled? In looking at the context in which 
the legacy was evoked, by whom, and with what degree of sincerity it is to be hoped that 
the above offered evidence that these views, are not as diametric as either author would 
have us believe, and that historical circumstances have been all important in how the myth 
has influenced events in the Balkans and beyond.  
                                                 
237 Emmert, “The Kosovo Legacy”. 
238 Ibid. 
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4 Munich  
4.1 Introduction, past and precedent 
In a chapter entitled Truth and Stereotype, from his Art and Illusion,239 E.H. Gombrich 
gives – as literally as you like – an illustration of the problem of precedent.  
He uses as his examples three artists from distinct eras (an anonymous 16th Century 
German, Merian a 17th Century Swiss, and the 19th Century British lithographer Garland) 
all of who attempt to render well-known buildings, Castel Sant’Angelo in Rome and the 
Cathedrals of Notre Dame in Paris and Chartres Cathedral. Gombrich notes certain fairly 
elementary mistakes that have been made by each man. He then argues that each artist:  
…begins not with his visual impression but with his idea or concept: The 
German artist with his concept of a castle that he applies as well as he can to 
that individual castle, Merian with his idea of a church, and the lithographer 
with a stereotype of a cathedral. The individual visual information, those 
distinctive features I have mentioned, are entered as it were, upon a pre-
existing blank or formulary (i.e., form). And, as so often happens with blanks, 
for they have no provisions for certain kinds of information we consider 
essential, it is just too bad for the information.240  
His point is that an artist cannot look at a church, castle or whatever without having some 
prior sense of what a church or castle looks like, (or should look like) and this precedent 
somehow becomes, to a greater or lesser extent, confused with the “pure” visual 
information before him and therefore the final rendered image is a mediation of stored 
information and new information.  
                                                 
239 Gombrich, E.H., A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, Phaidon Press, Oxford, 1960 
(1956), 62.  
240 Ibid., 62-63. 
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Argument by analogy might only get one so far,241 but this does indeed point to a problem 
that presents itself in the study of political history (or indeed, in our everyday perceptions 
of the world, however uncomfortable it is to generalise at this level). If, as has been 
famously stated, we make our history in the circumstance transmitted from the past, and 
that furthermore we live forwards but think backwards, we find ourselves in a sense in the 
same situation as Gombrich’s draughtsmen; we cannot use a loaded term like dictator – 
with its highly negative semantic field – without referring back to some (or even several) 
dictator(s) familiar from the past. To not do so however would be extremely imprudent, it 
would imply that prior knowledge and experience count for nothing. The reverse however, 
can be equally dangerous; it would mean ignoring the new information before us and 
miscalculating as a result; it hardly needs to be said that in the political and public sphere, 
such a miscalculation by someone in a position of power can lead to disaster. This section 
of the thesis examines cases in which it is argued that this – the confusion of past and 
present – is exactly what happened.  
4.1.1Munich as myth 
In his important study The Myth of the State (published posthumously) Ernst Cassirer 
wrote:  
If we study our modern political myth and the use that has been made of them 
we find in them, to our great surprise not only transvaluation of all ethical 
values but also a transformation of human speech. The magic word takes 
precedence of the semantic word....those words which formerly were used in a 
descriptive, logical or semantic sense, are now used as magic words that are 
destined to produce certain effects and stir up new emotions.242   
                                                 
241 That said, the point Gombrich is making was not confined to the visual arts. He points out that a 
single concept “simile” once covered both artist’s stereotypes and legal precedents. He further argues that 
seeking to find recognisable form where there is none is a well-documented psychological process: “The 
draughtsman first tries to classify the blot and fit it into some sort of familiar schema...Having selected such 
a schema to fit the form approximately, he will proceed to adjust it”. Ibid., 63-64.  
242 Cassirer, 283. 
 
 
 
 
110 
On what basis can it be argued that Munich, the now notorious agreement on 1938, is a 
political myth? Not certainly on the basis of any supernatural elements or agents, there are 
none. Nor, at least at face value, on the basis of factual contestation (unlike Masada and 
Kosovo); we know who took part, and what happened (or at least, we feel we do). Nor 
was, or is, Munich a nation-building narrative like Gallipoli and the others; Munich 
quickly shed its national costume and had reappeared in various other political cultures 
and discourses. Nor was it a heroic defeat like the others; no glory is to be extracted from 
it; Munich remains a cautionary tale, a “Never Again!” of – we are very often reminded – 
utmost relevance and urgency.  
A further important contrast to the other narratives mentioned; Munich had not been 
institutionalised, it has not generated any rituals, and it remains confined to realms of 
political discourse and rhetoric. Yet, as will be argued, is had been uniquely influential 
narrative with paradigmatic value, but has often been used for pernicious ends.  
In his study of conflict, Suganami speaks of “mechanisms” including “mechanisms as 
narratives”. His defines this as a mini-story, with which the target audience is presumed to 
be familiar, so that some of the story can be left out if necessary. The point of the 
mechanism is functional; a certain input should lead – under some if not all conditions – to 
a certain output. As he puts it (in slightly unclear language); “Certain outputs…are 
sometimes treated as it were in ‘the nature of things’ that, given the inputs, they were 
brought about. The linkages are so familiar that there is little need felt to explain them.”243 
This almost identical to Barthes definition of myth, (“giving a historical intention a 
natural justification”)244 and as will be argued through several examples, Munich as a 
rhetorical trope is a speech act that does indeed function as a mechanism. 
This case study will therefore differ substantially to the previous one, and will be more a 
study of political speech, but nonetheless will still use the term myth as its framework, and 
will conclude by arguing that despite any number of apparent differences, Munich and 
Kosovo do, on more than one level, resemble each other strikingly.  
                                                 
243 Suganami, Hidemi, On the Causes of War, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001 (1996), 166. 
244 Barthes, 143. 
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4.1.2 The image 
Few 20th Century images are as well-known as that of British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain disembarking from his plane after the Munich Conference of 1938, waving a 
piece of paper that bore Hitler’s signature that supposedly underlined “the desire of our 
two peoples never to go to war again”. As Eric Hobsbawm wrote: 
The very word ‘Munich’ became a synonym, in Western political discourse, 
for craven retreat. The shame of Munich, which was felt almost immediately, 
even by those who signed the agreement, lay not simply in handing Hitler a 
cheap triumph, but in the palpable fear of war that preceded it, and in the even 
more palpable sense of relief that it had been avoided at any cost. ‘Bande du 
cons’ the French Premier Daladier is said to have muttered contemptuously 
when, having signed away the life of an ally of France, he expected to be 
hissed at on his return to Paris, but met nothing but delirious cheers.245  
However Chamberlain did not expect to be hissed. He too was cheered, first at the airport, 
then with the King and Queen on the balcony of Buckingham Palace, finally outside at 
Downing Street. He certainly had cause to feel that his concession of the Sudetenland to 
Nazi Germany was popular with the general public. Certainly George Orwell was of that 
opinion:  
In spite of the campaigns of a few thousand left-wingers, it is fairly certain that 
the bulk of the English people were behind Chamberlain’s foreign 
policy…Like the mass of the people he did not want to pay the price of either 
peace or war. And public opinion was behind him all the while. It was behind 
him when he went to Munich…246  
The London Times editorial of September 30th 1938 stated: “in the meantime Great Britain 
may well be proud that her representative, through all the heated controversies of the last 
                                                 
245 Hobsbawm, 146-7. 
246 Orwell, George, The Lion and the Unicorn, Socialism and the English Genius, Penguin, London, 
1982 (1941), 52. 
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few weeks, has just one clear purpose in view – that achievement of a just solution of this 
problem of Central Europe without a world-wide conflagration.”247 
Chamberlain was continuing the “peace process” of his time, called appeasement, a policy 
of avoiding confrontation by making concessions (often, it must be said, at the expense of 
third parties). This was the type of thing that great powers had been doing for a long time, 
and continue to do today, although we might now call it détente, non-intervention, or 
something similar. As Paul Kennedy writes, “Appeasement – if, by which, we mean the 
older sense of an attempt to settle differences by negotiation and concession – was not a 
new feature in British diplomacy; as historians have pointed out, many aspects of it went 
back to Gladstone’s time or event further”.248 Certainly Martin Gilbert locates the “roots” 
of appeasement as far back as Burke and Fox and the British reaction to the French 
Revolution.249 So appeasement was by no means anything new in the 1930s and it was not 
until 1938/9 that the word took on the highly negative connotations that it has carried ever 
since. Surprisingly even Winston Churchill – traditionally seen as the incarnation of 
everything anti-appeasement – praised appeasement as a policy, and did so as late as 1950, 
with the rather vague proviso that it was a good policy as long as it was made from a 
position of strength.250  
It is debatable whether or not Chamberlain was in a position of strength at Munich, where 
he had his third and final meeting with Hitler (they had met previously at Berghof and 
Godesberg). Chamberlain had made an agreement with a man who had no intention of 
keeping it (indeed who most probably thought that the conference would break up without 
resolution, and who would be privately furious about having even made the agreement). 
The following spring Nazi Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. This utterly 
discredited the policy of appeasement, and amounted to something like a collective 
“trauma”251 for many British, both politicians and citizens. However, following the Nazi 
                                                 
247 London Times, September 30th 1938. 
248 Quoted in Martel, Gordon (ed.) The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, The A.J.P. 
Taylor Debate after Twenty-Five Years, Allen and Unwin, Boston, 1986, 147-48  
249 “Walpole, Burke and Fox were the Patriarchs of appeasement.” Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of 
Appeasement, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966, 67. 
250 Ibid., 8. 
251 It is probable that a psychological reading is possible; at least in the cases of people – like the British 
in 1956 – who had actual experience of the events of Munich and its consequences. One could see Suez-as-
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invasion of Poland, the “shame” that Hobsbawm spoke of was cleansed and dignity and 
honour were restored by the declaration of war on Nazi Germany. The subsequent sense of 
national mission and the performance not only of the British armed forces the British 
public in general, especially during the Battle of Britain, gave people an extraordinary 
sense of national pride252 (and at the time, unity253) and contributed to a construction of a 
very powerful national narrative, one which has a very strong resonance throughout 
British national life and collective memory; it was in Churchill’s famous phrase, “their 
finest hour”. 
The Second World War – and, very importantly, the events leading to the European war – 
have saturated political culture and seem to have defined the terms against which other 
events are measured, assessed and validated. The war had become paradigmatic. As 
Gordon Martel argued over twenty ago:  
Much of the rhetoric in which the political debates of the 1980s are conducted 
is firmly lodged in the events of the previous half-century. Images of the 
1930s continue to flash past us: Hitler’s moustache and Chamberlain’s 
umbrella are still instantly recognisable…the war – and its origins – functions 
today as a mental and moral shorthand.254  
This is probably still as true now as twenty years ago: the war and its outbreak have had, 
and continue to have, an enormous resonance throughout Western political culture, indeed 
are more resonance than the subsequent Cold War, which lasted some four decades. In 
2003, Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Milano wrote:  
As mythology, the Second Wold War and its origins have had a profound and 
enduring influence on the conduct of international relations and….the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Munich (discussed below) as a “acting out” of the trauma of 1938, to borrow this Freudian term from 
Dominick La Capra’s use. Certainly there was mass “denial” of the general popularity of Chamberlain’s 
actions, which was surely why he and a few easy-to-target accomplices like Halifax were so mercilessly 
scapegoated. See LaCapra, Dominick, Writing History, Writing Trauma, John Hopkins, Baltimore, 2001. 
172 Not even the iconoclastic historian A.J.P. Taylor was immune to this intoxication: “Even if the 
Germans came, someone should remain to lead the ultimate liberation and I wanted my sons, if not myself, 
to be among them. It sounds absurdly romantic now but that is how I felt in the glorious summer of 1940”, 
Taylor, A.J.P, A Personal History, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1984, 199. 
253 “No one who was alive then can forget the combination of one of the loveliest of English Summers, 
the relentless procession of terrible news and spirit of unity, amounting almost to exaltation, among the 
people” Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986, 233. 
254
 Martel, Gordon, (ed.), 11. 
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discipline on political science. Despite the best efforts of historians to explain 
the considerable constraints upon British and French governments in their 
confrontation with the Fascist and militarist powers of the 1930s 
‘appeasement’ seems likely to remain a term of political derision throughout 
the English-speaking world. Consequently, when statesmen or journalists 
perceive the threat of aggression from Colonel Nasser or Ghadaffi, Slobodan 
Milošević or Saddam Hussein, allusions to Hitler, Munich and appeasement 
can be expected to follow….While, to be sure, the world has changed, the 
ideological battle lines of the present ‘war on terror’ resonate powerfully with 
the great power clashes of the 1930s and 1940s.255 
This chapter will elaborate on and examine this phenomenon in detail. 
4.2 In their time 
For, as has already been pointed out, the custom of killing a god dates from so 
early a period of human history that in later ages, even when the custom 
continues to be practised, it is liable to be misinterpreted. The divine 
character of the animal or man is forgotten, and he comes to be regarded 
merely as an ordinary victim. This is especially likely to be the case when it is 
a divine man who is killed. For when a nation becomes civilised, if it does not 
drop human sacrifices altogether, it at least selects as victims only such 
wretches as would be put to death at any rate. Thus the killing of a god may 
sometimes come to be confounded with the execution of a criminal.256 
Much of the later literature on Neville Chamberlain has been compensatory, trying to 
counterbalance the popular image, which is certainly woeful. Such compensation is 
certainly justified, not only because of its inherent interest, but because the popular 
narrative of the events of 1938-1940 are so powerfully entrenched. It is certainly a battle 
                                                 
255 Boyce, Robert, and Milano, Joseph A., The Origins of the Second World War, the debate continues, 
Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2003, 11. 
256 Frazier, James The Golden Bough, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2012 
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backwards to try to lower the temperature and shine some belated light onto what went on 
regarding the Sudeten Crisis and the eventual outbreak of the European war. One need 
only offer two quotations. 
In October 1937, in an article in the Evening Standard, readers were told – in a not very 
convincing tone – that there was “a good chance of no major war taking place in our 
time”.257  
When eventually war did come, British radio listeners heard from their Prime Minister the 
following stirring speech:  
If the enemy does try and to invade this country we will fight him in the air 
and on the sea; we will fight him on the beaches with every weapon we have. 
He may manage here and there to make a breakthrough: if he does we will 
fight him on every road, in every village and in every house…258  
“In our time” and “fight him on the beaches”; how many people would believe that the 
former statement was by Churchill and the latter by Chamberlain?  
Despite a poor start during the First World War, which earned him the distrust of David 
Lloyd George, who had initially spotted and picked him, Chamberlain had over the course 
of the 1920s and 30s an impressive political career. He was considered an outstanding 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was admired for his diligence and quite determination. 
This latter aspect led to him being praised at the expense of the man whom he succeeded 
in Downing Street, the unenergetic Stanley Baldwin. 
In retrospect, it might surprise many that Chamberlain was a pusher of British re-
armament, and was commonly attacked by left wingers during the 1935 election as a “war 
monger”, a term so often used against Churchill (the same Churchill who wrote in that 
same year: “One may dislike Hitler's system and yet admire his patriotic achievement. If 
                                                 
257 Quoted in Dutton, David, Neville Chamberlain, Reputations Series, Arnold Publishers, London, 
2001, 111, (italics added). 
258 Quoted in Dutton, 116. 
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our country were defeated, I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our 
courage and lead us back to our place among the nations.”)259 
But the allegation of warmongery was unfair. And this does lead us to another aspect of 
Chamberlain’s character worth noting; his later efforts to prevent a war were very sincere. 
He had not – unlike many of his slightly younger contemporaries – served in the First 
World War (he had been appointed Director of National Service), but was sensitive to the 
horrors of conflict. In our era of the “chickenhawk”, that is, civilian politicians who have 
never served in combat and overcompensate by leading their countries into war, 
Chamberlain’s absence of comparable baggage is commendable.260 
As the old saying goes, success has a thousand fathers but failure is always an orphan. 
This has probably never been truer about any other single historical event or person. It is 
hard to imagine a more sustained example of reading the past backwards. If one were to 
believe the popular narrative, Chamberlain pushed through a policy pretty much alone and 
against the wish of his government, opposition, and the mass of popular opinion. The 
Prime Minister himself, according to Orwell was seen as either “a dark and wily schemer, 
plotting to sell England to Hitler, but far likelier that he was merely a stupid old man 
doing his best according to his very dim lights.”261 Neither characterisation stands up to 
analysis.  
That yardstick of contemporary political popularity claims – the Gallup poll – was first 
held in Britain during Chamberlain’s premiership, in 1938. Polls taken in early and late 
1939 and early 1940 show that the Prime Minister’s administration had approval rating of 
50, 54, and even 60%. These were good ratings, especially as they extend to the huge 
changeover date of 1940, and given that pre-war Britain was a more divided place 
politically than it would become during the decades of post-war consensus.  
What is all of this except a triumph of hindsight bias? How many evokers of the “lessons 
of Munich” really put themselves in the situation of the British Prime Minister in 1938? 
                                                 
259 Churchill, Winston, The Strand Magazine, November 1935, quoted on http://refspace.com/. 
260 One can argue that both Tony Blair and George W. Bush belong in this category; both men had 
fathers who were combatants in the Second World War. Indeed, Blair’s father had had the proverbial “good 
war” rising from private to acting major.  
261 Orwell, 51. 
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Was he really supposed to convince Britain, with its huge economic problems and the 
memory of unprecedented carnage of the Great War, to again go to war with a central 
European power over a country with which it has no formal alliance (Czechoslovakia had 
a formal treaty with France, but not with Britain)? A Gallup poll taken in March 1938; 
when the Government had been initially shaken by the resignation of the popular Anthony 
Eden (not unlike Michael Heseltine’s highly dramatic – though ultimately futile – 
resignation from Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet) and the German takeover of Austria, still 
showed that only 33% of voters favoured British support for Czechoslovakia in the event 
of German aggression with 43% opposed. 262 
Who then knew how pernicious Hitler’s political morality was? Or indeed, how dreadful 
was the state that he created and how monstrous its crimes would become? Munich 
preceded Kristallnacht (reports of which would contribute to a change of mood in Britain) 
and of course the Ribbentrop/Molotov Pact, which shocked everyone by its utter cynicism 
(most especially from the German side, which had been fiercely anti-Bolshevik). Who 
then knew?  
When Chamberlain announced that he was going to Munich to pursue a settlement, he was 
not hissed in the House of Commons; quite the contrary.  
Of the conference itself, some background is important. Hitler had invited Chamberlain to 
travel to confer in Germany on September 28th. That day was the expiry date of the 
Godesberg Memorandum, which as an effective ultimatum to the Czech government to 
allow the Sudetenland to be ceded to Germany by 2 o’clock. The Czechs had refused and 
the French – who had a formal alliance with Czechoslovakia – mobilised their armed 
forces. The British also mobilised the Royal Navy and it was generally expected that war 
would break out.  
Chamberlain was speaking in the House of Commons when the news of Hitler’s offer 
arrived. The contents of the Prime Minister’s speech had been bleak; the best he news 
could offer was that a German mobilisation had been postponed for 24 hours, at the 
request of Mussolini.  
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He announced that the invitation had been made and that he would go. This response of 
the House was one of overwhelming endorsement of the Prime Minister’s intention. The 
scenes of relief and joy were without precedent in the history of the House of Commons. 
The Pathe news commentary spoke of “a gasp of amazement and satisfaction runs around 
the world…as if the world had suddenly seen a gleam of hope in the darkness of 
despair.”263 
But there were moves against him, most especially from the Labour Party. The Labour 
animosity manifested in two ways; firstly – as Dutton argues – it prevented him from 
emerging as a real national leader during a crisis and secondly one of the three authors of 
the damning pamphlet “Guilty Men” was future Labour leader Michael Foot (1913-2010). 
The pamphlet sold very well (over 200,000 copies), and was as Dutton points out, surely 
very widely read, passed from hand to hand. It engendered a string of ephemeral 
imitations. Published under the pseudonym Cato, the imitations was penned by Gracchus 
and Cassius. It established the level – character assassination – which has remained 
dominant.  
Lady Luck certainly worked against Chamberlain; early events in the War, the evacuation 
of Dunkirk (a remarkable instance of collective cooperation, and logistical efficiency) was 
seen as a disaster as was – and it is hard to disagree – the Norwegian campaign. The 
frustrations of the Phony War, called the “Bore War” in Britain were increasingly vented 
on the Prime Minister. Dutton makes the important point that this was a period of great 
frustration for ordinary people: “The country was being subjected to innumerable 
inconveniences ranging from blackout to the closure of places of entertainment without 
the compensation of military success.”264 The Norwegian campaign embittered the 
military, and they were happy to speak about “betrayal” by politicians (as defeated 
military men often do, one need only think of first America’s humiliations in Vietnam, or 
the great narrative of a stab-in-the-back that Corporal Hitler used as a ladder to power).  
Schivelbusch speaks of a shared state of mind called “dreamland” (a term he attributes to 
Ernst Troeltsch referring to Germany’s defeat in WWI). That is, when having suffered a 
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defeat, a group (strangely) embraces the defeat, because of the huge changes it has 
brought about, it seems to have given a clear path to a better life, however delusional. He 
says this is often triggered by an internal revolution following defeat; “The overthrow of 
the old regime and its subsequent scapegoating for the nation’s defeat are experienced as a 
kind of victory. The more popular the revolt and the more charismatic the new leadership, 
the greater the triumph will seem.”265 Although one cannot strictly call Munich a military 
defeat – although it did have much of the sense of humiliation of such a defeat – nor can 
one speak of the replacement of Prime Minister as “revolution”, but the changing of leader 
during wartime is nonetheless formidable. More to the point, there was this huge shift in 
feeling, a sense of sweeping away the frustrations of the politics of the 1930s. Dutton 
argues that an aspect of the Guilty Men school was a revisionist and very negative view of 
the 1930s, one that has not really been challenged in the public imagination, aided by 
some classic works of the time, such as Orwell’s The Road to Wigan Pier; “Such works 
created a strong – indeed, for many, an indelible – monochrome image of mass 
unemployment, dole queues, and hunger marches.”266  
And then there was the other factor in this myth construction; the man who replaced 
Chamberlain as Prime Minister had become the most admired leader of modern times. 
Churchill was a lucky as Chamberlain was unlucky. There was a Teflon quality to his 
career that somehow he managed to shrug off errors, misstatements and poor judgments. 
Nor was consistency his forte: it is not that surprising that he “crossed the floor” (changed 
party) twice in his career. As First Lord of the Admiralty, he should have been the most 
targeted candidate for the mismanagement of the Norwegian Campaign, but somehow he 
escaped, and the Prime Minister was blamed. Some of his plans and ambitions when he 
did join Chamberlain’s war cabinet were unrealistic; for example, his suggestion that 
Britain go to war against both the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.  
The war cabinet indeed did think about a deal with Hitler (this during the war!) but 
Churchill was against it. However, rather than siding with his preferred candidate for 
replacement (Halifax who was also the more popular candidate for the position) 
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Chamberlain sided with Churchill over the issue of a possible deal with Germany; here too 
Chamberlain might deserve some credit.  
But for all that, Churchill did seem to be a man of destiny, and saw himself in those terms 
(it may indeed have been a factor in his troubled relationship with another God-ordained 
saviour General De Gaulle). Many admirers seem to be willing to elevate him to that 
sacral level, he has often been referred to a “saviour”. 
Churchill famously said that history would be kind to him because he intended to write it. 
As well as being an inspiring war leader; he was also a Noble Prize-winning author. His 
multi-volume of history of the war was much admired, but it allowed him to use his huge 
prestige to become a dominant voice of the war, in ways which would naturally be self-
serving. He was, above all, a politician.  
One can see the symmetry of myth taking possession of this narrative; one figure is 
progressively denigrated while a rival is elevated. This is so powerful that no amount of 
accurate historical revisionism can seemingly challenge the popular narrative; at least not 
any time soon: Churchill is as revered as Chamberlain is defamed.  
Chamberlain was scapegoated. If this term has become, to quote Raymond Williams, “a 
commonplace of diatribe” it is an important social/political function and ought to be 
properly understood. The term, based on the ancient Israelite practice of driving a goat 
into the wilderness so that the creature will take evil with him, was a form of sacrifice. 
Sacrifice has not entirely disappeared as a practice; and the fate of Chamberlain was to be 
a spectacular scapegoat for an episode of modern political history; all blame had been 
placed on his shoulders. In his study of scapegoating, Tom Douglas writes:  
There is also a process of the transfer of blame, which is more a group 
phenomenon and appears to operate at a less conscious level. Its true nature is 
often unrecognised by those who operate it; indeed, who tend to explain it in 
rational terms if asked, but whose rational observations are seldom rooted in 
objective fact.267  
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While conceding that classical scapegoating took place in small-scale communities, 
Douglas does note “the main exception seems to occur when public figure are pilloried for 
their actions and they follow a procedure of selecting a scapegoat to take the blame in their 
stead”,268 something greatly eased by modern mass communication. 
He is seen now seen as beyond; he has crossed some imaginary border and his actions – 
though as argued here are explainable – as now seen as utterly unimaginable to the mob 
throwing stones and shouting abuse in his wake. René Girard once wrote that, “Mammals 
mark their territorial borders with their excrement. Human being have long done the same 
thing by that particular form of excrement that we their call their scapegoats.” 269 
4.4 Second time farce: Suez revisited 
The Suez Crisis of 1956 surely stands out now as the case of the misapplication of 
Munich. The crisis could be placed in three historical contexts; 1) European 
decolonisation; 2) the expansion of the Cold War into the Middle East; and 3) the 
developing Arab/Israeli conflict.270 Certainly these overlapped, but it is worth trying to 
think of them separately for the following reason. The British media and government 
could have and should have seen the unfolding crises in these terms – though with some 
exceptions – failed to. (Indeed there was even a recent precedent, the nationalisation of 
Iran’s foreign-owned oilfields by its Prime Minister Mossadeq.) Rather, the British media 
and government imagined that a familiar set of circumstances from the past were reborn, 
and they sought answers in this fourth context, the events of the late 1930s. Why this 
default to a past of little objective resemblance? Why was the lure of the past, that 
particular past, so strong as to deflect attention away from urgent, unfolding political 
realities?  
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The crisis, to sketch it briefly here, began when the Government of Abdul Nasser Egypt 
nationalised the foreign-owned Suez Canal in 1956. Despite a weak case in international 
law (as in more recent British involvements in the Middle East) the British Government 
under Prime Minister Anthony Eden, rushed to arms (in covert collusion with France and 
Israel)271 and invaded Egypt, only to be forced to withdraw by a rare moment of 
Superpower consensus. It was an important in the process of European de-colonisation – 
Egypt’s Nasser was one of the founder of the Non-Aligned Movement – and also a mark 
that Britannia no longer ruled the waves. It was, as historian Alistair Horne judged it, “the 
shortest (‘war’) in history and probably the silliest.”272 
It did not seem so silly at the time however. There were very real things at risk, most of 
the Western world’s crude oil was carried through the canal, and control of it was very 
important. From the point of view of the British and Egyptians, one as the former ruler 
and the other as the emerging ex-colony, the symbolic weight of the conflict was huge. 
Christian Pineau, French Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote, “The Suez affair, so wounding 
to British honour, hardly changed the political situation”.273 This may have been the case 
for the French, but Suez was a lesser event for them, rather like a minor stopover between 
the disaster of Dien Bien Phu and the expanding horror of the Algerian War. By contrast, 
for the British, the political losses were large, and more than any other event, perhaps even 
more than the independence of India, Suez seemed to confirm the end of the British 
Empire, which had been divided into “West of” and “East of Suez”. 
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4.4.1 Munich on the Nile: British reactions to Suez 
When the nationalisation of the canal was announced, the public outrage in Britain took on 
a very alarmist voice; put briefly, this was Munich again and Nasser was another Hitler. 
There was a challenge implicit in this; “this-time-there-would-be-no-appeasement-of-a-
dictator.” 
It is strange that the actual armed conflict in Suez was merely a few days, and the build-up 
to the conflict seems somewhat disproportionate. This period, from July till the outbreak 
of fighting is the focus here. Between the Egyptian nationalisation of the canal and the 
eventual Anglo/French invasion three months passed.274 During that time there were 
considerable changes in public opinion in Britain, when it became clear that the United 
States was not sympathetic, many people, from the power elites down were sobered. When 
the invasion eventually took place at the same time that the Soviets sent their army to 
repress the Hungarian uprising, more people refused to support the Government.275 But 
this section is equally concerned with the first moment; the general reaction to the news of 
the nationalisation. 
 
The headlines and Letters to the Editor of the London Times – which traditionally 
represented established opinion quite accurately – in late July/August 1956, Munich, 
Dictator, Appeasement, Mussolini, Hitler and so on were repeated constantly. For 
example, under the editorial “The Hinge of History” was written, “The modern world as 
suffered many acts, like Hitler’s march into the Rhineland….quibbling over whether or 
not he (Nasser) was ‘legally entitled’ to make the grab will delight the finicky and comfort 
the fainthearted.”276 Two days later there was an editorial “Resisting the Aggressor” which 
was as sceptical of the usefulness of negotiation as its predecessor was dismissive of the 
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idea of legality. “So there is to be a conference. That is the net result of the three power 
talks in London. The news is bound to be heard with mixed feelings.”277  
 
A letter to the editor by the Conservative MP Julian Amery stated: “By themselves 
(sanctions) will no more deter Colonel Nasser that Mussolini was deterred by economic 
sanctions during the Abyssinian war” he concluded, “If our American Allies cannot or will 
not join us, then Britain and France must go ahead without them. It will not be the first 
time.”278Many other letters were no less strident; (Nasser was) “A military dictator who 
has established a fascist police state and intimate relations with the communist 
dictatorship.”279 
Elsewhere in the media, this alarmist manner was frequent: “One edition warned that the British 
people, ‘in their silent way, know better than their critics. They still want Britain Great’. The 
Daily Sketch echoed this tone in September with its notorious headline: ‘LET THE CRY 
BABIES HOWL! It’s GREAT Britain again.’”280  
Beyond the Times and Sketch (which represented the higher and lower strains of the British 
political right) most other papers, both broadsheet and tabloids supported the government’s 
stand on Suez, the Express, Daily Mail, Evening News, Evening Standard, Telegraph, Sunday 
Times, Sunday Express) whereas few opposed the government the Mirror, News Chronicle, 
Morning Star, People, Reynolds News and famously the (Manchester) Guardian and Observer 
(then, unlike now, separate papers). Excepting the Mirror, none of this latter group of papers had 
a large circulation.281 
One letter in the Daily Telegraph (an even more traditionally Tory paper than The Times) later 
expanded on in the historical journal Time and Tide – although published when the crisis was 
unravelling – is especially noteworthy: “The real danger if the Nasser movement had been 
allowed to progress unchecked, we would have been faced with by a coalition of all Arab, 
Muslim, Asiatic, and anti-western states, led nominally by Egypt but really by Russia; that is a 
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division of the world in which the enemies of civilisation are stronger that the supporters”.282 
This is notable not because it was written by a stereotypical, retired Colonel but rather it was 
written by Professor Gilbert Murray, a noted liberal internationalist, and ex-president of the 
United Nations Association.  
Beyond the media, politicians were also using fighting words. On August 2, the leader of the 
opposition Labour party Hugh Gaitskell called Nasser “Hitler”,283 while ex-Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee, then Labour leader in the House of Lords, described Nasser as an “Imperialist 
Dictator”.284 Another Labour member of the Commons, Reginald Paget, described the 
nationalisation of the canal as “a threat to strangle the whole industry of Europe…what we had 
to get used to in Hitler’s day”.285 In his famous diary, Harold Macmillan (then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, later Eden’s successor as Prime Minister) called Nasser “an Asiatic Mussolini, full 
of insult and abuse of the US and UK”.286 There was more considerable consensus at the time 
than is usually allowed.  
The idea, often stated, that Suez divided opinion in Britain must be placed in context. Firstly, it 
should be noted that in the mid 1950s there was extraordinary political consensus in Britain. The 
phrase used to describe this at the time was “Butskailism”. This term was a merging of the 
names of the previous Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell with that of his 
Conservative successor, Rab Butler. There had been considerable consensus about how best to 
run the British economy, and none of the sharp class and ideological divisions that marked 
politics in the 1930s and again in the 1970s and 80s. The split in opinion led to civil marches in 
Trafalgar Square, but certainly not strikes, riots, or other forms of sustained mass protest. This 
was a surface level fracture.  
 
The second point is that even if opinion became more divided by November 1956 (as opposed to 
the first moment of intoxication in July) the split was never one between equals. The division 
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was one between people who had the power to use military force and those who were powerless 
to stop it. 
 
Why were people, often well-informed opinion and policy makers, comparing an impoverished, 
agricultural North African ex-colony to the industrialised, militarised Germany of twenty years 
before? And why of all people Prime Minister Anthony Eden, a veteran of foreign affairs, and a 
man who was by academic training an Orientalist?287 
4.4.2 Memoirs of the Big Three 
In the preface of his autobiography Full Circle published in 1960, Eden states that “the lessons 
of the ‘thirties and their application to the ‘fifties…are the themes of my memoirs”.288 Like all 
political memoirs, they are self-serving. It might also be noted that there is no real documentary 
evidence beyond Eden’s own papers used. There are no references to other memoirs, rather the 
ex-statesman is defining the agenda and setting the record. Given that his impressive career was 
destroyed by Suez, it is not surprising that the book is even more bitter and self-defensive than is 
usual, even for a political memoir. However, only one aspect of all this is of interest here. 
Throughout the book Eden constantly compares Nasser to the Fascist dictators of the 1930s. But 
at no stage does he try to make a reasoned or systematic comparison; rather he does so by means 
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of slur289 and guilt by association.290 He writes from a position of constant bad faith throughout 
the book, blurring the potential with the actual (in contemporary language, politicians and 
spokesmen often speak of “capacity”). Eden seems more concerned with Nasser’s style of rule; 
“He (Nasser) has followed Hitler’s pattern, even to concentration camps and the propagation of 
Mein Kampf among his officers. He has understood and used the Goebbels pattern of 
propaganda in all its lying ruthlessness.”291 Indeed some of his political generalisations are 
childishly crude, for example: “Communist rulers are the primitive and ruthless priests of a 
modern religion, more skilful and more cautious than the megalomaniacal dictator, who is 
compelled to achieve power and fulfil his ambitions before he dies.”292 
The same is true of the account given by Eden’s Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd.293 Lloyd was 
writing much later (in 1978) and unlike Eden he had maintained a considerable political career 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speaker, and later Leader of the House of Commons) following 
the debacle of 1956. So he was not as self-protective as Eden. Furthermore Lloyd had also read 
other accounts, British, French, Egyptian and Israeli and spends much time niggling over small 
points.  
But unlike Eden at his time of writing, Lloyd had seen the course of events over the 1960s and 
early 1970s. These events would have included Nasser’s defeats – the failure of the United Arab 
Republic (a merger with Syria), the military defeat in Yemen, the disaster of the 1967 war – and 
his death in 1970. So one might imagine that Lloyd might drop the Nasser-was-Hitler argument, 
but on the contrary, he will not let it go. There are numerous references to Nasser as Hitler in 
Lloyd’s account, even in retrospect was he unwilling to change his mind. He writes of Nasser’s 
“obsessions” his “megalomania” much like Eden does, and again uses the same easily-
identifiable tags; such as Egyptian propaganda techniques, again compared to those of 
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Goebbels, and again references to Mein Kampf. Lloyd too, was obsessed with the events of the 
late 1930s; indeed, his fear of being called an appeaser is explicit in his book:  
As to the British political scene, our critics on the left would claim that it was 
they who had forced us to back down, but if we took no action those same 
people would very soon be crying ‘Munich again’. We would be the ‘guilty 
men’ who had failed to stand up to Nasser, just as, according to them, the 
conservatives in 1937 and 1938 had failed to stand up to Hitler. 
“Munich again?” he concluded, “Was that an exaggeration or an obsession?” Surely it was both. 
But Lloyd simply cannot let the idea go; in one bizarre passage he even makes an objectively 
good case for Nasser: 
Others preferred to compare Nasser with Mussolini. I myself thought that the 
comparison with Hitler was more apt, because Nasser’s The Philosophy of the 
Revolution read like Mein Kampf. It has been argued since that Nasser had not 
behind him the German industrial base, its war potential and the backing of a 
martial race. That was true but Nasser did not need them. He had Russian 
support….In any case, he was a patriot of simple tastes, trying to restore self-
confidence and pride of race to the Egyptians. He wished to relieve their 
poverty and improve their living standards.294 
But he concludes by stating; “Almost identical arguments had been made about Hitler”. 
Macmillan, whose volume of memoirs Riding the Storm, 1956-59, covers the relevant 
time, was equally partisan in retrospect. These were written and published in 1970-71, and 
as stated above, Nasser was by then dead, and had proved to be a toothless tiger. 
Macmillan, however argues otherwise; “if one traces his tactics, they bear a considerable 
likeness to those of Mussolini, whom in many aspects he resembled.”295 This stubbornness 
was what Barbara Tuchman referred to as “cognitive rigidity”, a strengthening rather than 
an adjustment (or abandonment) of belief when confronted with disproving evidence.296 
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Writing many years after the event, Lloyd (and indeed Macmillan, Eden or whoever) 
could well have distanced themselves from their earlier pronouncements; this is indeed 
one of the skills of writing political autobiography, retrospective rationalisation (“at-the-
time-we-generally-thought-X-whereas-now-we-know-Y”. But they did not.  
Even though demonising your enemy is not an exact science, what is striking about this 
hit-and-miss manner of demonisation is that it is so superficial; resting only on easily 
identifiable words, phrases, and images. This may have been in part because Fascism was 
easier to identify than to define. Robert Paxton’s study notes that “The most self-
consciously visual of all political forms, fascism presents itself to us in vivid images; a 
chauvinist demagogue haranguing an ecstatic crowd; disciplined ranks of marching 
youths, coloured shirted militants beating up members of some demonized minority.” 297 
But this poses as many questions as it answers, for most of these images were not 
available – nothing could have been more alien in Egypt than black/brownshirts, torch-lit 
parades etc., certainly Nasser was given to impassioned speech-making but so are Baptist 
Ministers; speech-making alone does not make anyone a Fascist.  
But one must pose the question; why was Nasser demonised in distinctly European terms? 
Surely an Egyptian Muslim of modest background might easily have been castigated as an 
“oriental” despot or “tribal” African? After all, the European colonial powers had long 
experience in racial/religious scaremongering; why not depict Nasser as some secularised, 
more modern version of a “Mad Mullah”? 
Eden’s individual reasons for doing so were obvious enough; he had resigned from 
Neville Chamberlain’s Conservative government (though not strictly because of the policy 
of appeasement, indeed he had carried out the same policy298) and so was not tainted with 
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being one of the “Men of Munich” and could exploit this moral high ground. After 
Munich, Eden – however unjustly – became the great hero of anti-appeasement, and 
naturally exploited this. But there was more to it than that, he really seemed to believe 
what he was saying in 1956 and afterwards, as did so many others who added their voices 
to his. 
The second point of objection is related and very important; surely the comparison of 
revolutionary Egypt with the Third Reich was no more than rhetoric and propaganda?299
The passages quoted above argue that certainly among the most powerful men during the 
crisis, Eden, Lloyd, and McMillan seemed to be sincere, they, as noted, wrote after the 
events and still refused to alter their strident opinions. But even if some of it was 
calculated propaganda, it was propaganda that was presented in an environment of a 
pluralistic, “free” press, among a large and potentially very skeptical readership. The 
propaganda had to be convincing to them; it had to be, in Lincoln’s terms credible.  
A.J.P. Taylor’s biographer, Adam Sisman writes of this obsession with the events of the 
later 1930s in quite exact psychological terms. “Britons” he writes, “have become 
dangerously and self-destructively fixated on a few years in their history. On the one hand, 
the ‘finest hour’; on the other Munich.”300 The fact that the fixation is of such a dual 
nature is a little disconcerting. There is both morbid fascination (with Munich) and 
romantic nostalgia (for the subsequent war), but the two are so inextricably connected.  
What the Suez-as-Munich trope – a confusion of nostalgia, alarmism, and cognitive 
dissonance – offered was something one rarely gets in ordinary life, yet alone in politics; a 
second chance. Indeed the chance it offered was two-fold, in symmetry with the “finest 
hour/Munich” obsession that brought it to life. This was to finally get the appeasement 
monkey off the collective British back, as if to say; “This time, with this dictator, we will 
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not be fooled or compromised”; to re-quote Macmillan “This was the supreme issue…It 
was 1938 over again.”301 By extension, it also seemingly made possible the chance to 
relive a glorious past, but to do so inexpensively, without any of the original sacrifice or 
commitment, to engage in that thing so beloved of so many politicians; a short, victorious 
war. 
4.5 Beyond Britain: Munich as a Cold War template 
But what makes “Munich” different from narratives, which usually operate on a national 
level, is its ability to resonate in various political cultures. It quickly ceased to be an 
Anglo/Franco affair and began to emerge in other cultures. The following extract is an 
example of the re-application of the idea of appeasement, by a person who once enjoyed 
huge moral authority: 
 
The spirit of Munich has by no means retreated into the past; it was not merely 
a brief episode. I even venture to say that the spirit of Munich prevails in the 
Twentieth Century. The timid civilized world has found nothing with which to 
oppose the onslaught of a sudden revival of barefaced barbarity, other than 
concessions and smiles. The spirit of Munich is a sickness of the will of 
successful people, it is the daily condition of those who have given themselves 
up to the thirst after prosperity at any price, to material well-being as the chief 
goal of earthly existence. Such people – and there are many in today's world – 
elect passivity and retreat, just so as their accustomed life might drag on a bit 
longer, just so as not to step over the threshold of hardship today – and 
tomorrow, you'll see, it will all be all right. (But it will never be all right! The 
price of cowardice will only be evil; we shall reap courage and victory only 
when we dare to make sacrifices.)302 
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This is an extract from the Nobel Prize acceptance statement of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. 
“Munich” has obviously moved a long way from the concession of the Sudetenland, and 
now the event has become a blueprint for very different kind of human behaviour. It is 
now about people who prefer material comfort (which is quite a lot of people when one 
thinks about it) who are the new appeasers, the new “guilty men”. They represented the 
spirit of Munich, which for Solzhenitsyn meant sickness and cowardice.  
Solzhenitsyn, of course, held no political office and wielded no actual power and therefore 
his utterance is markedly different to similar evocations of Munich by practicing 
statesmen and stateswomen. His condemning of Western values is less than precise in a 
political context. However, in a famous address to Harvard in 1978, he denounced 
Western “capitulation”: “Your shortsighted politicians who signed the hasty Vietnam 
capitulation seemingly gave America a carefree breathing pause; however, a hundredfold 
Vietnam now looms over you.” In the same speech, he also denounced the OSCE 
conference (then in Belgrade) in Munich-like terms “at the shameful Belgrade conference 
free Western diplomats in their weakness surrendered the line”.303 In a sense, Solzhenitsyn 
maps Munich onto a Cold War context; the weak West against the absolute threat of 
World Communism. The West, he insists, is marked by nothing so much as a “decline in 
courage” which: 
may be the most striking feature which an outside observer notices in the West 
in our days. The Western world has lost its civil courage, both as a whole and 
separately, in each country, each government, each political party and of 
course in the United Nations.304 
Governments, he assures us, are run by faceless bureaucrats who “get tongue-tied and 
paralyzed when they deal with powerful governments and threatening forces, with 
aggressors and international terrorists.” Again, the inability of the West to stand up to 
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aggressors; the Cold War is translated back into the Second World War, making both the 
West’s fault:  
In World War II against Hitler, instead of winning that war with its own 
forces, which would certainly have been sufficient, Western democracy grew 
and cultivated another enemy who would prove worse and more powerful yet, 
as Hitler never had so many resources and so many people, nor did he offer 
any attractive ideas, or have such a large number of supporters in the West – a 
potential fifth column – as the Soviet Union.305 
Solzhenitsyn’s allegations and his Manichean imagination often flirted, as here, with the 
apocalyptic. But rhetorical strategies always “up” the given case; making it into a civilizational 
struggle; good versus evil, us versus them; all of which if typical mythological discourse.  
But it was not only anti-Soviets such as Solzhenitsyn who used Munich as a trope; the Soviets 
themselves used it as a tool with which to denounce Western duplicity. Such was Munich’s 
transferability. However, for Soviet spokesmen to use it was not without risk, and exposed their 
flank to anti-Soviet critics.   
One such critic was Prince (later Sir) Dimitri Obolenski (1918-2001), the distinguished Balkan 
historian. A Russian exiled by the Revolution, he was deeply anti-Soviet but in a more discrete 
manner that the rather Wagnerian Solzhenitsyn (Obolenski stated frankly that he could not wish 
for a Soviet victory over the Nazis as he felt that Stalin as bad as Hitler). In his reticent memoir 
(the book is more about his illustrious relatives than the genuinely modest author) Obolenski 
describes a decidedly heated conference of British and Soviet historians in Stockholm in 1960. 
The final session was devoted to a Soviet paper on the diplomatic background to the Second 
World War. Its summary, Obolensky writes, “which had been distributed in advance, contained 
a number of severe attacks on Allied policy, listing in particular the Munich agreement”306 as 
well as “the British government’s alleged intention of inciting Hitler to attack the Soviet Union, 
and the length of time it took to launch the Second Front.”307 Fellow historian (and experienced 
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diplomat) Sir Charles Webster (1886-1961) issued a rebuttal. According to Obolensky, 
Webster’s manner was (one is not really surprised) “decidedly Churchillian”: 
“Yes” he said, “we concluded the Munich agreement; and a regrettable thing it was, 
as our historians have now admitted. But you” – he added, pointing an accusing 
finger at the soviet audience – “you did something even worse: you concluded a pact 
with Hitler; and so far not one of your historians has felt free to criticise what was 
done. Furthermore, you have accused us of duplicity when we negotiated with you 
in 1939: but you don’t understand the problem that faced our government and public 
opinion at the time. Why you” – again the accusing finger – “you had just had your 
purges, in which the greater part of your high command – from Marshal 
Tukhacheveky downward – had been liquidated. If these charges against your 
generals were true, it means that all your military secrets were the hands of the 
Germans…308 
The Soviet translators (seemingly all young) who had to translate this unwelcome message were 
too frightened to include any references to the purges and the Marshall. One of the British 
delegation did fill in the gaps in the translation however.  
One can see from the above exchange that ideologues on both sides of the Cold War division (or 
more realistically the US/USSR rivalry) could use Munich as a trope. In this, interestingly, 
Munich had evaded the traditional right/left dichotomy in politics It would be convenient if 
appeasement (as it is generally understood, in Hobsbawm’s words “craven retreat”) was a policy 
that had been carried out by the left, but it was not so. Chamberlain et al., were decidedly 
Conservative. Certainly Daladier was of the French Radical Party but headed a coalition 
National Front government, but he was very much the junior party in the Munich Conference, 
and followed Chamberlain’s lead (despite private doubts and well-attested, prior warning about 
the entire undertaking). But this fact has seemingly not bothered right-wing ideologues from 
indulging in some historical amnesia and making Munich their own. A further point on this; 
evocations of Munich are usually world-weary and politically realist in tone, that is, they are 
dismissive of (alleged) appeasement as the self-delusion and/or ideologically naïve. Yet one 
could at least argue that facing the risks and challenges of its time, appeasement as actually 
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carried out by the British was indeed realist; accepting of in more modern jargon “the facts on 
the ground”.  
Note exactly the realist tone in an early and embryonic speech by the Cold Warrior Ronald 
Reagan,309 who had no difficulty in linking the welfare state, with absolute surrender to the 
enemy.  
In a televised 1964 speech called A Time for Choosing (given in support of Barry Goldwater, 
who would run unsuccessfully against Lyndon Johnson for President), Reagan drew up an 
alarming picture of the world as he saw it, stressing from the outset that the speech was penned 
by himself alone (“The sponsor has been identified, but unlike most television programs, the 
performer hasn't been provided with a script. As a matter of fact, I have been permitted to 
choose my own words and discuss my own ideas regarding the choice that we face in the next 
few weeks”).310 
The Vietnam War was being fought and for Reagan this was all or nothing: “We're at war with the 
most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind.”311 After attacking various pet dislikes 
(government spending, government itself - “a little intellectual elite in a far-distant capitol can 
plan our lives for us better than we can plan them ourselves”) Reagan returns to the matter of the 
war, which he says is “a war that must be won”: 
Those who would trade our freedom for the soup kitchen of the welfare state 
have told us they have a utopian solution of peace without victory. They call 
their policy "accommodation." And they say if we'll only avoid any direct 
confrontation with the enemy, he'll forget his evil ways and learn to love us. 
All who oppose them are indicted as warmongers. They say we offer simple 
answers to complex problems. Well, perhaps there is a simple answer -- not an 
easy answer -- but simple: If you and I have the courage to tell our elected 
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officials that we want our national policy based on what we know in our hearts 
is morally right. 
Reagan then uses language and argumentation that will anticipate that of several future 
American and British statespersons, when evoking the solemn “lessons of history”. (These 
will be dealt with in several sections below.)  
Now let's set the record straight. There's no argument over the choice between 
peace and war, but there's only one guaranteed way you can have peace -- and 
you can have it in the next second -- surrender. 
Admittedly, there's a risk in any course we follow other than this, but every 
lesson of history tells us that the greater risk lies in appeasement, and this is 
the specter our well-meaning liberal friends refuse to face -- that their policy 
of accommodation is appeasement, and it gives no choice between peace and 
war, only between fight or surrender. If we continue to accommodate, 
continue to back and retreat, eventually we have to face the final demand -- the 
ultimatum.312  
The speech – which effectively launched Reagan’s unlikely career – is a timely reminder 
of the alarmism of the Cold War, and of its moral reduction, and – if one accepts the 
reductionism – the clarity offered by the conflict (one example of the diplomatic use of 
“clarity is examined below).  
Appeasement and Munich entered the political lexicon of the Cold War quite early, in fact, 
associated with two of its most dramatic (and later discredited) personalities, General 
Douglas MacArthur and Senator Joseph McCarthy. The unlikely figure of Dorothy Parker 
was accused by the California State Senate Committee on Un-American Activities of 
being a “Red appeaser” in 1949.313 Although she was named as one of 400 concealed 
communists by Joseph McCarthy, Parker was not actually called to testify before the 
Committee on Un-American Activities (although she did later appear before a New York 
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state legislative committee investigation in 1955, but it was a lesser affair than 
McCarthy’s show trials). Destructive as the episode of the Second Red Scare was 
domestically (it was also, along with the coeval Doctor’s Plot in the USSR, an exemplary 
theatre of political paranoia), an evocation of Munich by General MacArthur was 
influential in an actual Cold War military conflict. 
 
Following the dramatic fall of Pyongyang in October 1950 and the rapid advance of 
American and UN forces, the “American Cesar”, according to Max Hastings, “made plain 
his contempt for the carefully drawn niceties of Washington and the UN.”314 Of a British 
plan to create a buffer zone, to be jointly policed by UN and Chinese forces (China had 
not joined the conflict at that point) MacArthur responded: 
 
The widely reported British desire to appease the Chinese Communists by 
giving them a strip of North Korea finds its historic precedent in the action 
taken at Munich on 29 September 1938…to give up any portion of North 
Korea to the aggression of Chinese Communists would be the greatest defeat 
of the free world in recent times.315  
 
The civilizational lines here were drawn as dramatically as in the speeches of Solzhenitsyn 
and Reagan, the all-or-nothing tone, applied to both the Vietnam War and the earlier 
Korean. Post-Suez, Munich would also get a second airing back in the UK. 
4.6 Falkland’s War, 1982  
In his diaries of the 1950s, Harold Macmillan had caustically refered to a political 
colleague as ‘Munichois’ meaning, of course, a supporter of appeasement during the 
1930s. Regarding the Korea War then raging he wrote, “nor have we given enough 
warning against an ‘Eastern Munich.’”316 To be able to accuse someone of being an 
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appeaser was to possess the best weapon in the arsenal, the ultimate inside knowledge or 
“evidence” that allowed one to outflank an opponent (or even commit moral/political 
blackmail). Macmillan, who despite the avuncular manner was a cynical and ruthless 
politician, plainly enjoyed possession of this weapon. Referring to a special session of 
Parliament devoted to Suez, he writes “a good many Tories (Macmillan’s own party), 
mostly young and the sons of ‘Munichites’ – like Richard Wood – began to rat too.”317 For 
the future Prime Minister, being one of the “guilty men” was seemingly genetically 
transmittable, a stigma passed down from down from father to son, from one generation to 
another. Subsequent generations of British politicians have been happy to go to the cellar 
and drag out the weapon, whenever circumstances made it possible. One such possibility 
presented itself in 1982. 
The Falkland’s War of 1982 was sparked by the invasion of the inlands in the south 
Atlantic by the Argentinian armed forces. The inlands, called the Malvinas by the 
Argentinians, have been under de-facto British sovereignty since the 19th Century. Other 
powers have claimed the inlands as theirs (including the United States, Spain and France) 
but the only other modern and ongoing claim was by Argentina. At that time, Argentina 
was ruled a military junta, rightly notorious for its human rights abuses, in particular its 
“dirty war” against domestic opposition leading to widespread use of torture and extra-
judicial killings (the “disappeared”). Under the presidency of General Galtieri the junta 
had reached a crisis of legitimacy, it was deeply unpopular, the economy was in deep 
stagnation and there were mass-protests against the government.  
Speaking of the Falklands War, an adventure that – unlike Suez – was a political success 
for Downing Street, the late Margaret Thatcher wrote, “we were defending our honour as a 
nation, and principles of fundamental importance to the whole world – above all, that 
aggressors should never succeed.”318 Earlier in her memoir, Thatcher had written that she 
“drew from the failure of appeasement the lesson that aggression must always be firmly 
resisted.”319 She also comments on what she called the “Suez Syndrome” (a British 
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version of America’s Vietnam Syndrome), which she described in morally uncomplicated 
terms (as was her style) an unwillingness to fight through to the end, come what may.320 
As the following quotation makes clear, appeasement, Suez and the Falkland’s War were 
linked in her mind; “Since the Suez fiasco of 1956, British foreign policy had been one 
long retreat….We had come to be seen by both friends and enemies as a nation which 
lacked the will and the capability to defend it interests in peace, yet alone in war.”321  
This uncompromising aspect of her nature was very well weighed by Denis Healy, one of 
the most experienced and perceptive of her opponents (he was as the time, the Shadow 
Foreign Secretary).  
She saw consensus as a dirty word, because it meant a compromise between 
different interests or points of view. ‘To me’ she said, ‘consensus seems to be 
the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and policies. So it is 
something in which no one believes and to which no one objects.’ She told the 
diplomatist Tony Parsons while she was still in opposition that she regarded 
people who believed in consensus as ‘quislings and traitors’. But, though she 
insisted again and again that she stood for conviction against consensus, it has 
never been clear whether by conviction she means anything more that her 
current state of mind; the content of her conviction is simply the opinion she 
happens to hold on a particular issue at any particular time. 322 
Given the attention that the Falkland’s War has recently received in retrospect, it has been 
somewhat surprising to find out that the Prime Minister could not necessarily count on 
much support from her government, even cabinet. One must also note that recently 
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released documents indicated that the Prime Minister may have considered a compromise. 
Future research may show this to be correct. However, statements at the time were bullish; 
drafts of a press statement given by Defense Secretary Nott on 3 May 1982, note that “the 
measured and calculated military response which we have made must not be interpreted as 
weakness, or unwillingness to see it through.”323  
Having proved she was no Chamberlain, she implied that she was, of course, a Churchill, 
as one historian noted. “Invoking what she termed ‘the spirit of the South Atlantic – the 
real spirit of Britain’, Thatcher offered direct and indirect comparison between the 
Falklands War and her leadership of the nation, and the Second World War and 
Churchill’s leadership.”324 Her speech is noteworthy not only because of the predictable 
quotation of a Churchill wartime speech (and an equally predictable attack on trade 
unions), she also made explicit a link between past and present: “…we rejoice that Britain 
has re-kindled that spirit which has fired her for generations past and which today has 
begun to burn as brightly as before.”325  
Thatcher’s preference for military action over a diplomatic solution was transparent:  
…there were clear signs that what they (the Americans) were contemplating 
was a negotiation between the two sides. All of this was fundamentally 
misguided...But in practice the Haig negotiations, which flowed from all this, 
almost certainly worked in our favour by precluding for a time even less 
helpful diplomatic interventions from other directions, including the UN.326   
American documents from the conflict show that Haig cabled from London on April 8th 
and stated that:  
The prime Minister has the bit between her teeth, owing to the politics of a 
united nation and an angry parliament, as well as her own convictions about 
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the principles at stake.” “She is clearly prepared to use force. Though she 
admits her preference for a diplomatic solution, she is rigid in her insistence 
on a return to the status quo ante, and indeed seemingly determined that any 
solution involve some retribution."327  
The preference for a diplomatic solution was most probably disingenuous and only 
calculated to keep the US on-side, has Haig continued, "It is clear that they had not 
thought much about diplomatic possibilities.328  
Strangely, the recently-published Rattenbach Report (commissioned at the time by the 
Argentine Government and kept secret, despite some leaks) offers evidence that the 
invasion of the islands was merely an attempt (one would have to say, a very high-risk 
attempt) to settle the dispute of the islands, using force to get a diplomatic solution, 
however unlikely.329 
In short, it was decided to undertake an aggressive diplomatic action in the 
Malvinas case, in order to reactivate the efforts for a settlement of the dispute, 
indicating the need to initiate studies to evaluate the feasibility and desirability 
of an occupation of the Islands, founded in NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 
VALID FOR GREAT BRITAIN IF NEGOTIATIONS dilate. This was THE 
EMBRYO FORMAL MILITARY ALTERNATIVE.330 
This, however poorly judged, was an interesting mirror image of the British strategy; there 
diplomacy was pushed aside for military action; for the Argentinians, the military action 
was an attempt to push a diplomatic solution. The other interesting aspect is that – despite 
the very different political systems in the two countries – both governments were 
unpopular and no doubt thought that winning a conflict would reverse that. As Healy said, 
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Thatcher believed in “miracle cures”,331 and a short war that unleashes – as it did – a huge 
wave of populist nationalism was one such cure. The Argentinian leadership seemed to 
have believed in a similar cure; there could be only winner however; the Conservative 
were re-elected and the Junta eventually fell. Not that winning a war necessarily 
guarantees re-election, as an American president would find out a decade later. 
4.7 Gulf War 1 
Interestingly, when the US showed some interests in resolving the Argentine/British 
conflict diplomatically, President Reagan offered to send his Vice President to Buenos 
Aries. The offer was refused by the Argentinians. When he later replaced Reagan as 
president, George H. Bush would have a chance to try to resolve another conflict 
diplomatically; as will be seen, he did not take this option.  
The Gulf War as it had become known (although the term had been used previously to 
describe the deeply destructive Iran/Iraq War) was triggered when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
invaded and occupied Kuwait on August 2nd 1990. There were immediate sanctions placed 
on Iraq, and a United Nations Resolution 678 (there had been several demanding 
immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait) gave an American-led coalition 
permission to use “all necessary means” to expel the Iraqi occupiers from Kuwait. This 
was done with a massive air campaign and swift land war.  
Compared to the Second Gulf War (which will also be discussed below) the First Gulf 
War and the diplomatic efforts prior to it seem quite uncontroversial. But this does not 
mean that there might be unanswered questions about the conflict at this distance in time; 
there are in fact, but they are pale in comparison to the large and loud untruths that led to 
its sequel conflict; the linkage of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq with the bombings of September 
11th 2001, the confident claims about the existence of weapons of mass destruction, the 
“sexing up” of intelligence reports and so on. Still, there are significant unanswered 
questions regarding the First Gulf War; did Saddam believe that he had been given 
permission to annex Kuwait during the notorious conversation between himself and the 
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then American Ambassador April Glaspie, the fabricated atrocities that helped gain public 
support (and political support – as the senate vote authorising military action was a narrow 
52-47) for a military intervention. These controversies are important not only in 
themselves, but within the context of this paper because they form one aspect of the 
justification claims for armed conflict, alongside the particular element, the usage of 
Munich.  
During the buildup to the first Gulf War of 1991, President George H. Bush, himself a 
WWII veteran, evoked the 1930s both publically and in private correspondence, which he 
then later published. By this time, Munich had already taken on a life of its own, and 
displaced its original situationality. The examples discussed above show Munich’s 
flexibility, ability to be claimed as relevant to new contexts.  
In 1998 Bush defended his actions in his and Brent Scowcroft’s volume A World 
Transformed. One must briefly comment on the unusual structure of this volume. There 
are three narrative voices; Bush and Scowcroft both pen passages under their own names, 
but these are interrupted by a third “we” narrator. Unsurprisingly, some uncomfortable 
topics are left to the anonymous narrative. In one of “his” sections of the book, Bush tells 
us that he was reading “a book on World War II by British historian Martin Gilbert. I saw 
a direct analogy between what was occurring in Kuwait and what the Nazis had done”.332 
Preparing a speech for television on August 8th 1990, Bush wrote, “I tightened up the 
language to strengthen the similarity I saw between the Persian Gulf and the situation the 
Rhineland in the 1930s, when Hitler simply defied the Treaty of Versailles and marched 
in. This time I wanted no appeasement.”333 
Bush pushed the Saddam=Hitler formula in much the same way as Eden et al. pushed the 
Nasser=Hitler during the Suez crisis. It was not the only tactic employed, however, as 
often, tales of atrocities made a dramatic appearance and helped prepare public opinion for 
war. In his scathing report on the docility of the media leading up to and during the First 
Gulf War, John MacArthur writes of “Selling Babies” the dubious story of Iraqi troops 
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taking babies out of incubators and leaving them to die.334 MacArthur too was aware of 
the “Saddam-is-Hitler theme that proved so very useful to the White House” noting the 
Bush “had begun to model himself after the wartime Winston Churchill”.335 Interestingly, 
when assembling his “allies” Bush encountered another precedent, though one not soaked 
in the glory of World War Two: NSC diplomat Richard Hass suggested that “We may be 
able to do something along the lines of the Korean War model of a US-led multinational 
force”.336 
Korea, which ended in a stalemate that still exists, was never going to be as sellable as 
Munich.337 Not that everybody was buying Munich, at least not a face value. At a meeting 
between himself and Mikael Gorbachev in Helsinki in September 1990, Bush recorded 
how he used this associative strategy of argumentation in his disagreements with 
Gorbachev over how to deal with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait: “If we had 
offered Hitler some way out, would it have succeeded?” Gorbachev replied, not 
unreasonably, “Not the same situation” to which Bush replied “Only in personality”.338 
Gorbachev’s position, as he articulated it, was cautious, but precedent-based, he told Bush 
at a meeting on November 19; “On some things, of course, we have different ideas, but on 
this we must be together. In my heart, as yours I am sure, the preference is to solve this 
without blood. It can all turn out very badly, worse than Vietnam.” 339 
Not that, on the evidence of this book, Bush was very interested in situations as such, 
precedent and analogies were very important to him too. Furthermore, Bush took a 
jaundiced view of diplomacy, which he wasn't sure had developed all that much since the 
era of appeasement. “I knew what had happened in the 1930s when a weak League of 
Nations had failed to stand up to Japanese, Italian, and German aggression. The result was 
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to encourage the ambitions of those regimes.”340 This coupling of Munich and a lack of 
faith in diplomacy was very reminiscent of the British in 1956; diplomacy was only to be 
seen to be exhausted, so the real business of military action could take place.  
Privately, Bush wrote to his family from Camp David on December 31, 1990:  
My mind goes back to history: How many lives might have been saved if 
appeasement had given way to force earlier on in the late 30s or earliest 
40s?...sometimes in life you have to act as you think best – you can’t 
compromise, you can’t give in, even if your critics are loud and numerous.341  
In this argumentation, Bush sought justification in the past and defended new action, of 
which he had to convince people. “Not everyone in the Administration yet shared my 
feelings that it might be time to consider using force”. However, as mentioned, another 
historical precedent haunted Bush; “I did not want to repeat the problems of the Vietnam 
War.”342 Bush, one suspects, was torn between the drive factor of Munich and the 
restraining factor of Vietnam. In hoping for a “provocation” (which would justify using 
force) he was even envious of Lyndon Johnson’s exploitation of the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident; “I knew that the Vietnam War was different, but his efforts made a big 
impression on me, and I began to think about seeking a similar congressional vote of 
support.”343 One might guess that at that stage he hoped the Vietnam War would be 
different. Interestingly, his son would be even more tempted to try to stage a Tonkin-like 
incident when looking for a reason to invade Iraq, but he eventually used another 
justification. 
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4.8 Munich as personal legacy: Madeline Albright’s Balkan 
diplomacy 
“While for some people, diplomacy and foreign policy are acquired interests, I had them 
in my blood. My father had been a diplomat and also a professor, and from childhood I 
was his most avid student.” So states Madeline Albright in the preface of her memoir 
Madame Secretary.344 Albright was born Marie Jana Körbel, in Czechoslovakia in 1937. 
The linkage of family (especially her father “To understand me, you must understand my 
father”345) place – pre-war Czechoslovakia and later the United States – (“There was the 
statue of Liberty. Holding my sister’s hand, I stared in awe at the welcoming figure”),346 
“history” and subsequent career is quite frankly stated in her memoirs. Indeed they make 
her memoir (ghosted by her speechwriter Bill Woodward) more compelling than many of 
the rather predictable pieties, banalities and “buts”347 recorded therein.  
Her linkage between her original and adopted homelands reads as quite convincing and 
sincere; she seemed very unselfconscious and comfortable with her dual national heritage: 
Although Masaryk died when I was four months old, in every other sense I 
grew up with him. My family spoke about him often, and my father was 
deeply influenced by Masaryk’s profound faith in democracy, his belief that 
small countries were entitled to the same rights as larger ones and his respect 
and affection for the United States.348  
As stated, Albright’s father had been a diplomat and academic – with an expertise in 
Yugoslavia, he would write a book called “Tito’s Communism”; she would in fact attend 
Tito’s funeral – and by her own account had a strong influence on his daughter. “My 
father talked to me about history and foreign policy whenever he got the chance, and his 
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convictions became mine.”349 She continues that he “could make whatever period in 
history I was studying come alive with stories and place any battle or conference in 
context.”350 However, one particular piece of history made a very powerful impact: “When 
he spoke of World War II, he never strayed far from the lessons of Munich: unspeakable 
tragedies ensue when great countries appease evil.”351  
Munich was not just any political tool for Albright, it was a central part of her personal 
life-history and she seems quite self-entitled and possessive in using it. For instance, when 
Russian President Putin turned the table on her (referring to the Chechen conflict): 
Obliviously aware of my own history, he said that Russia was acting the way I 
would have wished Europe had acted against the Nazis. “Instead of another 
Munich, we are fighting them now before they grow stronger. And we shall 
smash them.”352 
This “my own history” is worth dwelling on, as it will be argued that it was very much her 
own personal “Munich” that she brought to the table when overseeing the Kosovo War of 
1999. One might say that Albright wore Munich much like she wore her distinct Stetson 
hat.  
It may be making too much of a detail, but I believe that it is noteworthy that the topic – 
suggested by her father – of Albright’s honor thesis was on a Czech politician that can be 
seen as a Chamberlain-like figure, at least from the simplistic and morally aggressive 
perspective of evoker of Munich. 
Zdenek Fierlinger was a Social Democrat who eagerly led his party into 
partnership with the Communists. The result ultimately was the death of 
Masaryk, the resignation of Benes, and the end of democracy. 
In my father’s circle Fierlinger was referred to as Quislinger, after Vidkun 
Quisling, the Norwegian politician whose cooperation with the Nazis before 
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and during World War II made his name synonymous with a flaccid spine and 
a treasonous heart.353 
Her first chapter is called “Heroes and Villains”, and in her search for “clarity” she would 
indeed be wilfully seeing political agents in such stark terms. 
Albright was US Ambassador to the United Nations during the first Clinton administration 
(1993-97) and in this capacity she had some dealings with the very flawed international 
diplomacy that sought to deal with that conflict. She summed up her feelings about in 
terms of Munich; in her chapter entitled “Horror in the Balkans”, she signs off by quoting 
Neville Chamberlain’s notorious radio speech (“a quarrel in a faraway country between 
people of whom we know nothing.”). She then comments: 
A year later Chamberlain’s own country was at war, in part because he done 
nothing to help the “faraway country” and its little-known people. America 
and its allies may be proud that, belatedly or not, we did come to the aid of the 
people of Bosnia – to their benefit, and ours.354 
This bracketing of Bosnia and Munich is important; as when conflict broke out in Kosovo 
in the late 1990s, these two failures (despite the spin she put on Bosnia “belatedly or not” 
– it was surely belated and a failure) seem to have provided guiding precedents. Of course, 
when the Kosovo crisis became internationalised in 1999, Albright was in a much more 
powerful position; she has become the first ever female US Secretary of State (in the 
second Clinton administration 1997-2001). This meant a move from a diplomatic office 
and environment to a more partisan political one.   
To briefly fill in the background, after escalating fighting between the newly-formed KLA 
(Kosovo Liberation Army) and Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1998, an international Contact 
Group was formed consisting of the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and Italy. They convened in London and Albright was determined to confront 
Milošević; “We had to approve concrete measures that would expand our leverage over 
Belgrade. That was how Milošević had been brought to the table at Dayton, and that was 
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the only language he would respond to now.”355 She was however – by her own account – 
underwhelmed by the degree of resolve shown by the various parties; 
I was determined not to betray the thrust of those who looked to America for 
leadership. At one point the ordinarily hawkish Jamie Rubin urged me to 
compromise on a particular measure. I glared and said “Jamie, do you think 
we’re in Munich?356 
In his book on the Kosovo conflict, Michael Ignatieff commented on Albright rounding on 
Rubin, stating that “Kosovo could not be this Administration’s Munich.”357 A second 
Contact Group meeting took place in Bonn but Albright was unimpressed; especially by 
the Russians and Italians. After further Serbian escalations another track was tried “we 
went not to the Contact Group but to NATO”.358 Furthermore she was dismissive of a plan 
presented by the late Robin Cook (then British Foreign Secretary) which would have 
sought a UN Security Council resolution that would authorise the use of force by NATO. 
This could have led permanent Security Council members vetoing NATO. Diplomacy was 
losing out to the military option. The Secretary’s own words could well have been 
describing 1938, not 1998. “I made the case again to my administration colleagues, 
arguing that if we did not act, the crisis would spread, more people would die, we would 
look weak, pressure , we would end up resorting to force anyway under even more difficult 
and tragic circumstances.”359 Milošević was described in terms that evoke appeasement: 
“His ambitions were not the kind that could be satisfied except at great cost to others”.360 
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Albright’s book was published in 2003, and has certainly been aware of the controversy of 
the Kosovo War, language like “Some revisionists have suggested that we missed signals 
from Belgrade” would seem to betray an uncomfortable awareness of the tainted legacy of 
the Kosovo war.361  
Her language now is more guarded than in statements she that made more immediately 
after the conflict. In interview given during the British television documentary Moral 
Combat, NATO at War (BBC, 2001), she was far more direct (and was indeed, her 
assistant James Rubin). The discrepancy between the earlier statements on television and 
the later ones on paper are important, and I believe, reveal a sense of discomfort with the 
entire Kosovo War and its troubled progress.  
In the documentary Albright spoke in starkly moral terms: “we were dealing with such a 
basic evil that could not be tolerated”.362 “Milošević was the same, evil Milošević, who 
had started this whole thing by the way in Kosovo by denying them their rights and we 
just had to stand up”.363 At another point she stated: “We could not repeat the kinds of 
mistakes that had happened over Bosnia, where there was a lot of talk and no action and 
that history would judge us very severely”.364 Not repeating the mistakes of the past, 
having to standing up, the judgment of history; these were fighting words.  
Conflicts often produce their own euphemisms, and the Kosovo war was not different. At 
numerous press conferences television audiences were told that a war aim was to 
“degrade” the Yugoslavian365 military.  
Some commentators such as Misha Glenny366 and Maria Todorova367 noted the use of the 
concept of “credibility”, most especially in the when NATO discovered that its air 
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campaign against Yugoslavia had been very poorly calculated, and dragged on for week 
after week. NATO could not change track, because it would lose its “credibility”, 
especially at a time when the alliance was celebrating its 50th year, and needed a clear 
sense of purpose to reaffirm the reasons for its existence. (Albright’s final argument, 
indeed her final sentence in her memoir’s chapters devoted to Kosovo “The Alliance 
Prevails” is “NATO would have been left divided and questioning its own relevance as the 
twenty first century dawned.”)368  
The third term concerned particularity the Rambouillet negotiations, which were convened 
to get some form of agreement between representative of the Kosovo Albanians and the 
Yugoslavian Government. The term in question was “clarity”. Seeking clarity was 
seemingly a parallel (and private, meaning that the American delegation were not 
disclosing this intention to the other representatives) channel, with a notably different goal 
in mind. In the words of James Rubin (as quoted in the BBC documentary, italics added):  
The second acceptable outcome was to create clarity where previously there 
had been ambiguity, and clarity as to which side was the cause of the problem, 
clarity as to which side NATO should defend and which side NATO should 
oppose and that meant the Kosovo Albanians agreeing to the package and the 
Serbs not agreeing to the package. 
This meant in effect that not finding an agreement between parties was also a satisfactory 
outcome. Rubin is quite frank on this; “Obviously publically we had to make clear we 
were seeking an agreement, but privately we knew that the chances of the Serbs agreeing 
were quite small.” 
Rubin’s boss, Albright, reveals the logic behind this; “if the Serbs would not agree and the 
Albanians would agree then there was a very clear cause for using force”. In her personal 
dealings with the Albanian delegation (especially their elected chairman Hashim Thaci, 
KLA leader and later Kosovo’s Prime Minister) Albright was desperate to get them to 
agree; “I was unbelievably frustrated; we needed clarity then and there”. 
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Another member of the Kosovo Albanian delegation, the editor Veton Surroi described 
Albright’s efforts to persuade the delegation thus: “She was saying; ‘you sign, the Serbs 
don’t sign, we bomb; you sign, the Serbs sign, you get NATO in; so it is up to you to sign; 
you don’t sign the Serbs don’t sign, we forget the subject’” he then emphasised “it was 
very explicit.”369  
This does indeed echo her own account: ‘“on the other hand,”’ I said ‘if you say yes and 
the Serbs say no, NATO will strike and go on striking until the Serb forces are out and 
NATO can go in. You will have security. And you will be able to govern yourselves.’” 370 
This was decidedly negative diplomacy; the US delegation was actively looking for a 
simplistic division of good versus evil: the agenda – it can at least be inferred by the above 
statements – was to use military force. This had been called “alibi diplomacy” 371and it 
resembles the pattern found in the other cases; Suez, the Falklands, and both Gulf Wars 
(examined below); establish a highly visible theater of negotiation and then negotiate in 
bad faith. Diplomacy has been tried and found not to work; we are left with no option but 
the military one.  
4.9 Bush Jr., Blair, and Gulf War 2 
During the above-mentioned Iraq War, (like Suez, another painful episode in 
Western/Middle Eastern relations) President George W. Bush found himself and his 
administration being accused – and by a staunch allay – of an act of “appeasement”. As 
the Washington “insider” Bob Woodward relates it: 
The President was in the Oval Office later that day reviewing a speech by 
Israeli Prime Minister Arial Sharon. Sharon had suggested that the United 
States was on the road to repeating the mistakes of Munich in 1938 when 
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British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had abandoned Czechoslovakia to 
Hitler. 
“Do not try to appease the Arabs at our expense,” Sharon said, addressing the 
America President. “Israel will not be Czechoslovakia” 
“We’re going to respond to that, yes?” Rice asked Bush. 
“Of course I’m going to respond to that.” 
They discussed a forceful blast back. Someone cautioned, “You’re going to get a 
headline that says: ‘BUSH RAPS SHARON.’” 
“Mr. President,” Rice said, “he just called you Neville Chamberlain. I think it’s time 
to say something strong.”372 
The “strong”, “forceful blast back” was as follows; “Fleisher later called Sharon’s 
comments ‘unacceptable.’”373 One wonders what a less robust response would have been 
like; the mere accusation of appeasement reduced a notoriously belligerent and insensitive 
White House to utter sheepishness in this instance, such is the power of a single word. 
4.9.1. Echoes of Churchill  
During his “War on Terror”, George W. Bush placed a bust of Winston Churchill in the 
Oval Office (the bust, he says, was given to him by Tony Blair).374 Perhaps it might seem 
strange to pay tribute to a foreign leader, but Bush no doubt shares the Republican 
aversion to the legacy of the American wartime leader, Franklin Roosevelt, a Democrat 
and father of the New Deal.375 Bush has tried to take on – as Marx put it – the “battle 
slogans and costume” of Churchill, aided by his speechwriters:  
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This is an enemy without conscience – and they cannot be appeased. If we 
were not fighting and destroying this enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. 
They would be plotting and killing Americans across the world and within our 
own borders. By fighting these terrorists in Iraq, Americans in uniform are 
defeating a direct threat to the American people. Against this adversary, there 
is only one effective response: We will never back down. We will never give 
in. And we will never accept anything less than complete victory.376  
In his memoirs, Bush also evokes the familiar co-ordinates. Referring to a telephone 
conversation with Blair, Bush says “I heard an echo of Winston Churchill in my friend’s 
voice. It was a moment of courage that will stay with me forever.”377 In the same chapter 
Bush talks of a meeting with Elie Wiesel. The meeting was in the context of the planning 
for war against Iraq, “I sought opinions on Iraq from a variety of sources”: 
Elie is a sober and gentle man. But there was passion in his seventy-four-year-
old eyes when he compared Saddam Hussein’s brutality to the Nazi genocide. 
“Mr. President,” he said, “you have a moral obligation to act against evil.” The 
force of his conviction affected me deeply. 378 
4.9.2 “There are glib and sometimes foolish comparisons” 
Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, to which Bush Jr. is referring above, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair readied his country for war. In doing so, he unsurprisingly plunged 
back into the 1930s. Munich was again very much in the air. The Guardian’s Richard 
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Norton-Taylor wrote that; “Blair similarly evoked ghost of the past. He could not endure 
the ‘shame’ of appeasement, he said a few days before the Iraq invasion. Britain would 
face a ‘living nightmare’ if it appeased Saddam Hussein.” 379  
When addressing the House of Commons on March 18, 2003, the day prior to the attack, 
Blair said: “And now the world has to learn the lesson all over again that weakness in the 
face of a threat from a tyrant, is the surest way not to peace but to war.”380 This speech is 
worth reviewing in some detail. Excepting only Thatcher, Blair is the most significant 
British Prime Minister since the Second World War. The Iraq War was the most 
controversial and divisive event of his tenure and his legacy will stand or fall by it (as he 
is no doubt well aware). His speech continued:  
What would any tyrannical regime possessing WMD think viewing the history 
of the world's diplomatic dance with Saddam? That our capacity to pass firm 
resolutions is only matched by our feebleness in implementing them.  
That is why this indulgence has to stop. Because it is dangerous. It is 
dangerous if such regimes disbelieve us.  
Dangerous if they think they can use our weakness, our hesitation, even the 
natural urges of our democracy towards peace, against us.381  
Shrewdly, Blair then denied that he was manipulating the very historical analogies that he 
was manipulating. This verbal method is worth pausing to note. Such verbal trickery was 
typical of Blair. In April 1998 he gave his most famous – and cringeworthy – soundbite, 
“the hand of history upon our shoulders” after listeners were assured that, “A day like 
today, it's not a day for soundbites”. Like Lloyd, Eden and Macmillan before him, also 
Blair strenuously defends his record (in his case, on Iraq) in his memoirs. He is clearly 
aware that he is justifying what many British commentators and voters still see as a deeply 
dishonest piece of statecraft in getting his country involved in the war, and one which had 
proved very costly in human terms (even if one only accepts the most conservative 
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estimates of the numbers killed). At one point he addresses this issue, stating; “There is no 
moral judgment that can or should be based on mathematics, here’s the number Saddam 
killed; here’s the number that died after his fall. Such a calculation is necessarily 
invidious.”382 Have stated this, Blair then fills two pages with exactly a “judgment based 
on mathematics”, (for what it’s worth, his final figures are “112,000 too many, but a far 
cry from half a million.”)383 But to revert to his speech:  
There are glib and sometimes foolish comparisons with the 1930s. No one 
here is an appeaser. But the only relevant point of analogy is that with history, 
we know what happened. We can look back and say: there's the time; that was 
the moment; for example, when Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by the 
Nazis - that's when we should have acted.  
But it wasn't clear at the time. In fact at the time, many people thought such a 
fear fanciful. Worse, put forward in bad faith by warmongers…  
Naturally should Hitler appear again in the same form, we would know what 
to do. But the point is that history doesn't declare the future to us so plainly. 
Each time is different and the present must be judged without the benefit of 
hindsight.384  
No doubt Blair – or his spin doctors, though he states in his memoirs that he alone wrote 
the speech – seemed to be at least aware of the risks of such an analogy. Interestingly, he 
had doubts about the Hitler passage, but nonetheless left it in the speech:  
In one passage, which I regretted and almost took out, I made reference to the 
1930s and to the almost universal refusal, for a long time, of people to believe 
Hitler was a threat. I was careful not conflate Saddam and Hitler and 
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specifically disowned many of the glib comparisons between 2003 and 
1933.385 
The tone of Blair’s moral crescendo was to present a familiar moral/existential dilemma, 
to which there could be only be one choice. Having very disingenuously told the House of 
Commons that; “No one here is an appeaser”, Blair concludes by drawing his lines in such 
a way that not to act with him is to appease. Though he does not even need to use the 
word, so embedded is it in his argument: 
Tell our allies386 that at the very moment of action, at the very moment when 
they need our determination that Britain faltered. I will not be party to such a 
course. This is not the time to falter. This is the time for this house, not just 
this government or indeed this prime minister, but for this house to give a lead, 
to show that we will stand up for what we know to be right, to show that we 
will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of 
life at risk, to show at the moment of decision that we have the courage to do 
the right thing.387 
The most obvious connection is the fact that both Bush Senior and Blair were committed 
to war against the same country, Iraq, but what is of importance is that in both cases there 
was a negotiation process taking place, in which neither Bush or Blair had any faith but to 
which they had to pay lip-service, while the process failed and they could finally use 
force, as they wanted all along. The 2003 Bush Jr./Blair White House Memo as it is 
called, stated that Blair really only wanted diplomatic “cover” for military action; “a 
second resolution would give us international cover, especially with the Arabs”.388 The 
summary of the memo, which recorded a two-hour White House meeting between both 
leaders in late January 2003, says: "Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the 
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388 Bush-Blair Iraq war memo revealed, BBC, March 27th, 2006, available at 
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military planning."389 Again one notes the familiar pattern and sequence: “diplomatic 
strategy had to be arranged around the military planning”. The military option was put 
first, and the diplomacy second, and in selling this policy to the public Munich was one of 
the most powerful legitimisers. 
In this sense, the political deployment of “Munich” becomes almost a form of non-
diplomacy. After all, goes the argument, negotiation failed in the 1930s, and look what 
happened, therefore negotiation is a waste of time. 
While still in office, Tony Blair’s successor Gordon Brown defended his country’s 
increasingly unpopular involvement in Afghanistan in terms of the 1930s. Speaking at the 
Lord Mayor's Banquet at Guildhall on November 16, 2009, the then Prime Minister said: 
…vigilance in defence of national security will never be sacrificed to 
expediency. Necessary resolution will never succumb to appeasement. The 
greater international good will never be subordinated to the mood of the 
passing moment...390  
Having badly lost a general election since, one might question Mr. Brown’s ability to 
calculate the “mood of the passing moment”. In any event, Brown’s use of Munich was 
different to that of his predecessor Blair; Blair needed to justify a very controversial 
decision to go to war, Brown needed to justify his country’s ongoing commitment to a war 
that (unlike Iraq) was not greatly opposed by public opinion at the start, but has become 
increasingly unpopular. Therefore he needed to revisit, old, ever-reliable Munich.  
3.10.2 Islamo-fascism, the debate 
A very curious outgrowth of the mining of Munich is the bizarre idea that the ongoing 
War on Terror is morally equivalent to the European politics of the 1930s, and is being 
fought on the legitimacy conferred by the Second World War. It is deeply a-historical, 
even more so than the elevation of Nasser to Hitler in the 1950s. So far, the idea has 
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mostly been thrown rather loudly among journalists, although at least one prominent 
historian has contributed to the debate, as it has developed thus far.  
If nobody had explicitly used the formula: Osama Bin Laden = Hitler, it is nonetheless the 
same well of legitimacy that is being used by the sanctioning of the term Islamo-Fascism. 
Of course, merely to use such a formula would show just how unsustainable Islamo-fascist 
is as a concept. The itinerant Bin Laden did not even officially reside in one state; he was 
a fugitive not a dictator. And indeed, before the capture and execution of Saddam Hussein 
in late 2006, such a formula could not have been used; had it been, we would have found 
ourselves living in the era of Two Hitlers, much like the two Popes of yesteryear. 
Of those who have used the term uncritically, probably the best known was the gifted 
journalist Christopher Hitchens (1949-2011), during his descent into Blimpish self-
parody.391 He did not coin the phrase, but as William Sapphire (1929-2009) has written, 
Hitchens had been the populariser of the phrase.392 Certainly Hitchens tried to elevate the 
phrase to a coherent argument: “Does Bin Ladenism or Salafism or whatever we agree to 
call it have anything in common with fascism?” 
I think yes. The most obvious points of comparison would be these: Both 
movements are based on a cult of murderous violence that exalts death and 
destruction and despises the life of the mind. ("Death to the intellect! Long 
live death!" as Gen. Francisco Franco's sidekick Gonzalo Queipo de Llano so 
pithily phrased it.) Both are hostile to modernity (except when it comes to the 
pursuit of weapons), and both are bitterly nostalgic for past empires and lost 
glories. Both are obsessed with real and imagined "humiliations" and thirsty 
for revenge. Both are chronically infected with the toxin of anti-Jewish 
paranoia (interestingly, also, with its milder cousin, anti-Freemason paranoia). 
Both are inclined to leader worship and to the exclusive stress on the power of 
one great book. Both have a strong commitment to sexual repression—
especially to the repression of any sexual "deviance"—and to its counterparts 
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the subordination of the female and contempt for the feminine. Both despise 
art and literature as symptoms of degeneration and decadence; both burn 
books and destroy museums and treasures.393 
Even the tone of Hitchens’s language is unconvinced; he was a very sharp polemicist, and the 
above, ramble-to-the-point style was far removed from his usual rapid and pointed response. 
Nor do the content of his arguments stand even the faintest critical glance: The “exclusive stress 
on the power of one great book” presumably refers to Mein Kamp; are we to believe that this 
was a user’s manual, regularly checked in the ordinary, everyday affairs of being a Nazi? As for 
“despise art and literature”, some was very selectively despised some but also revered. None of 
this convinces.  
Katy Pollit, who exchanged many polemics with Hitchens, was far more accurate in saying that 
“I think it is worth preserving "fascism" as a term with specific historical content”: 
"Islamo-fascism" looks like an analytic term, but really it's an emotional one, 
intended to get us to think less and fear more. It presents the bewildering 
politics of the Muslim world as a simple matter of Us versus Them, with war 
to the end the only answer, as with Hitler. If you doubt that every other British 
Muslim under the age of 30 is ready to blow himself up for Allah, or that 
shredding the Constitution is the way to protect ourselves from suicide 
bombers, if you think that Hamas might be less popular if Palestinians were 
less miserable, you get cast as Neville Chamberlain, while Bush plays FDR.394 
Agreed, but surely and importantly wrong about FDR; as was stated above, George W. Bush 
like Thatcher before him was happy to wrap himself in Churchill’s legacy. One historian who 
has entered this journalists’ debate is Niall Fergusson, who despite a provocative profile and 
right wing beliefs, distances himself from the phrase and makes perfect sense:  
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...what we see at the moment is an attempt to interpret our present predicament 
in a rather caricatured World War II idiom. I mean, "Islamofascism" illustrates 
the point well, because it's a completely misleading concept. In fact, there's 
virtually no overlap between the ideology of al Qaeda and fascism. It's just a 
way of making us feel that we're the "greatest generation" fighting another 
World War, like the war our fathers and grandfathers fought. You're 
translating a crisis symbolized by 9/11 into a sort of pseudo World War II. So, 
9/11 becomes Pearl Harbor and then you go after the bad guys who are the 
fascists, and if you don't support us, then you must be an appeaser.395 
“In rather caricatured World War II idiom” states it correctly, but at present there seems 
no end in sight.  
Interestingly, a biographer of Mussolini and historian of Italian Fascism feels that there is 
still a struggle against fascism to be fought, although by this he means a struggle to 
promote those humane values that Fascism despised, and which he feels are not being 
delivered by contemporary societies; “But I must also accept that the democracies of our 
time (not to mention the dictatorships) have not brought us to happiness and, sadly, may 
be presently be transporting us away from that desired state.”396  
Yet the world which lives under the hegemony of economic rationalism and 
which seems every day more in the care of new conservatives is a 
frighteningly irrational and brutal place. The ghosts of the Fascist past may indeed 
break open the c ampagne when they hear of the current approval of pre-
emptive strikes and the cheerful acceptance of collateral damage that 
accompanies them.397 
He was writing in 2006, with the wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq seem to provide 
the background to his pessimistic but sincerely-felt world view. He concludes that 
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“Historic Fascism is probably dead and buried but, in our future, anti-fascism, loosely 
defined as a sustained search for liberty, equality, fraternity and sorority, must go on.”398  
It is surely this fact, “historical fascism is probably dead and buried” that makes it 
fascinating. In an insightful essay ‘“Never Again” is Now’, Hans Keller has written about 
how aspects of the past are imaginative ventures, which may horrify but also fascinate.  
Both fictional and historical representations are dreamlike in that they express 
some sort of desire, in all the complexity of that term. The pressing need to 
represent the Holocaust in poetry, novels, films, drama, and history must come 
from a desire to repeat in the imagination happenings and events that horrify 
and fascinate. We only represent what we desire. The desire to represent the 
Holocaust however, is not the desire to repeat it as an event, nor necessarily 
the desire to repeat the form-giving pleasure of representation itself; rather, it 
is a desire to repeat the Holocaust in a suitably altered form to meet complex, 
often contradictory, sets of present needs.399  
This compelling insight goes far beyond the Holocaust. One might well substitute Munich, 
Katyn, (although they are bound together as World War II) the Holodomar, the Vietnam 
War, or 9/11, all of which fascinate their respective audiences. The desire of which Keller 
writes may seem morbid, but it is also cunning; it is a desire to repeat “in a suitably altered 
form” from a safe distance, knowing that the desired events cannot occur; if it could occur, 
there would not be the desire, there would be fear. 
4.10 Next up, Iran? 
As an attack on Iran looks increasingly possible400, one cannot but notice the language 
being used. There are many sceptical voices on the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but 
their reasoned arguments are not winning the battle of the airwaves (the necessary prelude 
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to actual battles). Speaking in Los Angeles in 2008, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin 
Netanyahu shared the following anecdote with his audience:  
In a restaurant in New York, he was approached by a father who introduced 
himself and his 12 year old son. He asked the PM if he could give the boy one 
sentence to share with his classmates in social studies: I looked at that boy and 
said “why do you want that sentence?” and the boy replied “Because I’m 
interested in the future of the world”. Netanyahu then told the boy that “It’s 
1938 and Iran is Germany. It’s 1938 and Iran is Germany and it’s racing to 
arm itself with atomic bombs.”401  
Netanyahu is a very capable spokesman, and has a knack of connecting well with Western 
– especially American – audiences and making his alarmist assertions seem reasoned and 
convincing. And his speech indeed reached higher levels of alarm. The Holocaust was 
evoked, Iran’s President Ahmadinejad compared to Hitler and the former is even made to 
sound even more cunning and ambitious than the latter. “The big difference is this; Hitler 
first embarked on a world conflict and then tried to develop atomic weapons. 
Ahmadinejad is going about it in reverse order; he first wants to develop atomic weapons 
and then embark on the world crisis.”402 
One might draw attention to the weasel word, “crisis”. When speaking about Hitler 
Netanyahu spoke of “world conflict”. When then comparing Ahmadinejad to Hitler he 
uses a similar-sounding but not identifiable term “the world crisis”. This would be the get-
out-of-jail-card (in case anyone might actually question if Iran could somehow ignite a 
world conflict). This type of alarmism is classical paranoid discourse. “He (the paranoid 
spokesman) constantly lives at a turning point: it is now or never in organizing resistance 
to conspiracy. Time is forever running out.”403 But somehow time never actually runs out; 
“The apocalyptic of the paranoid style runs dangerously near to hopeless pessimism, but 
usually stops short of it.”404 More recently (September 2012), Prime Minister Netanyahu 
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delivered a speech in the United Nations General Assembly – warning the world of a 
nuclear-armed Iran. He literally drew lines but also sketched in his background along 
familiar patterns: 
For today, a great battle is being waged between the modern and the medieval. 
The forces of modernity seek a bright future in which the rights of all are 
protected, in which an ever-expanding digital library is available in the palm 
of every child, in which every life is sacred...405 
Thus is the world broken down into binary opposites, and the negative forces – and the 
global scope of their ambition – are then identified. 
Yet the medieval forces of radical Islam, whom you just saw storming the 
American embassies throughout the Middle East, they oppose this…. 
 
They seek supremacy over all Muslims. They are bent on world conquest. 
They want to destroy Israel, Europe, America. They want to extinguish 
freedom. They want to end the modern world. 
This project is then translated back into the Second World War. 
Some 70 years ago, the world saw another fanatic ideology bent on world 
conquest. It went down in flames. But not before it took millions of people 
with it. Those who opposed that fanaticism waited too long to act. 
A linkage is then made to the present crisis and the inability of diplomacy to stop it. 
For nearly a decade, the international community has tried to stop the Iranian 
nuclear program with diplomacy. 
That hasn't worked. 
The next sentence then links historical catastrophe, the present crisis, and the failure of 
diplomacy: 
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If the Western powers had drawn clear red lines during the 1930s, I believe 
they would have stopped Nazi aggression and World War II might have been 
avoided. 
He ends on a note of high alarm, stating that: “it's only a few months, possibly a few 
weeks before they get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb.”  
Veteran Middle-Eastern journalist Robert Fisk demonstrated this “time is forever running 
out” and “dangerously-near-but-not-quite” aspects of alarmism in his debunking of 
Netanyahu’s speech:  
Iran is the centre of terrorism, fundamentalism and subversion and is … more 
dangerous than Nazism, because Hitler did not possess a nuclear bomb …" 
Bibi speaking on Thursday? Nope. The ex-Prime Minister of Israel, Shimon 
Peres, in 1996. And – I'm indebted here to the indispensable Roger Cohen – 
Peres himself said in 1992 that Iran would have a nuclear bomb by 1999! 
That's 13 years ago. And Ehud Barak – now Bibi's Defence Minister – said in 
1996 that Iran would have a nuke by 2004. That's eight years ago.406 
If we are being asked seriously to compare the recent Iranian President to Hitler, we must 
have a Chamberlain. At the time of writing, right-wing opinion in the United States has 
already decided who to nominate for this role, their present President (who, not 
coincidently has had a less than smooth relationship with Netanyahu, indeed the former 
has been humiliated by the latter). Early in his first term, Obama publically stated that he 
was willing to hold talks with Iran, explicitly with regards to the latter country’s nuclear 
programme. For critics, this was probably already ominous: willingness to engage in 
positive diplomacy is a sign of “weakness” (need it be said that, conversely, Netanyahu’s 
confrontational manner has wide appeal to the same audience). Voices are now accusing 
Obama of appeasement in the face of Iran (and/or a not-very-well-defined general Islamic 
threat). I can quote two: the elderly American stand-up comedian Jackie Mason and the 
Professor of Classics and conservative political commentator Bruce Thorton, who has 
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recently published a work called The Wages of Appeasement; Ancient Athens, Munich, 
and Obama's America. One notes the moral/evangelical tone of the title, and the implied 
urgent message to us, now, in our present crisis. The comedian has taken to making short 
videos and posting them on YouTube, offering unsolicited political analysis, which is 
mostly him talking ad hoc about what seem like cherished grievances. About Obama we 
are told: “He acts as if he is Winston Churchill but he is really Chamberlain, this man is 
giving up without a fight and we are going to be destroyed without a fight ‘cause he hasn’t 
got the guts to make a fight”.407 This has reached this level of absurdity; the comic is as 
deadly serious as the professor (whose only difference is the more refined language the 
professor uses to make the same allegation). 
4. 11 Summary 
The above case studies all reveal similar patterns. In the cases of Suez, the Falkland’s 
War, both Gulf Wars and the Kosovo War (it is too early to know if Iran can be included) 
we noted that the evocation of Munich was used by one side in a conflict, and that in each 
of these cases the side was largely going through the motion of a negotiating a settlement 
to a conflict, while in fact preparing itself for the military action that eventually took 
place. In Suez, despite the cover of the formation of the Suez Canal Users Association and 
the setting up of the London Conference, the actual course of action decided on was 
military force. As early as July 31, 1956, the American ambassador in London cabled the 
Department of State, saying: “Eden, Macmillan and Lloyd showed throughout unexpected 
calm and no hysteria. They act as though they really have taken a decision after profound 
reflection. They are flexible on procedures leading up to showdown but insist over and 
over again that whatever conferences, arrangements, public postures and manoeuvres 
might be necessary, at the end they are determined to use force.”408  
 
A very similar pattern is discernible with the Falklands War. As Al Haig reported 
regarding his diplomatic efforts with Mrs Thatcher: “She is clearly prepared to use force. 
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Though she admits her preference for a diplomatic solution, she is rigid in her insistence 
on a return to the status quo ante, and indeed seemingly determined that any solution 
involve some retribution."409 This alleged preference for a diplomatic solution was most 
probably disingenuous and only calculated the keep the US on-side, has Haig continued, 
"It is clear that they had not thought much about diplomatic possibilities.”  
 
In the first Gulf War George H. Bush could state “This time I wanted no appeasement” 
and argued the point to Gorbachev. He also used the image and language of standing up to 
dictators, much like Thatcher before him. 
 
The second Gulf War is probably the most flagrant case to date of the subversion of a 
diplomatic effort in order to pursue a military option. What become the main reason – the 
now notorious WMD – had they in fact existed, could have been located by the efforts of 
Blix and the AEC, had they in fact existed.410 Had the inspections been allowed to 
continue, as Blix wished, they would have proved what is now general knowledge; that 
there were no WMDs. The White House Memo provides compelling evidence that the 
decision was made to go to war against Iraq, and that the only useful diplomacy was that 
which would give “cover”: 
? That Bush said, “if ultimately we failed [to get the second resolution], military 
action would follow anyway.”  
? Blair responded that he was: “solidly with the President and ready to do whatever 
it took to disarm Saddam.” 
? Blair also said that: “a second Security Council resolution would provide an 
insurance policy against the unexpected, and international cover, including with 
the Arabs.” 
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Not that in this conversion, either Bush JR or Blair mentioned Munich, but as evidenced 
above they were both – especially Blair – happy to use it as a rhetorical tool, and the fear 
of appearing to commit appeasement as they understood it, was surely a strong element of 
their personal calculus. According to Alistair Campbell’s diary, “TB (Blair) said we were 
in high-risk, high reward territory.” 411 Bush was simply not interested in diplomacy and 
wanted to wage war: “He (Saddam) is not going to get between us and freedom. Once we 
strike we go for it, we don’t wait for the world to sing Kum by yah, to hold hands and wait 
for Saddam to develop a better karma.”412 A later entry by Campbell states that “Bush was 
talking the diplomatic talk while clearly irritated by the whole thing.”413  
It is not being suggested there that all evocations of Munich contribute to war; some cases 
have been quoted that have been expressions of ideological conflict, but nonetheless these 
seem enhanced by reference to the events of late 1930s. 
There are, no doubt, many cases where the politics of the 1930s might indeed be relevant 
or instructive, or just inherently interesting (which indeed they are). Even in those cases 
above where it has been argued that Munich was used as a rhetorical tool that some side in 
a conflict felt useful to escalate or – just as importantly – justify an escalation, it was not 
the only tool used or the sole motivation. All this said, I believe that there is nonetheless a 
sinister pattern linking 1956, 1982, 1991, 1999 and 2003 (and perhaps 2013, if there is to 
be an attack on Iran). Munich has been a variable in this; strongest surely in 1956, weakest 
probably in 1991 (when there was the strongest legalistic and diplomatic case, although as 
stated, there are unanswered questions about the lead up to that conflict).  
This pattern – allowing, of course, for the specific circumstances of each – is simple; plan 
for war, pay lip service to international diplomatic efforts to avoid conflict, and actively 
frustrate/subvert the diplomatic project so that there is seemingly “no other option left”. 
And, as I hope had been demonstrated, using argumentation and rhetoric about 
appeasement seems to be an ideal vehicle for this: “we know what happened back then, it 
cannot be allowed to happen now”. “History” seems to be conveniently on your side. 
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Not only as students of history, but also as ordinary citizens, we have a right to ask when 
will our statesmen stop indulging in this Churchill not Chamberlain posturing? Surely this 
quaint triangle of traitor/fool (Chamberlain), agent of evil (Hitler) and 11th hour 
saviour/hero (Churchill) is not the best model on which to conduct foreign policy. 
Bosworth had written that: “It is the ghost of Adolf Hitler who ensures that we think of all 
dictators and all societies that have the misfortune to be ruled by them as the replica of this 
murderous and inexorable regime.”414 He continues, “But letting Hitler be our history 
teacher and implicit model is not a good idea.”415  
The danger of building up an enemy into Hitler is that is places the builder in a dilemma. 
He, (but is had been she on occasion), forces himself into a corner. No matter how 
problematic the conflict is, he cannot be seen to waver or hesitate; to do so is to open 
himself to the accusation of “appeasement”. That being the case, he will have to persevere 
with the conflict – no matter what the cost is – hoping for something that might be claimed 
as a victory. He will have dismissed any chance of negotiation; indeed the very idea of 
negotiation is seen as delusion at best, treason and cowardice at worst.  
It is hard to think of a more dangerous way to conduct policy. As has been argued here, 
evocations of Munich have contributed considerably to war in, and for, our time. 
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5 Conclusions 
At the beginning of this thesis, I set out to that not only is political myth, when properly 
defined, a useful concept in examining the political instrumentality of the past, but also 
proposed that Munich be considered a political myth, even though most many of the 
elements associated with political myth seem to be absent from Munich. The reason 
behind the comparative method was to broader the concept of a political myth and to 
argue that it is not merely confined to national narratives, emerging countries and states, 
romantic sensibilities and less-than-fully-open political systems. To restate; few would 
argue that Kosovo is a classic political myth, but many might argue that Munich is such.  
On what basis can “Kosovo” as defined above be compared with “Munich” as defined 
above?  
One can note the strange coincidence that Kosovo did (however inadvertently) ignite the 
First World War, and Munich (notoriously) tried but failed to prevent the Second.  
5.1 Methodological comparison  
The differences between the two are notable, if one goes back to the original checklist: 
1. Durability  
2. Factual accuracy  
3. Group-centeredness and “ownership”  
4. Flexibility  
5. Level of usage  
6. Media of transmission  
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1. Durability: Although both cases are examples of how the past is evoked and seen as 
relevant to the present, they seem to operate in two distinct, though related, modalities. 
The Kosovo legacy, at least after it could become institutionalised with the emergence of a 
Serbian polity in the 19th Century, is more like a case of linear continuity. 
If one looks at Munich and the way it has been evoked, there is a difference. Munich, as 
seen by the British in 1956, or by Madeline Albright in 1999, is not so much a continuity 
as a recurrence of the past, the process of which Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Napoleon remains the classic diagnosis. Marx noted the asymmetry of past and 
present comparisons (at least of those that he mentions) the latter is farce compared to the 
original, which is tragedy. This asymmetry had been identified as an essential aspect of 
authority, which is one of the keywords of this thesis. Authority deriving from a past event 
is that which grants that event its ability to legitimise later actions. This legitimacy seeking 
task is very accurately described by Marx as a process of “translating back into the 
language of the original”.  
The two modalities are distinct – and this distinction is an important aspect of the 
comparative agenda of the thesis – but they do have a common functionality, using the 
past to legitimise present actions. 
The Kosovo Myth has existed for over 600 years. It had for a longer period a covert 
existence and later an overt one. The first existence we know little of, but it was sustained 
by a vibrant folk culture. On the second overt lifetime we can say much more, as we are 
able to chart its influence from the early 19th Century; in its overt, institutionalized 
lifetime, it has been utilised for almost 200 years now. Munich by contrast is a much 
younger narrative; but it has had a busy lifetime and one fears it will live long.  
2. Factual accuracy: There is no way of escaping the fact that this is deeply problematic. 
For historians, factual accuracy is fundamental to the discipline: gaining as accurate an 
account of the past is the primary task. But political myths are often a disconcerting 
mixture of the empirically-provable and the empirically-dubious, but this latter seems to 
matter little to its target audience. It is this audience, through its tellings and re-tellings of 
a narrative, that often project their concerns and onto the past event. It was argued above 
that Gallipoli in Australian experience has gone through several rounds of re-versioning; a 
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Vietnam-era anti-war tale, an anti-British tale of betrayal and slaughter of the innocents, 
even most recently an attempt to make the original commitment sound like an 
contemporary UN-style peace keeping mission. None of these later readings can be 
squared with the facts that Australians volunteered to fight in British colours. 
Considerably more dubious claims have been made about other events; and this is 
certainly the case with Kosovo. The Kosovo Maiden did not exist, Brankovic was not a 
traitor, and the elaborate metaphysical narrative – Tzar Lazar’s choice – that was grafted 
onto the historical event could only be believed – at the most literal of levels – by the most 
religious literalist. But many of the most salient aspects of the battle, the death of Lazar, 
the killing of Murat, the huge slaughter are more than enough to make the story deeply 
compelling. All these aspects – even the factual dubious – add the authority to the 
narrative, and to ignore the aspects that are dubious (because they too are sources of 
political legitimacy) is to be, in Burke’s worrying phrase; “wise historically, a fool in 
practice.”  
How does this compare with Munich? It has been argued above the Munich’s factual 
accuracy is probably more contestable that might be habitually assumed; the simplistic 
image of Chamberlain, and he alone, carried out the policy with neither political nor 
popular support, is a triumph of hindsight bias. But to date that has remained the enduring 
image, despite the openness of the appeasement debate.  
3. Ownership: The ownership of the Kosovo Myth has mostly been Serbian – although it 
has been noted that at times of Serbian success and leadership, such as the gaining of 
independence and especially at the time of the First Balkan War, other South Slavs were 
willing to share in the praising of Vidovdan, for example, the Croatian sculptor Ivan 
Meštrović made plans for an elaborate Vidovdan monument, and also depicted some 
figures from the Kosovo myth, the Kosovo Maiden and Miloš Obilić.416 It had been noted 
too that rival, external groups and outright enemies were willing to use Vidovdan; the 
Ustaša regime as a pretext to begin massacres of Serbs in the NHD – supposedly there was 
                                                 
416 He was also a committed Yugoslav and member of the Yugoslav Committee (although he later 
refused invitations to live in post-war socialist Yugoslavia). However, his plans for a Vidovdan monument 
date from 1907, and his sculpture of the Kosovo Maiden dates from 1908. 
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going to be a Serbian rebellion starting June 28th, this was fictitious. In the post-war 
period, Stalin chose the same date to expel Yugoslavia from Cominform.  
Among Serbs, of numerous political creeds and both religious and anti-religious beliefs, 
the ownership rights of the Kosovo legacy has been furiously contested.  
Here there is a large contrast with Munich.  
Munich is not explicitly owned by anyone. In this, it differs from national myths, which 
are usually centered on one particular group; most typically and self-defined as a culture 
or nation. Because of this, in no way is Munich a calendar event; and it is not 
geographically grounded. No ceremonies of rituals evoke it, and beyond newspaper 
headlines, no institutions transfer it (Gallipoli is commemorated in numerous ways noted 
above, there is even a sporting event between the Turkish, New Zealand and Australian 
handball teams called the Gallipoli Tri-Nations). Munich is deeply political and its 
“message”, its loud urgent “Never Again!” has seemingly universal relevance, and has 
been utilised in many different political cultures and contexts. This message is, of course, 
a subjective interpretation.  
The many users of Munich quoted in this thesis have been mostly from the political right, 
or at least, centerists like Tony Blair and Madeline Albright who are committed to liberal 
interventionism. It is a point of inconvenience that appeasement – in the context of 1930s 
Britain – was a policy carried out by a Conservative Prime Minister (albeit of a National 
Government, though an overwhelmingly Conservative one). It would be an even stronger 
right wing trope if appeasement had been a policy of the left. It was not however. In this 
sense Munich has evaded the right/left dichotomy to a considerable extent. Indeed, among 
the first voices of the “Guilty Men School” were left-wingers such as Michael Foot (who 
was one of the three anonymous authors of the 1940 pamphlet “Guilty Men”). Some right-
wing spokesmen, such as Ronald Reagan did try to link appeasement with liberal 
weakness (as he perceived it) but this requires some historical amnesia. But as is the case 
of political myths, facts often fall into second place.  
4. Flexibility: The range of political creeds argue the formidable flexibility of the Kosovo 
Myth; one can hardly imagine two more diametrical worldviews than those of the Bosnian 
rebels and Patriarch Gavrilo, yet both were able to draw upon Kosovo, in the case of the 
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former, as a modernising, revolutionary creed, in the later a deeply spiritual commitment. 
This, of course, ignores the degrees of exploitation of the myth, some trivialising by 
merely commercialising images, although even some of this commercialisation could 
become sinister, as in the case of the Obilić football club, which became owned by the 
warlord Arkan.  
By contrast Munich had shown little flexibility. So far (although this could change, and 
could have been otherwise) it had been used a very direct cautionary tale, “history” as an 
urgent lesson, that must be applied now to avoid past disasters from recurring. This 
alarmism has been very instrumental politically; this instrumentality cannot really be 
challenged, even if one does not agree with any of the cases of its usage tabulated above.   
5. Level of Usage: The levels at which Kosovo has functioned are layered and complex. In 
calendar terms Vidovdan was ritualised into becoming a framework through which later 
experiences were refracted as Halpern noted; the dead of all wars were remembered on 
Vidovdan each year. The number of hugely important events that were timed to take place 
on Vidovdan must make it date almost with parallel. Even following the fateful day in 
1914; 1919, 1921, 1948, 1989, 2000 all continued to make it a day of huge resonance and 
gravitas.  
In spatial/geographic terms it was deeply problematic. “Kosovo” was both an event and 
the site of that event; the actual site was mostly alienated from the subscribers to the myth; 
at least in the popular imagination, it was lost, longed for, eventually regained, only to be 
recently lost again.  
Little of this applies to Munich. It is not commemorated in any physical or spatial sense, it 
has not generated any rituals, and it is not a calendar event. Its main level of usage had 
been political speech and political discourse, which leads us to the final point of 
comparison. 
6. Media of Transmission: The story of the Battle of Kosovo Polje was firstly preserved 
by Church text, but – as was the case everywhere in the Middle Ages – very few Serbs 
could read. However there was the vibrant tradition of oral poetry and song, and for 
centuries Serbian peasants shared and transmitted the hagiography of the battle via their 
singers and guslars. As was argued above, when a Serbian state emerged, first autonomous 
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later independent in the 19th Century, Kosovo could be institutionalised in an overt way 
through the agencies and institutions of the emerging state. At the cultural level – not that 
it should be divided too sharply from the political level – it became the subject of plays, 
visual arts and literary debate. The medieval Serbian Empire, which popularly if not 
strictly was brought to an end by the battle of 1389, became a model for the emerging 
nation – as was witnessed by the Garašanin’s Nacertanje (discussed above). That the 
Kosovo legacy and its heroes, martyrs (and sometimes traitors) became a rallying cry in 
times of conflict is well attested; indeed, the Kosovo legacy (however inadvertently) 
inspired an huge conflict in 1914 that went some way to destroying the young nation, 
certainly killing many of the men whose mothers had greeted them as “avengers of 
Kosovo”.  
Munich, as stated, is largely confined to the realms of political speech; the political speech 
of power holders, often facing a crisis or, – and this is significant – often causing a crisis. 
5.3 Structural comparison 
Is one then justified in comparing Kosovo and Munich?  
On one level, the two overlap in the diplomacy of the Kosovo war of 1999, one can argue 
that Madeline Albright’s Munich Moment, gave Milošević his Kosovo Moment, leading 
his country against overwhelming forces. 
On another level, that is, a simple structural/functional level, one can observe a 
resemblance between the contents of the two myths, their triadic structure. It is worth 
requiting Lincoln’s argument that “a taxonomy that forces us to separate narratives so 
similar in form and structure…..surely serves us ill as an analytic tool.”417 If one looks at 
the structure of the two narratives, one notes symmetries: 
 
  
                                                 
417 Lincoln, 1989, 11. 
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            Lazar  
                   Son-in-law  Son-in-law 
          Obilić Accused of treason by        Brankovic 
Becomes hero               Commits treason 
 
Hero    Traitor Arch-enemy 
   
Obilić   Brankovic Murad 
Churchill Chamberlain Hitler 
 
To use the term “traitor” for Chamberlain is inexact and unjust; but certainly that is 
implied by authors like Leibovitz and Finkel (who argue that Chamberlain actively 
colluded with Hitler) and indeed with much of the “Guilty Men” school. Chamberlain did 
not change sides like a traitor, however he is seen as somehow an enabler of evil, not the 
exact equivalent of a traitor morally, but nonetheless a deeply repulsive figure, the one 
who brought the wolf to the door. Nonetheless this central figure, traitor or enabler, seems 
to be an essential component, and this is intriguing. Because in terms of factual accuracy, 
we know that Vuk Brankovic was not a traitor, and one can point out that – however 
misguided his actions seem in cosy retrospect – Chamberlain was not alone in carrying out 
the policy of appeasement, and the policy was more popular than will ever be admitted 
afterwards.  
Brankovic was easily identified as a traitor for the simple reason that he survived a battle 
in which the other leaders died. By contrasting symmetry, Chamberlain was so easily 
defamed for the very reason that he died (having remained in government until forced to 
retire due to illness) in 1940.  
Theoreticians of myth like Barthes and Lincoln have stressed myth’s connotative aspect, 
and this certainly comes into play during usages of Munich; politicians (see the speech of 
George W. Bush quoted in section 4.9.1) who use Churchillian rhetoric are not only 
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associating and aligning themselves with the British wartime Prime Minister, but they are 
also “proving” themselves the opposite of Chamberlain. Conversely, a politician who 
accuses an opponent of appeasement is promoting himself to Churchill’s role, a hero not a 
compromiser. It would be an amusing game if it were not so dangerous.  
But it is dangerous, and seeming deep-rooted. The pairing is seemingly very compelling. 
Noted in the simple table above was the traitor/hero pairing. Certainly others could be 
added; Ganelon and Charlemagne as told by Roland, and – most famously – Judas and 
Jesus (who served as quite explicit models for Brankovic and Lazar). To say that these 
pairings are Biblical is not entirely satisfactory; as though the Bible was cultural bedrock 
and there was nothing prior to it. One can at least argue that the symmetry is moral, and/or 
psychological, even and/or aesthetic. Trivial as the last category may sound, one can quote 
Richard Wollheim: 
It seems natural to me that art is more deeply rooted in human nature than 
morality, and I am surprised by the fact that philosophers make little of the 
fact, that though good art is more likeable than bad art, virtuous people do not 
enjoy this same advantage over those to whom we are drawn primarily for 
their charm, their gaiety, or their sweetness of nature, or their 
outrageousness.418 
Surely the appeal of these pairings – and narratives that embody such pairings – is the 
sense of moral navigation they offer, their clarity.  
However, where both cases are most worthy of comparison is their extraordinary degree to 
which they have been sought after to supply political legitimacy. The twin wells of 
political authority seem vast; the archetypical figures have become paradigmatic. In this, 
both are master narratives.  
                                                 
418 Wollheim, Richard, The Mind and its Depths” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993, Preface. 
 
 
 
 
178 
5. 2 “Everyone has their own madness” 
In his book on Serbia, veteran historian Stephan Pavlowitch makes a “Plea for Saint Guy” 
(that is, Saint Guido, the Saint Vitus of Vidovdan) and asks that perhaps he should finally 
get some time off (and, by implication, Serbia therefore get a healthier breed of politics). 
Admittedly, Pavlowitch was writing during the despair of the Milošević years, and things 
have improved since then (although writing in 2013, the jury is certainly still out, certainly 
as regards to Serbia’s willingness to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence).  
Bogdan Bogdanovic (1922-2010) sculptor and one-time mayor of Belgrade once stated in 
an interview that “everyone has their own madness, their own Kosovo.”419 Perhaps not 
everyone, but other peoples have also had to deal with the weight of painful historical 
experience.  
The Polish journalist Magda Jelonkiewicz, the grand-niece of a victim of the Katyn 
massacre, wrote of the Smolensk plane crash that killed President Kaczyński (and many 
other prominent Poles on their way to a Katyn remembrance ceremony): “On hearing the 
news, I thought it just couldn’t be true. ‘Why is it happening to us? Are we cursed as a 
nation?’ I wondered.” 
And there it was. I had fallen victim to the stereotypical perception of Poland. 
Our history’s pages are written with heroic deaths. As children, we were taught 
that Poland’s suffering would help to redeem the sins of the evil world. 
The idea of being a victim cemented us as a nation. However, I think it is 
dangerous to fall into the trap of old-fashioned thinking and view the crash in 
terms of yet another sacrifice. 
Yet for all her desire to be free of the traumatic past, Jelonkiewicz still concludes; “If we 
have erased our battles, heroic deaths, regimes and uprisings from our national memory – 
what are we left with?”420 
For many Serbs, the loss of Kosovo (now actualised by Kosovo’s independence) means a 
similar reckoning: “If we have erased our battles, heroic deaths, regimes and uprisings 
                                                 
419 Novi List, February 24, 2005. 
420 The Irish Times, April 15, 2010. 
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from our national memory – what are we left with?” (It is hoped that the above study 
offers evidence of how formidable such a reckoning will be).  
However, one must point out that Kosovo only belonged to Serbia from 1912 until 1999 
(when it became an international protectorate and de facto independent state) and even not 
fully for all of that period (if one factors in the occupation regimes of the Second World 
War).  
Political myths can sometimes fall out of use (especially if replaced by another, as 
happened in the case of Masada, when it was securely institutionalised but then displaced 
by the Holocaust). The Kosovo Myth may now be losing its instrumental value; Duijzings 
writing in 2000 stated that “The myth has been discredited by those who have utilised and 
manipulated it most.”421 That said, and it is hoped that this thesis had offered evidence; 
political myths can be easily and unexpectedly revived (as was Joan of Arc when 
circumstances suited).  
In the same spirit (as with Pavlowitch pleading for poor Guido), one might ask that our 
own madness, that is, Munich be ditched, and ask our contemporary statesmen and 
stateswomen to legitimise their actions on merit, not on the borrowed authority of the past.  
5.3 To horrify and fascinate 
Hans Keller – quoted above –has written about how aspects of the past are imaginative 
ventures, which may horrify but compel, betraying as he puts it “a desire to repeat in the 
imagination happenings and events that horrify and fascinate.” He continues:  
Both fictional and historical representations are dreamlike in that they express 
some sort of desire, in all the complexity of that term. The pressing need to 
represent the Holocaust in poetry, novels, films, drama, and history must come 
from a desire to repeat in the imagination happenings and events that horrify 
and fascinate. We only represent what we desire. The desire to represent the 
Holocaust however, is not the desire to repeat it as an event, nor necessarily 
                                                 
421 Duijzings, 205. 
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the desire to repeat the form-giving pleasure of representation itself; rather, it 
is a desire to repeat the Holocaust in a suitably altered form to meet complex, 
often contradictory, sets of present needs.422  
The important caveat however, is that the desire is to repeat the event, but to repeat it in a 
suitable altered form. This is almost a perfect diagnosis for the fixation with Munich, and 
by implications, the war it failed to prevent.  
“We do not draw the moral lessons we might from history” wrote Edmund Burke. He 
went to argue:  
…seldom have two ages the same fashion in their pretexts and the same mode 
of mischief. Wickedness is a little more inventive. Whilst you are discussing 
fashion, the fashion is gone by….you are terrifying yourself with ghost and 
apparitions, while your house is the haunt of robbers.423  
It had been argued above that the many evocations of Munich seem to betray an 
immaturity, a form of wishful thinking that seems longs for chance to do what was not 
done in 1938. But that can never happen; “the fashion is gone by”.  
But given the huge moral appeal of Munich, and the endless appeal of the Second World 
War as a legitimacy source, I fear we may be stuck with it until something better replaces 
it; or perhaps something even worse. 
 
 
                                                 
422 In Fay et al., (eds.), 226.  
423 Burke, 1968 (1790), 247-8. 
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